CEDAW AND GENDER VIOLENCE: AN
EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT

Neil A. Englehart*

2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 265

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ....................................................................... 265
I. THE CEDAW COMMITTEE AND VIOLENCE
   AGAINST WOMEN.................................................................. 266
II. STATE ACTION IN RESPONSE TO GENERAL
    RECOMMENDATION 19 .................................................... 268
III. THE EFFECTS OF STATE ACTION ..................................... 270
CONCLUSION .......................................................................... 274

INTRODUCTION

Does the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) reduce violence against women? CEDAW has the distinction of being an unusually effective human rights treaty: promoting women’s political rights in particular, having a modest effect on women’s social rights, but showing little or no effect on economic rights. However, unlike these other rights, the CEDAW Treaty does not explicitly mention violence. The CEDAW Committee interpreted the Treaty as covering gender violence after the fact. It issued General Recommendations in 1989 and 1992 mandating states to collect information and take action on the issue, respectively. The Committee’s advocacy on the issue of...
violence raises interesting issues in international law: To what degree can a treaty body raise issues not explicitly included in treaty law, to what degree will states comply with its recommendations on these issues, and how effective will such advocacy be? This Article examines these questions empirically, looking at how states have responded to the CEDAW Committee’s General Recommendations on gender violence, and the degree to which their responses have been effective on the ground.

I. THE CEDAW COMMITTEE AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN

The CEDAW Committee’s advocacy on the issue of violence against women is based on two recommendations issued years after the Treaty came into force. The first of these, General Recommendation 12, was issued in 1989. It asks States parties to include information on violence against women in their reports to the Committee, including discussing what legislative and other measures they have taken on the matter. This recommendation thus requires states to collect information on violence against women and introduces a presumption that States parties will actively work on the issue. The second is General Recommendation 19, issued in 1992. This is more comprehensive and more strongly worded. It asserts that States parties are obligated to fight gender violence based on the definition of discrimination in Article 1 of the Treaty:

\[
\text{Any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.}
\]

General Recommendation 19 thus makes a claim that States parties are obligated by CEDAW to work against violence against women, although the word violence never occurs in this definition of discrimination or anywhere else in the Treaty. Furthermore, this obligation consists not just of refraining from state violence, but also

---

3. 8th Sess. Report, supra note 2, ¶ 392.
preventing violence by others, including private actors. Indeed, the CEDAW Committee argues that States parties are obligated to not just pass and enforce laws against gender violence, but also to change attitudes and social dynamics that lead to violence against women.

Gender violence entered the discourse of U.N. women’s rights advocacy at the 1985 Nairobi Conference assessing the results of the U.N. Decade for Women. The Nairobi Conference’s concluding document mapped out strategies for future U.N. efforts for the advancement of women and included, among other things, a statement that “[g]overnments should undertake effective measures . . . to identify, prevent and eliminate all violence, including family violence, against women and children.” The issue was not a major topic at the conference, however, and its inclusion in the forward-looking strategies was almost an afterthought. However, the Division for the Advancement of Women convened an expert group meeting on gender violence in 1986, and the Economic and Social Council of the U.N. (ECOSOC) subsequently reaffirmed the goals of the Nairobi Conference and invited the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) to take action on the issue of violence against women. On this basis, the CSW drafted a Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (Declaration) in 1991. The Declaration was adopted by the General Assembly in 1993, which invoked CEDAW, as well as other human rights treaties, in doing

---

7. Id. at 4.
The General Assembly resolution adopting the Declaration also encouraged states to ratify CEDAW and to create laws, programs, and institutions to address violence against women.\textsuperscript{13} The CEDAW Committee’s General Recommendations of 1989 and 1992 were thus part of a sequence of events taking place within the U.N. system addressing violence against women. It is notable, however, that the CEDAW Committee was at the forefront of this process. It acted more quickly than the CSW, even in the absence of a specific mandate from ECOSOC. The character of General Recommendations 12 and 19 is different from the Declaration as well because the Declaration is a statement of principles, whereas the General Recommendations are binding on CEDAW parties. The CEDAW Committee did not invent the U.N. system’s concern with the issue of gender violence from whole cloth. It tapped into ongoing discussions at the Nairobi Conference, ECOSOC, the CSW, and the Division for the Advancement of Women. However, the CEDAW Committee’s actions were more timely, more aggressive, and more binding than the more modest efforts of these other U.N. organizations.

