Gubernatorial Executive Orders Under the Michigan Constitution of 1963

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I. Introduction

The power to act unilaterally by executive order is perhaps the broadest administrative tool that Michigan’s governors possesses under the Michigan Constitution of 1963. Functioning as legal, policy and political tools, executive orders have been increasingly used by Michigan governors over the past four decades to exercise control over the executive branch and to enhance political power. However, despite the broad implications of Michigan’s governors’ ability to act by executive order, Michigan’s citizens’ public awareness, much less understanding, of this power is extremely limited.

The lack of public knowledge of Michigan’s governors’ ability to act by executive order is compounded by the fact that the scope and the boundaries of this power are often defined in a limited fashion, if at all. Although limited illustrations of the power exist in case law and in commentaries examining the powers of other state governors, no authoritative reference detailing the executive order powers of Michigan’s governors has been advanced until now. Therefore, in order to contribute to the public understanding of the system by which it is governed and the individuals who operate within that system, this article will detail the historical development of gubernatorial executive order powers in Michigan, and serve as a reference regarding the scope of the governor’s ability to act by executive order.

Part II of this article presents background information on of executive orders, including the executive power of governors, the historical origin of gubernatorial executive orders; the general types of executive orders; and the typical form of executive orders. Part III examines the historical development of gubernatorial executive orders in Michigan, focusing on the weakness of the governor under the 1908 Constitution, the 1961 Constitutional Convention, and the implementation of the 1963 Constitution. Finally, Part IV sets forth the current scope of the
Governor’s executive order powers, including rules of construction and interpretation, constitutional bases of power traditionally cited in executive orders, and constitutional bases of power not traditionally cited in executive orders; and concludes by examining the governor’s inherent authority to act by executive order as the chief executive.

II. Background

A. Gubernatorial Executive Power

Three classes of governors exist in the United States: state, territorial, and military. A state governor is the chief executive officer of one of the states, a territorial governor is the chief executive officer of a territory, and a military governor is the chief executive officer of a state, who is appointed by the President during a time of war when the civil authority of the state cannot be maintained.1

Generally, the people of a state vest the supreme executive power of the state in a governor via the state’s constitution. The people of the State of Michigan have vested the executive power of Michigan’s state government in the governor under Article 5, section 1 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963 which provides, “[t]he executive power is vested in the governor.” Thus, the Governor is the chief executive of the State of Michigan.

As the highest executive authority in the state, the office of governor is “one of high dignity in which the people have a paramount interest.”2 The governor of a state represents all of the people in the performance of his or her duties, and those acts that are authorized become binding on all citizens of that state.3 However, the actual exercise of gubernatorial power is highly prescribed. The office of governor is a constitutional office with powers delegated by the people, and as a result, a governor does not exist under common law or possess common law
powers. Since the governor is a mere executive officer, her general authority is narrowly limited by the constitution of the state. Accordingly:

The governor has no prerogative powers, but possesses only those powers and duties as are vested in [her] by constitutional grant or by statutory grant. The extent and exercise of the governor’s powers under statute will depend on the particular provisions thereof, and [her] duties under statutory provisions are circumscribed by the terms of the legislation; but in acting or failing to act in [her] official capacity the governor is always subject to constitutional limitations. Generally, the duties of the governor may be limited to those imposed on [her] by the constitution, but it has also been held that the legislature may require the governor to perform duties other than those specified in the constitution.

Nevertheless, a constitutional grant of supreme executive power implies the power necessary to secure the efficient and fair execution of the law, so long as that power is exercised within constitutional and statutory limitations.

A governor bears the same relation to a state as the President does to the federal government, and a governor is normally entitled to the same immunities, privileges and exemptions in the discharge of gubernatorial duties. Thus, in practical terms, a governor receives her power only through legislative enactment or by constitutional provision, and the governor cannot alter, expand, or diminish that power. Correspondingly, the legislature of a state may not interfere with a state governor’s exercise of gubernatorial powers that are granted by a state’s constitution.

B. Historical Origin of Gubernatorial Executive Orders

Although the presidential power to issue executive orders was first utilized by George Washington, state governors typically did not begin to use gubernatorial executive orders until after the presidential terms of Andrew Jackson. Gubernatorial executive orders generally arose as an indirect result of the Jacksonian era fractionalization of state executive branches and the proliferation of elective state administrative offices. Although initially afforded a weak status vis-à-vis state legislatures in the early years of the republic, state governors were gradually able
to use the growth of the independence and prestige of their offices to increase their power through developments such as direct popular election of the governor, extended terms in office, the reintroduction of the gubernatorial veto (albeit in qualified form) and the decline of public confidence in the effectiveness of the legislature as the chief mechanism of state government.\textsuperscript{12}

However, even as the powers of state governors increased, governors found these increases mitigated by the rise in the number of independent or semi-independent state agencies corresponding with the increasing number of functions in which the state engaged.\textsuperscript{13} Governors often found themselves left with little, if any, real control over independent and semi-independent agencies, as oversight of these agencies often reposed only in the state legislature.\textsuperscript{14} Initially, state functions were limited, so the rise of so many autonomous agencies presented little problem.\textsuperscript{15} But as state services, state employees, and, most importantly, state expenditures began to increase exponentially in the twentieth century, governors’ relative lack of control over so many areas of state government began to present increasing problems.\textsuperscript{16} Ultimately, many governors started to advocate a strengthening of their power in order to exercise general control over all or most state administrative functions.\textsuperscript{17}

Initially, states sought to achieve such a result through consolidation of the numerous independent and semi-independent agencies.\textsuperscript{18} Other attempted solutions included the substitution of appointed agency heads for independently elected individuals and fiscal reforms granting governors powers in the areas of budget preparation and execution.\textsuperscript{19} However, no one solution proved to be a panacea to the problems of effectively administering state government.\textsuperscript{20} Thus, states began to increasingly see the gubernatorial power to issue executive orders as an effective manner in which to solve the problems of controlling and administering state government.\textsuperscript{21}
C. Types of Gubernatorial Executive Orders

In granting governors the power to issue executive orders, states have recognized that two of the most potent managerial tools to effectively administer state government include the power to direct, and the power to remove.22 Although removal powers generally depend on some constitutional or statutory authority, the power to direct is often poorly defined, if specified at all in state constitutions.23 Some states provide for a gubernatorial ordinance power or a general power of executive order by constitution or statute, but clear parameters are often omitted, making the scope of such power subject to controversy.

Nevertheless in jurisdictions recognizing such powers, whether by common law, constitution or statute, executive orders are generally classified in one of three categories: (1) ceremonial and political proclamations, (2) gubernatorial ordinances, and (3) orders for administrative direction and control.24 However, although the bulk of executive orders fall within these three categories, they are neither exhaustive, nor mutually exclusive: some executive orders resist being classified into neat analytical divisions.25

1. Ceremonial and Political Proclamations

Ceremonial and political proclamations are generally proclamations establishing special days or weeks.26 Governors often issue these proclamations for the purpose of recognizing contributions to society by organizations or individuals, memorializing individuals or events, commemorating important dates, and raising awareness of societal problems.27 Although gubernatorial proclamations are usually issued under the great seal of the state and over the governor’s signature, and published or proclaimed to the public at large, they may convey legal effect or only ceremonial significance.28
2. Gubernatorial Ordinances

Gubernatorial ordinances are regulations or ordinances which “affect the public at large, generally have the force of law, and serve to implement or supplement the constitution and laws of the state.” Such regulations or ordinances are usually issued pursuant to statutory authority granted by the legislature or pursuant to specific or general constitutional authority. Additionally, some governors have attempted to issue gubernatorial regulations or ordinances in order to effectuate the constitution itself, although such attempts may run the risk of being deemed unconstitutional under a separation of powers analysis as a usurpation of the policy-making prerogative of the legislature. Gubernatorial ordinances generally possess the same characteristics and are grounded in the same legal bases as orders for administrative direction and control. Thus, courts usually examine the applicability of gubernatorial ordinances in light of the precedents controlling orders for administrative direction and control.

3. Orders for Administrative Direction and Control

Orders for administrative direction and control consolidate administrative power in the governor and operate as instruments of executive authority. The form and style of such orders varies from state to state and from governor to governor, based on factors such as the subject matter within the order; the objects to which the order is directed; the goal or desired result of the order; the express or implied consequences for noncompliance with the order; and the legal bases upon which the order is issued. Orders for administrative direction and control may generally fall anywhere on a spectrum between discretionary orders that merely request a course of action or result, and mandatory orders that dictate the specific course of action and result desired. Furthermore, in addition to making use of the governor’s power to direct, mandatory orders may also effectuate the governor’s removal power as a consequence of noncompliance.
Thus, of the five previously mentioned factors which determine the ultimate form of an order for administrative direction and control, the most important factor may be the legal base or bases upon which the order is issued, for those bases usually determine what other factors may also be implicated.\textsuperscript{38}

D. Form of Gubernatorial Executive Orders

Gubernatorial executive orders generally resemble other types of law and are relatively uniform in structure from one to another.\textsuperscript{39} Most executive orders are usually composed of four distinct parts. The first part usually contains paragraphs starting with “whereas,” followed by a statement of the legal bases upon which the governor is issuing the order. This part will usually contain a clause stating the location of the constitutional and statutory authority for the order (if applicable), as well as a statement illustrating the particular relevance of that authority to the immediate situation.\textsuperscript{40} Sometimes this part is also used to make broad political statements or pronouncements on issues unrelated to the order or outside of the governor’s ability to directly affect by executive order.\textsuperscript{41}

The second part of an executive order generally contains clauses also beginning with the word “whereas,” but these clauses detail the specific context of the order. An order will generally contain of number of these clauses stating the nature of the situation, why or how the situation arose, and why the governor needs to issue an executive order in relation to the situation.\textsuperscript{42}

The third part of an executive order often contains a statement of direction by the governor. This statement is the substance of the order,\textsuperscript{43} and it details the specific actions the governor requires to be taken and the timetable by which they are to be completed. “The length
of this section depends upon the nature and complexity of the order itself and may range from a single paragraph to a number of pages."

Finally, the fourth part of an executive order is usually composed of formalities relating to the filing of the order itself, such as the date of issue, the signature of the issuing governor, the seal of the state where the order was issued, and the signature of the secretary of state who affixed the seal and files the order.

III. Historical Development of Gubernatorial Executive Orders in Michigan

A. The Weak Executive under the 1908 Constitution

Like many other states, the State of Michigan historically has found itself forced to deal with the problems inherent in a weak chief executive. The Michigan Constitution of 1908 reflects the Jacksonian era fractionalization of the executive branch. Conservative Republicans had dominated the 1907 constitutional convention, resisting wholesale change, and the 1908 constitution ultimately represented little more than a reorganization and slight expansion of the Michigan Constitution of 1850.45

By the late 1950’s, the state faced unresolved fiscal problems, controversy over legislative apportionment, and weakness in the executive branch with regard to the legislature.46 In 1961 the executive branch contained approximately 130 different state administrative agencies, boards, commissions and departments.47 These problems led rapidly to a growing sense that the only solution to the problems in state government was a complete overhaul of the entire governmental structure.48

However, although the Michigan Constitution of 1908 contained provisions making it relatively easy to amend, wholesale revision of the constitution was somewhat difficult.49 Under
the 1908 Constitution, the question of a new constitutional convention was put before the voters only once every 16 years. Otherwise, a new constitutional convention could only be called if ratified by a majority of the total votes cast in an election. Nevertheless, although this requirement proved to be an overwhelming obstacle to wholesale revision, it was ultimately surmounted by a constitutional amendment in 1960, and in April of 1961 a majority of voters approved a referendum calling a constitutional convention. Thereafter, Michigan voters chose 144 delegates in September 1961 to draft a new constitution.

B. The Constitutional Convention of 1961

The delegates to the constitutional convention assembled on October 3, 1961 in Lansing and set to work immediately. One of the main focuses of the convention was the re-organization and the strengthening of the executive branch. In the words of one delegate:

[I]n the last 20 or 25 or 30 years, the number of state boards, agencies, departments, authorities, commissions and so on has increased and increased without any relation to any kind of logical structure. There is absolutely no thyme or reason to the structure of the state government… [R]eorganization is a must if the governor is to have a structure of government such that he can maintain contact with the heads of his principal departments in such a way as to not only know what is going on but to be able to give some supervision and direction to the functioning of state government.

Completing their work on August 1, 1962, the delegates ultimately agreed to provide for a stronger governor in the interest of administrative efficiency. The most emblematic change from the constitution of 1908 was the elimination of the adjective “chief” when describing the executive power vested in the governor. The adjective had been interpreted as a limitation on the governor’s power, and as such was discarded so the language would properly reflect the “major responsibility the governor bears for the executive branch.”

The delegates also extended the governor’s term of office to four years in order to lessen the concern of the immediate political consequences of gubernatorial action, and set
gubernatorial elections in years in which no presidential election was to take place in order to reduce the likelihood that national political issues would intrude into the election of the state’s chief executive. Additionally, the delegates agreed to provide for the consolidation of almost all state agencies into a maximum of 20 departments, most headed by single executives appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the senate.

Finally, the delegates agreed to grant the governor specifically enumerated powers that had not appeared in the 1908 constitution, such as the power to re-organize the executive branch according to his discretion; the power to establish temporary commissions existing independently of the 20 departments specified in section 2; the power to initiate court proceedings to enforce compliance with any constitutional or legislative mandate; and the power to reduce expenditures from appropriations under certain circumstances.

Thus, although certain constraints were placed on the use of some powers, the governor was granted wide authority to administrate the state as he saw fit. On April 1, 1963, a majority of Michigan voters agreed and ratified the Michigan Constitution of 1963.

C. Implementation of the 1963 Constitution

1. 1964 to 1991: Governors Romney, Milliken and Blanchard

After its successful ratification in April, 1963, the Michigan Constitution of 1963 entered into effect on January 1, 1964. The first governor to serve under the new constitution was George Romney. Governor Romney served from 1963 to 1969 and began issuing executive orders in 1964. However, Governor Romney issued these first executive orders solely pursuant to his emergency powers. In these orders Governor Romney began the practice in Michigan of issuing a proclamation declaring a state of emergency or disaster, and then issuing a separate executive order on the basis of that proclamation.
In 1965, Governor Romney began issuing more executive orders on a further variety of subjects. In addition to executive orders pursuant to his emergency powers, Romney issued executive orders pursuant to his power to create temporary commissions, his power to suspend or remove state officers, his power to re-organize the executive branch, and his supervisory powers as the chief executive officer. These orders set forth what was to become the typical structure of executive orders in Michigan: “whereas” clauses setting forth the governor’s authority to issue the order, followed by a statement of the action intended by the governor, as well as the intended results.

Governor Romney also began issuing other types of executive orders in the form of documents titled “executive directives,” establishing the precedent in Michigan whereby gubernatorial executive orders issued in Michigan under the 1963 Constitution are formally designated as “Executive Orders,” “Executive Directives,” or “Proclamations.” Although Michigan’s gubernatorial Executive Orders, Directives and Proclamations are all executive orders in the broad sense of the term, for the sake of clarity, this article will hereinafter refer to executive orders in their broad sense as “executive orders,” while any examples of “Executive Orders,” “Executive Directives,” or “Proclamations” will refer specifically to the documents officially titled as such when issued by Michigan governors. Furthermore, “Executive Re-organization Orders” will refer to any Executive Orders that re-organize the executive branch, even though such Orders are officially designated “Executive Orders.”

Executive Directives, while generally regarded as executive orders in the broad sense, differ from Michigan gubernatorial Executive Orders in that Executive Directives are often illustrations of the governor’s administrative authority and are aimed almost exclusively at subordinates in the executive branch. Executive Directives are usually official, written
communications of the internal governing policies of the Governor to members of her cabinet and senior staff. The purpose of Executive Directives is to state clearly and concisely the governor’s expectation of the policies, practices and procedures various departments, agencies and senior staff of the governor will uniformly follow during the governor’s tenure. Although Executive Directives may stand alone, in some instances they may also act as a companion to Executive Orders, giving clarification to particular departments as to their responsibility in carrying out an Executive Order.\textsuperscript{73}

Additionally, Michigan governors may also generally use an Executive Directive to accomplish a purpose that could be achieved just as well through an Executive Order.\textsuperscript{74} Although not usually the case, one reason for doing so may be to protect the Executive Directive from any possible interference by the legislature. As will be examined later, Article 5, section 2 of the 1963 Constitution authorizes the governor to re-organize the executive branch. Similarly, Article 5, section 8 authorizes the governor to supervise the executive branch. One major difference between these two provisions is that section 2 grants the legislature a veto over gubernatorial actions taken pursuant to that section, while section 8 does not.

If an Executive Order is issued with regards to the executive branch, members of the legislature might interpret that Order as having been issued pursuant to Article 5, section 2, and accordingly, those legislators might attempt to exercise their constitutional veto power under section 2 to block the measure. Conversely, an Executive Directive that accomplishes the same result will more likely be interpreted as having been issued pursuant to Article 5, section 8, thus denying the legislature the opportunity to to interfere with the governor’s action.\textsuperscript{75}

When William G. Milliken succeeded Romney as governor, he continued to issue Executive Orders, Executive Directives and Proclamations in the same manner Governor
Romney had begun. However, as his term of office drew on, Governor Milliken began to make further use of the gubernatorial power to re-organize the executive branch. Although tentative at first, Governor Milliken’s Executive Re-organization Orders began gradually to evolve in both the complexity and the number of subjects they embraced. Additionally, as the state slumped through two back-to-back recessions in the 1970’s, Governor Milliken became the first Michigan governor to utilize his constitutional power to reduce appropriations, issuing his first Executive Order reducing appropriations in 1970, and continuing to periodically issue similar Executive Orders reducing appropriations over the next twelve years.

Governor James J. Blanchard, Governor Milliken’s successor, also continued to issue Executive Orders, Directives and Proclamations in the same style Governor Romney had established. Governor Blanchard took office in 1983 facing a $1.7 billion budget deficit and a nationwide recession. Not surprisingly, Governor Blanchard appears to have issued a number of his initial Executive Orders in reaction to the state of the economy, as most of them deal with job creation and budget reduction. However, overall, Governor Blanchard’s orders broke little ground from those of his predecessors. Thus, when Governor Blanchard left office on January 1, 1991, the boundaries of the legal status, form and substance of Michigan’s gubernatorial executive orders seemed fairly well settled.

2. 1991 to 2004: Governors Engler and Granholm

Nonetheless, after Governor John M. Engler assumed office, any individuals who believed that Michigan’s first three governors under the 1963 Constitution had reached the limit of their gubernatorial executive order powers realized their mistake. Although, Governor Engler stayed within the framework established by Governor Romney in many respects, Governor Engler vastly increased the use of Executive Re-organization Orders, both in terms of the
number issued, as well as the scope of the objects embraced. For example, during his first year in office, Governor Engler issued 26 Executive Re-organization Orders.\(^85\) In contrast, Governor Milliken had issued only eight Executive Re-organization Orders in 1973, the calendar year that had previously seen the issuance of the most Executive Re-organization Orders.\(^86\) Through the use of Executive Re-organization Orders, and subsequent court decisions upholding this use, Governor Engler was able to establish in the governor a self-executing quasi-legislative authority over the executive branch, giving him the power to create, abolish or transfer entities, powers and functions as he saw fit.\(^87\)

Thus, when Jennifer M. Granholm\(^88\) assumed the office of Governor, she inherited the precedent with respect to most powers set by Governor Romney, as well as the expansive re-organization authority secured to the office by Governor Engler. During her first year in office, Governor Granholm issued “executive orders,” under her supervisory powers relating to two ethics measures;\(^89\) created eight temporary commissions or agencies;\(^90\) acted four times under her emergency powers;\(^91\) re-organized the executive branch twice;\(^92\) and ordered two expenditure reductions.\(^93\) Additionally, she also issued 25 executive directives establishing guidelines and procedures for members of the executive branch to follow.\(^94\)

IV. Scope of Gubernatorial Executive Order Powers under the 1963 Constitution

A. Rules of Construction and Interpretation

Michigan’s governors possess only those powers granted to them by the state constitution.\(^95\) Consequently, gubernatorial executive orders in Michigan must be issued pursuant to at least one provision of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, whether or not the specific provision is explicitly stated in the order itself or implied therein. As the validity and
effect of an executive order stems from constitutional provisions, the meaning ascribed to those provisions is of critical importance. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has developed a number of guidelines for interpreting the 1963 Constitution.

The primary rule of constitutional construction in Michigan is the rule of the “common understanding” of the purpose and intent of the people who adopted the provision at issue. The intent to be determined is that of the people who adopted the constitutional provision at issue. Intent should be determined by reference to the state of the law or custom previously existing, and by contemporaneous construction, rather than by reference to the changed views of the present day. Thus, a court should place itself in the position of the framers to ascertain what was meant at the time the provision was adopted. To that end, both the "Address to the People" and the convention debates may be consulted.

However, debates which took place in constitutional convention committees must be placed in perspective; they are individual expressions of concepts as the speakers perceive them and, although they are sometimes illuminating, affording a sense of direction, they are not decisive as to intent of the general convention or of the people in adopting the measures; committee debates will be looked to only in the absence of guidance in constitutional language as well as in the "Address to the People" or when court finds in the debates a recurring thread of explanation binding together the whole of a constitutional concept.

Notably, in examining the constitutional debates, the Supreme Court has held that where “provided by law” is used in a constitutional provision, the drafters intended that the legislature should do the entire job of implementing that provision. Conversely, the term “prescribed by law” indicates that the section itself provides the overall plan for its own implementation, and the legislature is delegated only the power to specify certain details. Additionally, in construing
statutory language, the Supreme Court must independently determine the meaning of all constitutional terms, even if they have been defined by the statute.\textsuperscript{103}

Furthermore, the Supreme Court has also set forth three general rules to use in interpreting the meaning of gubernatorial executive orders issued under the 1963 Constitution.\textsuperscript{104} First, the executive intends the meaning that is clearly expressed and an unambiguous executive order does not need interpretation.\textsuperscript{105} Second, the corollary of the first rule is that every word, sentence and section of the order should be given effect, if possible.\textsuperscript{106} Finally, if the meaning of an executive order is in doubt, the interpretation given by the agency administering it is persuasive as to the meaning of the order unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the order.\textsuperscript{107}

\textbf{B. Constitutional Bases of Power Traditionally Cited in Executive Orders}

Thus, today, a consistent pattern has developed with respect to the powers implicated by gubernatorial executive orders. As seen earlier, the Executive Orders, Executive Directives, and Proclamations that Governors Romney, Milliken, Blanchard, Engler and Granholm issued during their terms all generally fall within one of six broad categories of powers authorized by constitutional and statutory authority. Therefore, the following section will further illustrate these powers in order to better understand their basis and the scope.

\textbf{1. Temporary or Special Commissions Power}

The most ubiquitous traditional category of executive power used to authorize gubernatorial executive orders is the power to appoint temporary or special commissions. The most obvious example of this power is set forth in Article 5, section 4 of the 1963 Constitution. This section provides that, “[t]emporary commissions or agencies for special purposes with a life
of no more than two years may be established by law and need not be allocated within a principal
department.”

The language referring to “a principal department,” refers to Article 5, section 2, which
states, in part:

All executive and administrative offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the
executive branch of state government and their respective functions, powers and
duties, except for the office of governor and lieutenant governor and the
governing bodies of institutions of higher education provided for in this
constitution, shall be allocated by law among and within not more than 20
principal departments. They shall be grouped as far as practicable according to
major purposes.

Section 2 requires that the approximately 130 various state administrative agencies,
boards, commissions, and departments existing when the 1963 Constitution entered into effect be
grouped together according to their major purposes in no more than twenty principle
departments, not including the offices of the governor and lieutenant governor, and the
governing bodies of state colleges and universities. Accordingly, under section 4, the governor
may establish temporary commissions or agencies that exist independently of any other state
departments organized pursuant to section 2, and these temporary commissions may only exist
for two years from their date of creation. Although this section has never been specifically
interpreted by the courts, any interpretation would likely correspond to the plain meaning of the
constitutional provision.

However, the governor’s power to form temporary or special commissions is not limited
to those set forth in section 4. Sections 1, and 8 of Article 5, have also served in conjunction as a
basis for the governor to appoint temporary or special commissions. Section 1, a carryover
from the 1908 Constitution, provides that: “[t]he executive power is vested in the
governor.” Section 8, which is also carried over from the 1908 Constitution, provides that:
Each principal department shall be under the supervision of the governor unless otherwise provided by this constitution. The governor shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed. He shall transact all necessary business with the officers of government and may require information in writing from all executive and administrative state officers, elective and appointive, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices.114

These sections, respectively, vest the governor with executive and supervisory power over the executive branch. Although limited by section 2 (any temporary or special commissions created pursuant to sections 1 and 8 must fall within the departments mandated by section 2, as opposed to section 4 which allows for temporary or special commissions independent of those departments), sections 1 and 8 appear to grant the governor an inherent ability to appoint temporary or special commissions anywhere within the executive branch, be they in the executive office itself, or in any other department mandated under the Executive Organization Act of 1965.115

Correspondingly, the governor’s constitutional ability to create special commissions under sections 1 and 8 has been recognized by the state legislature. For example, in 1931 the state legislature enacted the Special Commissions act.116 Under this act, the governor may create special commissions of unlimited duration at any time, for any purpose she deems necessary or advisable, consisting of as many members she deems appropriate.117 However, any special commissions created under this act must fall within the executive office of the governor.118

Additionally, the legislature has also recognized the governor’s authority to create temporary or special commissions within the other departments mandated by Article 5, section 2. In 1978, the legislature enacted the Base Conversion Authority act,119 which allows the governor, upon notification by the federal government that a federal military installation in Michigan is to be closed, and upon resolution by the local township authority with jurisdiction over the area of the military installation requesting the establishment of a base conversion
authority, to issue an Executive Order to create a base conversion authority within the Department of Labor and Economic Growth.\textsuperscript{120}  

Finally, the governor’s inherent authority to create special or temporary commissions has also been recognized by the United States Congress. A number of federal statutes delegate the authority to state governors to implement those federal statutes by gubernatorial executive order, and Michigan governors have done so.\textsuperscript{121} Although the propriety of such delegations may be questioned under the concept of federalism, no gubernatorial Executive Orders issued in Michigan pursuant to these statutes have yet been challenged in the courts.

2. Emergency Powers

A second frequently used traditional category of power is the governor’s emergency powers. Although emergencies on their own do not create power or authority in a governor, they may afford occasions for the exercise of powers already existing.\textsuperscript{122} Executive orders issued pursuant to the emergency powers usually involve two steps. Under the first step, the governor invokes the emergency powers by declaring some type of disaster or emergency under her Article 5, section 1, executive authority. The legislature has delegated the governor the ability to declare a state of emergency or disaster under section 1 in three different ways: the Emergency Management Act,\textsuperscript{123} the Emergency Powers of the Governor act,\textsuperscript{124} and the Declaration of State of Energy Emergency Act.\textsuperscript{125}

The Emergency Management Act is a broad grant of authority that delegates responsibility to the governor to cope with dangers to the state or its people in a time of emergency. The act allows the governor to proclaim a state of emergency or disaster through Executive Orders, Directives or Proclamations carrying the force of law.\textsuperscript{126} Such declarations
continue to exist for 28 days, at which point they automatically terminate unless both houses of the legislature, by resolution, approve of a request by the governor for an extension.\textsuperscript{127}

Additionally any Executive Order, Directive, or Proclamation declaring a state of emergency or disaster must state the nature of the threat, the areas threatened, the conditions causing the threat, and the conditions that would allow the state of emergency or disaster to terminate.\textsuperscript{128} Such an order must be filed with the Secretary of State and the State Police and disseminated promptly in order to bring it to the public’s attention.\textsuperscript{129} Furthermore, any order declaring a state of emergency or disaster under the Emergency Management Act also authorizes the governor to deploy any supplies stockpiled pursuant to the act; accept assistance from the federal government; or enter into reciprocal aid agreements with other states, the federal government, or a neighboring state or province of another country.\textsuperscript{130} Two examples of such agreements are the Interstate Emergency Management Assistance Compact; Equipment,\textsuperscript{131} and the Interstate Emergency Management Assistance Compact; Personnel.\textsuperscript{132}

The Emergency Management Act also empowers the governor to suspend regulatory statutes, orders or rules (excluding those related to the criminal process or criminal procedures) when compliance would hinder or delay necessary action; utilize all available state and federal resources as reasonably necessary; transfer department functions; commandeer private property; direct and compel evacuations; prescribe modes of ingress or egress for evacuations; limit or suspend the sale of alcohol, tobacco, firearms, explosives, and combustibles; provide for temporary emergency housing; and direct all other actions necessary or appropriate.\textsuperscript{133} Furthermore, the act states that anyone who willfully disobeys an order related to the aforementioned powers is guilty of a misdemeanor.\textsuperscript{134}
Finally, the Emergency Management Act also authorizes the governor to declare a heightened state of alert in order to prevent terrorist acts or apprehend terrorists. Under this section of the act, the governor is afforded the same powers as in the event of a state of emergency or disaster, except that she may not limit the sale of alcohol. Furthermore, a heightened state of alert lasts 60 days, rather than 28, but may also be extended pursuant to the approval of both houses of the legislature.

The second legislatively delegated gubernatorial authority to declare a state of emergency or disaster under Article 5, section 1 is the Emergency Powers of the Governor act. This act grants the governor broad powers strikingly similar to those granted under the Emergency Management Act. Moreover, the Emergency Powers of the Governor act explicitly states its intent to give the governor broad power to act, as well as the requirement that the act be broadly construed.

The third statute that authorizes the governor to invoke her emergency powers is the Declaration of State of Energy Emergency Act. Under this act, the governor can declare, by Executive Order, or Proclamation, a state of energy emergency. An energy emergency is a condition of danger to the health, safety, or welfare of the citizens of the state due to an impending or present energy shortage. A state of energy emergency continues for 90 days, or until the governor finds the emergency has passed – whichever is shorter – and the legislature may approve an extension for a specific number of days, or terminate the state of energy emergency by a concurrent resolution adopted by a record roll call vote by a majority of the members elected to and serving in each house of the legislature.

Once the governor declares a state of energy emergency, she may order specific restrictions on the use and sale of energy resources, including restrictions on the interior
temperature of public, commercial, industrial, and school buildings; restrictions on the hours of
the day in which those buildings may be open; restrictions on the lighting levels in those
buildings; restrictions on the conditions for sale of energy resources to consumers; restrictions on
the display of decorative lighting; restrictions on the use of privately owned vehicles and the
reduction of speed limits; restrictions on public transportation (including ordering facilities
closed); and restrictions on pupil transportation by public schools. The governor may also
direct energy suppliers to provide an energy resource to any person or facility that provides an
essential service for health, safety or welfare of state residents, and may suspend, by Executive
Order with specificity, a directly related regulatory statute (excluding those related to the
criminal process or criminal procedures) when compliance would hinder or delay any necessary
action.

If a state of energy emergency is declared, the governor may implement any of the
provisions of the act by executive order, directive or proclamation, and individuals who
knowingly violate such orders, directives or proclamations are subject to a misdemeanor. Additionally, a declaration of a state of energy emergency does not limit, modify, or abridge the
governor’s powers to declare state of emergency under the Emergency Management Act, or
interfere with any of the governor’s other constitutional or statutory powers.

Therefore, once the governor declares a state of emergency or disaster, she may then take
the second step involved in issuing an Executive Order pursuant to her emergency powers:
sending in elements of the state militia pursuant to her powers as commander in chief under
Article 5, section 12, which provides that, “[t]he governor shall be commander-in-chief of the
armed forces and may call them out to execute the laws, suppress insurrections and repel
invasion.” This provision reflects similar language from the 1908 Constitution, and it is
implemented by the Michigan Military Act, which states that the governor is commander in
chief of the militia, and may order any members of the organized or unorganized militia to
active state service in case of riot, tumult, breach of the peace, resistance of process, or for
service in aid of civil authority, whether state or federal, or in time of public danger, disaster,
crisis, catastrophe or other public emergency within the state.

Additionally, under the Michigan Military Act, the governor may enter into an agreement
with the governors of one or more other states authorizing the joint use of state military forces in
time of invasion, rebellion, public disaster, or catastrophe, or to assist with drug enforcement,
and may order Michigan military forces into another state in pursuit of insurrectionists,
saboteurs, enemies or enemy forces, in the event of war, or other declared emergency, until other
state or federal forces can take up the pursuit.

The governor may also order the organization, disbanding, arrangement, transfer,
conversion, alteration, consolidation, or attachment of units of the state military establishment;
declare martial law, when forces are deployed, in order to promote the maintenance of law and
order, promote officers and warrant officers of the organized militia; prescribe the awarding
of medals and public recognition for distinguished service, longevity, acts of valor or meritorious
achievement to members of the organized militia, or to other individuals who have rendered
appropriate service to the military establishment; and appoint a board of 3 national guard
officers, to inquire into and make recommendations for the payment of compensation, claims,
medical attention, hospital treatment, funeral expenses, and other expenses for a member of the
state military establishment injured, disabled, or killed during the performance of active state
service or special duty.
However, while the Governor is commander-in-chief of the militia, the governor’s ability to remove or otherwise discipline officers of the militia is unclear. In *McDonald v Schnipke*, the Supreme Court held that the governor may not remove or otherwise discipline officers of the militia.¹⁵⁹ However, *McDonald* was decided based upon Michigan law prior to the enactment of the Executive Organization Act of 1965,¹⁶⁰ which provides that the Adjutant General serves at the pleasure of the Governor. As a result, the Governor likely has authority to remove the Adjutant General, despite the holding in *McDonald*.

### 3. Budgetary Powers

The third category of gubernatorial power traditionally relied upon to issue executive orders is the governor’s power to reduce appropriations. This power, one of a number of broad budgetary powers granted to the governor under the 1963 Constitution,¹⁶¹ arises from Article 5, section 20, which states:

No appropriation shall be a mandate to spend. The governor, with the approval of the appropriating committees of the house and senate, shall reduce expenditures authorized by appropriations whenever it appears that actual revenues for a fiscal period will fall below the revenue estimates on which appropriations for that period were based. Reductions in expenditures shall be made in accordance with procedures prescribed by law.

This provision is new to the 1963 Constitution. It grants the governor power to control state expenditures in the interest of a balanced budget. The Michigan Constitution of 1963 requires a balanced state budget under Article 5, section 18, which provides: “[p]roposed expenditures from any fund shall not exceed the estimated revenue thereof;” and Article 6, section 31, which provides:

Any bill requiring an appropriation to carry out its purpose shall be considered an appropriation bill. One of the general appropriation bills as passed by the legislature shall contain an itemized statement of estimated revenue by major source in each operating fund for the ensuing fiscal period, the total of which shall
not be less than the total of all appropriations made from each fund in the general appropriation bills as passed.

Under Article 5, section 20, the governor, with the approval of the appropriations committees of each house of the legislature, must cut expenditures when economic indicators predict that actual revenues will fall short of estimated revenues. However, the governor cannot reduce expenditures of the legislature or the judiciary, or from funds created by the constitution and dedicated to a specific purpose.

This power has been implemented by the legislature through the Management and Budget Act, which authorizes the Governor to determine which appropriations to reduce to remedy the shortfall, and issue an Executive Order, subject to approval by the House and Senate appropriations committees, implementing the reduction. The governor must give the committees five days advance notice before submitting an expenditure reduction, and the committees must vote to approve or reject the governor’s recommendations in a resolution within ten days of receiving the order. The order is not effective if rejected by either committee. In that event, the governor must wait 30 days, but may then begin the process again. If approved by both committees, the order becomes effective when filed with the Secretary of State (along with the both resolutions approving the order). In interpreting this section, the Supreme Court has held that the governor has discretion to reduce expenditures of some agencies to a greater extent than expenditures of others and no requirement of proportionality exists with respect to the reductions.

4. Supervisory Powers

A fourth traditional category of gubernatorial power that Michigan governors have utilized to issue executive orders arises from the governor’s general supervisory powers over the executive branch. The Michigan Constitution of 1963 vests responsibility for the supervision of
the executive branch of state government in the governor, and the governor may make
reasonable delegations of executive or administrative duties. The governor’s supervisory
powers arise mainly from Article 5, section 8 of the 1963 Constitution, which provides:

Each principal department shall be under the supervision of the governor unless
otherwise provided by this constitution. The governor shall take care that the laws
be faithfully executed. He shall transact all necessary business with the officers of
government and may require information in writing from all executive and
administrative state officers, elective and appointive, upon any subject relating to
the duties of their respective offices.

With the exception of the first sentence placing each principal department under the
supervision of the governor, this language is identical to language in the 1908 Constitution.

“Since 1835, the governor has been charged with the responsibility of taking care that the laws
are faithfully executed. Each Michigan constitution has allowed the governor to request
information in writing from state officers in the executive branch.”

Section 8 has been subject to only limited judicial interpretation. But the Court of
Appeals has interpreted the provision broadly, stating that it allows the governor to require that
department heads comply with executive orders, and that the governor’s use of the word
“request” rather than the word “order” is irrelevant for the purpose of determining the binding
effect of a gubernatorial executive order on an administrative department head. However, the
Supreme Court has imposed a narrow restriction on this power, ruling that section 8 prevents the
governor from employing outside counsel at the expense of the state to advise him on drafting
proposed legislation because the phrase allowing the governor to require information in writing
from executive branch state officers simultaneously compels the governor to seek legal advice
from the attorney general. Even so, despite that narrow limitation, section 8 arguably grants
the governor broad authority over the administration of the executive branch, and serves as the
basis by which the governor may issue Executive Orders, Directives or Proclamations having binding effect on members of the executive branch.

Another constitutional provision that arguably provides a basis for the governor’s supervisory powers is Article 5, section 1. However, the text of this section, which vests the executive authority in the governor, is largely undefined, and offers even less guidance than section 8. Finally, the governor’s authority under Article 5, section 10, which provides, in part, that, “[t]he governor shall have power and it shall be his duty to inquire into the condition and administration of any public office and the acts of any public officer, elective or appointive,” may also possibly serve as a basis by which the governor may exercise supervisory authority over the executive branch.

5. Removal Powers

A rarely used traditional category of gubernatorial power that has been used to issue executive orders is the governor’s removal powers. These powers fall within one of three categories: the power to remove state officers, the power to remove local officers, and the power to remove judges. With respect to state officers, Article V, section 10 states that:

The governor shall have power and it shall be his duty to inquire into the condition and administration of any public office and the acts of any public officer, elective or appointive. He may remove or suspend from office for gross neglect of duty or for corrupt conduct in office, or for any other misfeasance or malfeasance therein, any elective or appointive state officer, except legislative or judicial, and shall report the reasons for such removal or suspension to the legislature.

The Constitution of 1850 was the first Michigan Constitution to contain authority granting the governor power to remove state officials. However, this authority, also contained in the 1908 constitution, allowed for the governor to remove state officials only when the legislature was not in session. Under the 1963 Constitution that limitation is eliminated,
although the current provision still does not extend to officers of the legislative or judicial branches.

“Removal” is defined as deprivation of office by the act of a competent superior officer acting within his or her scope of authority.\(^{176}\) The governor has the power to remove state officers only for cause, and must give notice and an opportunity for a hearing.\(^{177}\) Furthermore, misfeasance is defined as “a default in not doing a lawful thing in a proper manner, or omitting to do it as it should be done,”\(^{178}\) and malfeasance is the failure to perform the duties of a public office.\(^{179}\) The Supreme Court described the details of the removal power in *Attorney General ex rel Rich v Jochim*, stating:

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\text{[The Governor] is given inquisitional power, that [she] may ascertain their condition, for the public welfare. No other means is provided for acquiring the necessary information. If [she] discovers irregularities of particular character, it is [her] duty to remove the officer, and supply his place by appointment, reporting [her] action to the Legislature at the next session. *Dullam v Willson* is authority for the proposition that the incumbent is entitled to notice of the charge, and an opportunity to be heard in his defense. This necessarily implies that the governor’s action is, in a sense, judicial. But it does not follow that the investigation must be made by some other person or officer, who must make complaint to the Governor; that the complainant must procure consul; or that the Governor is necessarily interested, and thereby disqualified from hearing and determining, because [she] performs the other duties which are specifically imposed upon [her] by this section of the Constitution. . . There is nothing in the record to show any interest upon the part of the Governor, further than to ascertain the condition of the office, and to action upon the information obtained as the Constitution requires. It is the duty of the Governor to investigate, using all lawful means to go to the bottom of any real or supposed irregularity. To that end, [she] may use clerks and expert accountants, if necessary, and it is fair to presume that the State would recognize.}\(^{180}\)

The governor’s power to remove state officials under section 10 is self-executing and not subject to implementation by the Legislature.\(^{181}\) Even though the legislature has enacted statutory provisions relating to the removal of the Attorney General and the Secretary of State,\(^{182}\)
members of the governing bodies of state universities, and appointees filling vacant offices during a legislative recess, all constitutional officers are removable by the Governor.

In contrast to the governor’s ability to remove state officials, the governor’s ability to remove local officials under Article VII, section 33 is not self-executing. This section provides that, “[a]ny elected officer of a political subdivision may be removed from office in the manner and for the causes provided by law.” Thus, the governor’s power to remove officers of a political subdivision is implemented by the Michigan Election Law, which includes provisions for removal of most local offices. However, the governor does not have power to remove county executives, members of community college boards, and school district board members, as the legislature has not granted the governor such power.

The Governor’s power to remove local officials is generally not subject to judicial review, unless an exercise of the removal power is arbitrary. Once again however, the Governor must afford the accused public officer notice and a reasonable opportunity to present a defense, and an accused public officer is entitled to fair and just treatment in the course of the removal proceedings. Nevertheless, despite these protections for the accused, the Governor is the sole tribunal in removal proceedings, and the accused has no right of appeal or review. If the Governor acts within the law, the Governor’s decision is final.

Finally, the governor may remove judges from office under Article 6, section 25, but only upon the concurrence of the legislature. This section provides that:

For reasonable cause, which is not sufficient ground for impeachment, the governor shall remove any judge on a concurrent resolution of two-thirds of the members elected to and serving in each house of the legislature. The cause for removal shall be stated at length in the resolution.

Once again, this authority reflects language from the 1908 Constitution. The governor’s power to remove is implemented by the Michigan Election Law which contains
sections providing for the removal of Justices of the Supreme Court, Judges of the Court of Appeals, Circuit Court Judges, Probate Court Judges, and District Court Judges.

6. Re-organization Powers

a) Explicit Re-organization Power

The final generally recognized category of power that a governor may use to issue an executive order deals with the governor’s power to re-organize the executive branch. The 1963 Constitution explicitly grants the governor the power to effect re-organizations of the executive branch in Article 5, section 2, which states:

Subsequent to the initial allocation, the governor may make changes in the organization of the executive branch or in the assignment of functions among its units which he considers necessary for efficient administration. Where these changes require the force of law, they shall be set forth in executive orders and submitted to the legislature. Thereafter the legislature shall have 60 calendar days of a regular session, or a full regular session if of shorter duration, to disapprove each executive order. Unless disapproved in both houses by a resolution concurred in by a majority of the members elected to and serving in each house, each order shall become effective at a date thereafter to be designated by the governor.

In addition to granting the governor the power to re-organize the executive branch, Article 5, section 2 requires that:

All executive and administrative offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the executive branch of state government and their respective functions, powers and duties, except for the office of governor and lieutenant governor and the governing bodies of institutions of higher education provided for in this constitution, shall be allocated by law among and within not more than 20 principal departments. They shall be grouped as far as practicable according to major purposes.

Section 12 of the Schedule and Temporary provisions to the 1963 Constitution gave the legislature two years after the effective date of the new constitution to make the initial allocation of agencies. However, if the Legislature failed to complete the reassignments in two years, the Governor was given the authority to make the initial reorganization within one year thereafter.
But the legislature successfully completed its task, reorganizing state administrative agencies into nineteen principal departments in the Executive Organization Act of 1965.\textsuperscript{205}

The Executive Organization Act of 1965 implements the constitutional provisions and sets out an organizational plan for the executive branch of government. The Act also establishes a classification system that identifies three types of transfers to consolidate all state agencies into 19 departments. A type I transfer agency retains all its substantive powers, but staff activities such as budgeting and procurement are provided by the head of the principal department.\textsuperscript{206} Under a type II transfer, all powers, duties, and functions are transferred to the principal department, and the transferred agency exercises only those duties delegated to it by the department head.\textsuperscript{207} A type III transfer provides for the transfer of the agency to the principal department and the abolishment of the agency.\textsuperscript{208} Additionally, a fourth type of classification continues to exist within the principal department and exercises all of its statutory powers.\textsuperscript{209} Finally, the head of each principal department, with the approval of the governor, is authorized to establish the internal organization of the department.\textsuperscript{210}

The Executive Organization Act of 1965 also sets for the procedures required in issuing an executive re-organization order. Whenever the governor makes changes in the organization of the executive branch or in the assignment of functions among its units which require the force of law, such changes must be set forth in executive orders and copies of the orders must be submitted to the legislature as provided in section 2 of article 5 of the state constitution.\textsuperscript{211} An executive re-organization order must be filed with the department of state in the same manner as required by law for the filing of public acts of the state,\textsuperscript{212} and copies of each such executive order must be filed with and retained on record by the legislative council and a copy transmitted to each member of the legislature.\textsuperscript{213}
The Legislature then has no more than 60 calendar days during a regular session (or a full regular session if less than 60 days) to disapprove the order.\textsuperscript{214} Unless disapproved by a concurrent resolution of a majority of the members serving in \textit{both} the House of Representatives and the State Senate, an executive re-organization order becomes effective at the date designated by the governor.\textsuperscript{215} Executive re-organization orders not overturned by the Legislature have the force and effect of law,\textsuperscript{216} and they must be dated, given an identification number, and published in the same manner as required by law for the publication of the public acts of the state.\textsuperscript{217} Although an executive reorganization order may be modified or repealed by the legislature at any time by law,\textsuperscript{218} it bears note that no executive reorganization order has been disapproved by the Michigan Legislature in nearly 40 years.

However, although the Executive Organization Act of 1965 was enacted to implement the governor’s constitutional re-organization power and to allow the governor to reshape the executive branch of state government,\textsuperscript{219} the act does not limit the Governor’s broad reorganization authority under Article 5, section 2.\textsuperscript{220} Re-organization orders may “effect something as limited as a transfer of functions among executive branch entities or as broad as alterations in the very structure of the executive branch.”\textsuperscript{221} The only constitutional limitations placed on the Governor in effecting a re-organization are that a re-organization may not result in the establishment of more than 20 principal departments, and that the reorganization is subject to disapproval by the legislature.

Additionally, while the Governor may assign or reassign functions within the executive branch by executive order, executive orders may not alter statutory functions. Thus, for example, while Governor Engler was not constitutionally able diminish or abolish authority legislatively-delegated to the State Board of Education, he was able to transfer that authority to
the Superintendent of Public Instruction by Executive Order. Similarly, former Governor Milliken could constitutionally transfer to the Natural Resources Commission rule-promulgation authority formerly delegated by the legislature to the Water Resources Commission.

b) Inherent Authority Supporting Re-organizations

In addition to section 2, the inherent power granted to the governor by Article 5, sections 1 (vesting executive authority in the governor) and 8 (granting the governor supervisory authority over the executive branch), may also serve as constitutional bases for Executive Reorganization Orders. Section 2 is new to the 1963 Constitution, but its basis lies in a similar 1958 act that granted the governor re-organization power over the executive branch. Public Act 125 authorized the governor to submit reorganization plans within the first 30 days of any regular legislative session. Any reorganization plan became effective 90 days after the legislative adjournment unless disapproved within 60 legislative days by either house of the legislature.

Public Act 125 of 1958 was enacted while the 1908 Constitution was in effect. Under the separation of powers doctrine, the legislature may delegate some of its functions, but only to lawful public agencies or other branches of the government: not to private individuals or corporations. Thus, the legislature was able to delegate its re-organization authority to the governor under the Act because of the inherent executive authority vested in the governor by the 1908 Constitution. Thus, although the legislature ultimately repealed Public Act 125 of 1958, the inherent executive authority in Article 5, section 1 is often cited in Executive Reorganization Orders as a constitutional basis supporting the governor’s authority to issue an Executive Order.
Additionally, Article 5 section 8, which vests supervisory power over the executive branch in the governor, has also been cited as a constitutional basis for issuing Executive Re-organization Orders.\textsuperscript{233} The delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1961 added an explicit grant of supervisory power over the executive branch in recognition of the governor’s responsibility to make sure the departments of the executive branch performed their duties as provided by law.\textsuperscript{234} Therefore, as the natural corollary of the responsibility to supervise the executive branch is the right to take action to ensure that the executive branch continues to function, section 8 also supports the assertion that the governor is inherently authorized to issue executive orders.

Unfortunately, however, previous Michigan governors have cited sections 1 and 8 as support for the governor’s authority to issue Executive Re-organization Orders in a seemingly arbitrary manner.\textsuperscript{235} Thus, while these two sections may be utilized to support the re-organization authority in section 2, no concrete rules have arisen to explain when or why their inclusion might be necessary in a given situation.

\textbf{C. Constitutional Bases of Power Traditionally Not Cited in Executive Orders}

The Michigan Constitution of 1963 also grants powers to the governor that could theoretically serve as the basis by which the governor could issue an executive order. However, although Michigan governors have exercised some of these powers to order some kind of action, no governor has explicitly used these powers to support an Executive Orders, Directive or Proclamation. Nonetheless, each one could presumably serve, at least in conjunction with the aforementioned powers, if not on its own, as a basis by which the governor may issue an executive order.
1. Special Sessions of the Legislature

No Michigan governor has used the constitutional power to convene special sessions of the legislature in an executive order. Article 5, section 15 of the 1963 Constitution provides that, “[t]he governor may convene the legislature on extraordinary occasions.” This language is the same as language contained in the 1908 constitution. The Governor has the power under section 15 to “communicate by message to the legislature at the beginning of each session [including extra sessions] and may at other times present to the legislature information as to the affairs of the state and recommend measures he [or she] considers necessary or desirable.”

However, the Governor may not call a joint convention of the House of Representatives and the State Senate. “When the legislature is convened on extraordinary occasions in special session, no bill shall be passed on any subjects other than those expressly stated in the governor’s proclamation or submitted by special message.” Although the governor may control the subject-matter of legislation to be enacted at special session, the governor may not restrict boundaries within the natural range of that subject, dictate legislative methods, or limit the class of those affected. Accordingly, the governor may not restrict the Legislature to consideration of a particular bill, since, within the subject submitted by the Governor, the Legislature has freedom of action. During an extra session, the Legislature may consider proposed constitutional amendments, regardless of the scope of the Governor’s proclamation or special message.

Additionally, in the event of an emergency, the Governor may convene the Legislature, whether in regular or extra session, outside of Lansing. Article 5, section 16 of the 1963 Constitution provides that, “[t]he governor may convene the legislature at some other place when the seat of government becomes dangerous from any cause.” This section is also substantially similar to language found in the 1908 Constitution which states, “[the governor] may convene
the legislature at some other place when the seat of government becomes dangerous from disease or a common enemy.\textsuperscript{242} The change in this language reflects the concern among the framers about the dangers inherent in life in the atomic age, and the observation that disease or enemies do not represent the only threats that could justify removal of the legislature from the capitol.\textsuperscript{243}

2. Writs of Election

Similarly, no governor has cited the authority to issue writs of election in an executive order. Article 5, section 13 of the 1963 Constitution provides that: “[t]he governor shall issue writs of election to fill vacancies in the senate or house of representatives. Any such election shall be held in a manner prescribed by law.”\textsuperscript{244} With the exception of the addition of the second sentence regarding the manner of holding elections, this provision is identical to its analogue in the 1908 Constitution.\textsuperscript{245}

In calling a special election, the governor must comply with the Michigan Election Law, which specifies the procedures by which such elections are to be called.\textsuperscript{246} Under the Election Law, the governor has the discretion to call a special election\textsuperscript{247} or direct that the vacancy be filled by voters at the next general election.\textsuperscript{248} Therefore, although the governor has no discretion as to whether to fill a vacancy, the governor does have discretion as to when that vacancy shall be filled, whether at a special election occurring prior to the next general election, or at a special election happening concurrent to the next general election.

The Governor must call a special election to fill vacancies in the State Senate,\textsuperscript{249} the State House of Representatives,\textsuperscript{250} the Michigan delegation of the United States House of Representatives,\textsuperscript{251} and in limited circumstances, township offices.\textsuperscript{252} When calling a special election for a partisan office, a primary election and nominating process is required. Section 631 of the Election Law provides:
Whenever a special election shall be called to fill a vacancy in any office, the candidates for which are regularly nominated in accordance with the provisions of this act relating to primary nominations, a special primary for all political parties shall be held in the county, district or city in which the vacancy occurs on such day as may be fixed by the official or legislative body calling the special election, but not less than 20 days prior to the date of such special election, and the authorities calling any such special primary shall, in the call therefor, fix the time within which candidates may file nominating petitions.

3. Clemency Powers

Finally, Michigan governors have traditionally not cited their clemency powers when issuing executive orders. The governor has exclusive authority to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons for criminal offenses. Article 5, section 4 of the 1963 Constitution provides:

The governor shall have power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons after convictions for all offenses, except cases of impeachment, upon such conditions and limitations as he may direct, subject to procedures and regulations prescribed by law. He shall inform the legislature annually of each reprieve, commutation and pardon granted, stating the reasons therefor.

The clemency powers are exclusive in the governor, and the Michigan Supreme Court, interpreting an identical analogue in the 1908 Constitution, has held that any law restricting the Governor’s power of pardon and commutation of sentence is unconstitutional and void. As a result, once a court imposes a sentence, and the defendant has commenced serving that sentence, a court may only alter the conviction or sentence for legally cognizable reasons. Action in excess of that authority infringes on the governor’s exclusive clemency powers.

However, the Governor’s power to pardon is not absolute. Punishment for contempt of court, for example, is an offense within the exclusive control of the judiciary, and the governor’s pardoning power is not applicable. Furthermore, when exercising her clemency powers, the governor is subject to procedures and regulations set forth in law. In particular, the Corrections Code of 1953 establishes the State Parole Board within the Department of Corrections, and
articulates the specific procedures for pardons, reprieves, and commutations, including application, investigation, public hearing, and recommendation to the Governor.  

C. Inherent Authority to Issue Executive Orders

In the event that no provision under the Michigan Constitution of 1963 provides specific authority for the governor to act in a situation, the executive and supervisory authority contained in sections 1 and 8 of Article 5 might also grant the governor a broad, inherent power to take action by executive order. Most state constitutions contain provisions vesting supervisory and executive powers in the governor, especially provisions providing that the governor is to faithfully execute the law. Generally, most courts are split in opinion as to whether or not these types of executive and supervisory provisions grant power in and of themselves. On one side are those who have found that these provisions do not represent a constitutional grant of executive order powers: the ‘weak governor’ argument. On the other side are those who feel that these provisions do vest a governor with authority to act: the ‘strong governor’ argument.

Proponents of the “weak governor” argument often cite cases holding that the general constitutional language does not vest governors with rights because it does not confer specific power, that a broad grant is limited by later specific grants of executive power, and that such general constitutional language is only declaratory and not binding. In contrast, proponents of the “strong governor” argument maintain that a grant of executive power is "something more than a verbal adornment of the office, and implies such power as will secure an efficient execution of the laws" and that the phrase "the executive power shall vest in the governor" would be meaningless if the governor's powers were, in fact, limited to those which are specifically enumerated. The relative abstraction or lack of specific detail in a constitutional provision implies a desire on the part of the drafters to impart managerial flexibility.
Records from the Constitutional Convention of 1961 indicate that the drafters supported an interpretation of the constitution in line with the ‘strong governor’ argument. The drafters stated in their address to the people of Michigan that the provision was exactly the same as the similar provision contained in the 1908 constitution, with the exception that the word “chief” before “executive power” was eliminated due to the possibility that it could be interpreted as a limitation on the exercise of executive power. The drafters intended that like the President under the United States Constitution, the ultimate rights and responsibilities for the exercise of executive power (or lack thereof) should lie with the governor. Indeed, opponents of the language who were overruled objected that the new language was only appropriate if the drafters intention was to, “make all parts of the executive branch subservient completely to the governor.”

These statements indicate that the drafters meant for these provisions to be a very real, binding grant of authority to the governor as the executive officer. Although specific constitutional grants of authority to the governor were also included in other provisions, the drafters’ comments indicate that they were not intended to limit the broad grant of executive power. Rather, the comments show that the drafters did indeed intend to grant the governor authority to exercise her executive power to the fullest possible extent.

Adopting the strong governor argument, a Wisconsin commentator recently set forth a model test of judicial enforcement for determining the validity of gubernatorial executive orders issued pursuant to this inherent authority. The commentator, Benjamin S. Longlet, proposed a three-prong test whereby an executive order issued pursuant to a governor’s executive or supervisory authority is valid so long as the order is: 1) non-legislative, 2) issued pursuant to some constitutional authority, and 3) consistent with existing law.
In determining whether a function is non-legislative, Longlet stated that:

The crucial test for determining whether an ordinance is legislative or administrative, therefore, is whether the ordinance makes new law or merely executes a preexisting law... By analogy, if a gubernatorial executive order were, by its terms, to balance and choose between competing policy objectives or otherwise constitute a 'high-level overall plan embracing the general goals,' it would be constitutionally invalid and should not be enforced.\textsuperscript{271}

With regard to constitutional authority, Longlet argues that provisions of the Wisconsin Constitution which are substantially similar to the Michigan Constitution of 1963 (an executive power clause,\textsuperscript{272} a “faithfully execute the law” clause,\textsuperscript{273} and a “transact all necessary business” clause\textsuperscript{274}), should be broadly construed to authorize the issuance of executive orders under the “strong governor” theory.\textsuperscript{275}

Finally, Longlet states that the decision as to whether an executive order is consonant with existing statutes revolves around the “faithfully execute the law” clause, and depends on whether the reviewing court adopts a “black letter” or “policy implementation” interpretation of the clause.\textsuperscript{276} An executive order could contravene specific statutory language without violating the law’s underlying policy objectives, or conversely, violate the purposes of a statute without contravening its black-letter terms.\textsuperscript{277}

Therefore, because this test relies on provisions of the Wisconsin Constitution which are substantially Article 5, sections 1 and 8 of the 1963 Constitution, a Michigan court might elect to adopt this test as an authoritative determinant of the validity of a gubernatorial executive order issued pursuant to those sections.

\textbf{V. Conclusion}

The ability of Michigan’s governors to issue executive orders under the Michigan Constitution of 1963 has been the subject of a continuous, gradual expansion in the 40 years since the 1963 Constitution entered into effect. As the governor is ultimately accountable to the
public for the administration of the executive branch of government, Michigan’s governors will
likely continue to act unilaterally by executive order in order to achieve the utmost flexibility in
managing a 21st century state.

Furthermore, as state governments become more complex, spend more money, and
employ increasing numbers of people, gubernatorial executive orders will continue to expand,
both in the number and the scope of subjects they embrace. Accordingly, the citizens of
Michigan must possess the resources adequate to allow them to develop to a sufficient
understanding of the powers granted to their governor, as well as the limitations placed on the
exercise of that power, in order to safeguard their rights and ensure good governance.

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1 38 Am Jur 2d, Governor, § 1 (2002).
2 81A CJS Governor § 130 (2002).
3 81A CJS Governor § 130 (2002).
4 81A CJS Governor § 130 (2002); 81A CJS States § 82 (2002).
5 81A CJS Governor § 130 (2002); 81A CJS States § 82 (2002).
6 81A CJS States § 130 (2002).
7 16 CJS, Constitutional Law § 215.
8 38 Am Jur 2d, Governor, § 1 (2002).
9 President Washington issued the Neutrality Proclamation in 1793, which declared – without any prior
authorization by Congress – that the official policy of the United States was to remain neutral in the brewing war in
Europe between Britain and France. Thus, by implication, American states and businesses were to refrain from
(1999).
10 Note, Gubernatorial Executive Orders as Devices for Administrative Direction and Control, 50 Iowa L Rev 78,
79-82 (1964). Andrew Jackson was the seventh President of the United States, and served in that office from 1829
11 Note, Gubernatorial Executive Orders as Devices for Administrative Direction and Control, 50 Iowa L Rev 78,
79-82 (1964).
12 Id. at 78-79.
13 Id. at 79.
14 Id. at 79-80.
15 Id. at 80.
16 Id. at 80-81.
17 Id. at 81.
18 Id. at 79.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 81.
21 Id. at 82.
22 Id. at 81.
23 Id. at 81-82.
24 Id.
25 Id.
27 Some commentators also consider the acts of the governor in ordering special elections and in summoning the state legislature to fall within this category. Note, *Gubernatorial Executive Orders as Devices for Administrative Direction and Control*, 50 Iowa L Rev 78, 83 (1964).
28 *Id.* at 82.
29 *Id.* at 83.
30 *Id.*
31 *Id.*
32 *Id.* at 83-84.
33 *Id.* at 84.
36 *Id.*
37 *Id.* at 84-85.
38 *Id.* at 85.
42 See, e.g., clauses 3-6 of Executive Order No 2003-11 (August 21, 2003) (declaring a state of energy emergency).
44 *Id.*
47 *Id.* at 653.
48 *Id.* at 648.
50 *Id.*
51 *Id.*
52 *Id.*
53 Michigan voters amended the 1908 constitution in 1960 in what came to be called the “Gateway Amendment.” This amendment eased the process for calling a constitutional convention by requiring that a question on general constitutional revision be placed on the ballot in 1961 and every 16 years thereafter, and by reducing the threshold number of voters required to call a constitutional convention. Fino, *The Michigan State Constitution: A Reference Guide* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1996) p 20.
54 *Id.* at 20-21.
55 *Id.* at 20-21.
57 2 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 1836.
59 See, e.g., Const 1908, art 6, § 2; Const 1963, art 5, § 1.
60 1 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 337.
63 Const 1963, art 5, §§ 2, 4, 8, and 20.


See, e.g., Executive Order No 1965-2 (February 25, 1965).


See, e.g., Executive Order No 1965-6 (May 20, 1965) (although this order was later overturned by McDonald v Schnipke, 380 Mich 14, 155 NW2d 169 (1968)).

See, e.g., Executive Order No 1965-8 (October 25, 1965).

See, e.g., Executive Order No 1966-3 (May 13, 1966).

See, e.g., Executive Directive No 1965-12 (November 4, 1965) (addressing the Michigan Civil Service Commission in order to clarify Executive Order No 1965-16 (November 4, 1965)).


This argument assumes that the governor is not fraudulently using the form of an “executive directive” to shield an order that is, in actuality, issued pursuant to Article 5, section 2. In that situation, the legislature is presumably not precluded from exercising their constitutional authority under section 2 to veto the measure.


See, e.g., Executive Order No 1973-2 (January 11, 1973) (transferring and consolidating environmental functions within the DNR); Executive Order No 1975-10 (October 13, 1975) (transferring public service commission’s railroad regulation functions to department of state highways and transportation).

See, e.g., Executive Order No 1970-17 (November 17, 1970).


Executive Order No 2003-4 (February 27, 2003); Executive Order No 2003-5 (February 28, 2003); Executive Order No 2003-7 (June 19, 2003); Executive Order No 2003-8 (July 30, 2003); Executive Order No 2003-9 (July 30,


92 Executive Order No 2003-18 (October 2, 2003); and Executive Order No 2003-20 (October 20, 2003).

93 Executive Order No 2003-3 (February 19, 2003); and Executive Order No 2003-23 (December 10, 2003).


95 Edward Thompson Co v Maynard, 269 Mich 97, 113, 256 NW 817 (1934).


102 Id.


105 Id.

106 Id.

107 Id.


110 See, e.g., Executive Order No 1994-24 (September 8, 1994) (establishing the Governor’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Michigan Gaming within the Executive Office).

111 Const 1908, art 6, § 2.

112 Const 1963, art 5, § 1.

113 Const 1908, art 6, § 3.

114 Const 1963, art 5, § 8.


116 1931 PA 195, MCL 10.51 to 10.57.

117 Id.

118 MCL 16.111.

119 1978 PA 151, MCL 3.551 to 3.561.

120 See MCL 3.552; Executive Order No 2003-18 (October 2, 2003) (transferring powers formerly exercised by Department of Commerce to Department of Labor and Economic Growth.)

121 See, e.g., Executive Order No 1994-20 (July 13, 1994) (establishing the Michigan Rehabilitation Advisory Council pursuant to 29 USC 101 et seq); Executive Order No 1994-23 (September 6, 1994) (establishing the Michigan Statewide Independent Living Council pursuant to 29 USC 701, et seq).


123 1976 PA 390, MCL 30.401 to 30.421.

124 1945 PA 302, MCL 10.31 to MCL 10.33.

125 1982 PA 191, MCL 10.81 to 10.89.

126 MCL 30.403.

127 Id.

128 Id.

129 Id.

130 Id.

131 2001 PA 247, MCL 3.991 to 3.994.

132 2001 PA 248, MCL 3.1001 to 3.1004.

133 MCL 30.405.

134 Id.

135 MCL 30.421.

136 Id.
The organized militia of this state taken collectively shall be known as the state military establishment and constitutes the armed forces of this state. The organized militia consists of the army national guard, the air national guard, and the defense force when actually in existence as provided in this act. The unorganized militia consists of all other able-bodied citizens of this state and all other able-bodied citizens who are residents of this state who have or shall have declared their intention to become citizens of the United States, who shall be age 17 or over and not more than age 60, and shall be subject to state military duty as provided in this act.” MCL 32.509.

See, e.g., Const 1963, art 5 § 18 (power to submit original budgetary plan to legislature); Const 1963, art 5 § 19 (line item veto of appropriations); Const 1963, art 5 § 20 (power to reduce appropriations). Additionally, MCL 18.393 allows the governor to transfer appropriated funds within an administrative department.
MCL 168.293.

MCL 168.293.


Const 1963, art 6, § 33.

1954 PA 116, MCL 168.1 to 168.992.

See MCL 168.207 (all county officers named in MCL 168.200, including the county clerk, the county treasurer, register of deeds, prosecuting attorney, sheriff, drain commissioner, surveyor and coroner); MCL 168.238 (county auditor); MCL 168.268 (county road commissioner); MCL 168.327 (city officers); MCL 168.369 (township officers); and MCL 168.383 (village officers).

See Burback v Romney, 380 Mich 209, 217, 156 NW2d 549 (1968).


People ex rel Clardy v Balch, 268 Mich 196, 201, 255 NW 762 (1934).


People ex rel Clardy v Balch, 268 Mich 196, 201-02, 255 NW 762 (1934).

Const 1963, art 6, § 25.

Const 1908, art 9, § 6.

1954 PA 116, MCL 168.1 to 168.992.

MCL 168.403.

MCL 168.409k.

MCL 168.423.

MCL 168.443.

MCL 168.4671.

Const 1963, sched § 12.

Id.

1958 PA 125, MCL 16.1 to 16.6, repealed by 1968 PA 237.
Only one re-organization was effected under 1958 PA 125. In 1962, the independent Office of Civil Defense was transferred to the Michigan State Police. Although five other reorganizations of the executive branch took place subsequent to this, they were all enacted by statute after being submitted by executive order. Legislative enactment occurred to avoid use of the executive-initiated reorganization because some legislators were concerned about the constitutionality of the 1958 act, believing it violated the separation of powers doctrine. Citizens Research Council of Michigan, Executive Reorganization of State Government, Council Comments No 1009, p 2 (July 1992).

Nevertheless, delegates at the 1961 Constitutional Convention decided to include a provision in the new constitution allowing the governor to re-organize the executive branch through Executive Order, believing that, “the governor is in the best position to have knowledge of the structural problems and needs that exist in the executive branch.” 1 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 1768. Declining to adopt a minority report allowing disapproval of a re-organization order by a majority of either house of the legislature, and another minority report requiring a two-thirds majority of each house to approve the order, the delegates ultimately settled on the current formula, requiring both houses of the legislature to disapprove of a re-organization order by resolution in order to prevent such an order from taking effect.

Citations:

226 MCL 16.1, repealed by 1968 PA 237.
227 MCL 16.2, repealed by 1968 PA 237.
228 MCL 16.1, repealed by 1968 PA 237.
229 See, e.g., People ex rel Shumway v Bennett, 29 Mich 451 (1874).
230 See Const 1908, art 6, §§ 2-3.
232 See, e.g., Executive Order No 2001-7 (October 1, 2001) (invoking Article 5, sections 1 and 2).
233 See, e.g., Executive Order No 1999-1 (February 3, 1999) (invoking Article 5, sections 1, 2 and 8).
234 See, e.g., Executive Order No 2001-7 (October 1, 2001) (invoking Article 5, sections 1 and 2).
235 See, e.g., Executive Order No 1995-13 (May 23, 1995) (invoking only Article 5, section 2); Executive Order No 1999-1 (February 3, 1999) (invoking Article 5, sections 1, 2 and 8); Executive Order No 2001-7 (October 1, 2001) (invoking Article 5, sections 1 and 2).
236 See, Const 1908, Art 6, § 7.
237 Const 1963, art 5, § 17.
239 Const 1963, art 4, § 28.
242 Const 1908, art 6, § 8.
244 Const 1963, art 5, § 13.
245 See Const 1908, art 6, § 6.
246 1954 PA 116, MCL 168.1 to 168.992.
247 A “special election” means “any election, other than a regular election called by competent authority for the purpose of choosing officials to fill vacancies in public office.” MCL 168.6.
248 MCL 168.634.
249 MCL 168.178, 168.634.
250 MCL 168.178, 168.634.
252 MCL 168.370 (governor may fill vacancy if it is not filled within 45 days by the township board of supervisors).
253 MCL 168.631.
254 Const 1908, art 6, § 9.
257 1953 PA 232, MCL 791.201 to 791.283.
258 MCL 791.231a.
259 See MCL 791.206, 791.243, and 791.244.
261 *Id.* at 86.
262 *Id.* at 86-87.
263 *Id.* at 88.
264 *Id.* at 87.
266 2 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 3378.
267 *Id.* at 337-38.
268 *Id.* at 336.
270 *Id.* at 1327-28.
271 *Id.* at 1331-32 (internal citations omitted).
272 “The executive power shall be vested in a governor.” Wis Const, art 5, § 1.
273 “[The governor] shall transact all necessary business with the officers of the government, civil and military.” Wis Const, art 5, § 4.
274 “[The governor] shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” Wis Const, art 5, § 4.
276 *Id.* at 1337 (2000).
277 *Id.*