II. STATE ACTION IN RESPONSE TO GENERAL RECOMMENDATION 19

Governments might well argue that they had not intended to take action on the issue of gender violence when they ratified CEDAW, since violence is not mentioned in the text of the treaty. If so, we might then expect low levels of compliance with the General Recommendations. To what degree have States parties responded to General Recommendation 19 in particular? The results presented in Figures 1–4 suggest that actually there has been a high degree of compliance.\textsuperscript{14}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{12} G.A. Res. 48/104, supra note 11, at 217.
  \item \textsuperscript{13} Id. at 218.
  \item \textsuperscript{14} The data in Figures 1–4 have been compiled from several sources. The primary source has been the periodic reports submitted by CEDAW States parties, which require the States parties to report on their implementation of the treaty. \textit{Country Reports}, U.N. WOMEN, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reports.htm (last updated Dec. 28, 2007). These data were supplemented and checked in some cases by reference to government and NGO reports. Data for non-parties and States parties that have failed to submit reports were collected from U.N. documents and websites, most notably the Secretary General’s database on violence against women, \textit{U.N. Secretary General’s Database on Violence Against Women}, U.N. WOMEN, http://sgdatabase.unwomen.org/home.action (last visited Apr. 7, 2014), as well as government and NGO data sources.
\end{itemize}
Figure 1 shows the number of states that have enacted anti-gender violence laws, including both constitutional provisions and statutes.\textsuperscript{15} Such laws were very rare until the early 1990s, but in 1992 the number suddenly begins to increase, rising steadily until 2011. Furthermore, the increase is almost entirely among the States parties with the non-party trend remaining steady at one to two countries in each year for the entire series.

Similarly, States parties are far more likely to have institutions specifically tasked with preventing gender violence than non-parties, as seen in Figure 2, which counts the number of states having either gender-violence programs or government agencies specifically tasked with reducing gender violence.\textsuperscript{16} Once again, the trend for both groups is nearly identical until the early 1990s when the CEDAW party line increases dramatically, beginning in 1993.

As seen in Figure 3, constitutional provisions and legislation specifically targeting domestic violence is more common than those targeting gender violence more broadly, but we see the same trend: it is nearly non-existent until the early 1990s when there is a sudden increase among the States parties.\textsuperscript{17} Here, the upward trend among the States parties began in 1990, following General Recommendation 12, rather than after General Recommendation 19 in 1992. The non-party trend remains basically flat at two to three countries per year.

Figure 4 displays the number of countries with institutions responsible for preventing and addressing domestic violence.\textsuperscript{18} Once again, the number of non-parties with such institutions remains basically flat, while the States parties show a sharp increase after 1992.

It seems incontrovertible that the CEDAW Committee’s General Recommendations 12 and 19, from 1989 and 1992 respectively, had an impact on the behavior of States parties. The increase precedes the General Assembly’s adoption of the Declaration, but comes well after the issue was first raised at the Nairobi Conference in 1985. Furthermore, only the CEDAW parties show an increasing likelihood of having laws and institutions aimed at addressing gender and domestic violence. While it is true that many states were ratifying CEDAW during this period, increasing the number of States parties, this increase explains neither the rapid

\textsuperscript{15.} See infra Figure 1.
\textsuperscript{16.} See infra Figure 2.
\textsuperscript{17.} See infra Figure 3.
\textsuperscript{18.} See infra Figure 4.
rise in the laws and institutions created by States parties only after the early 1990s, nor the large discrepancy between the behavior of States parties and non-parties. The increase coincides exactly with the General Recommendations: in no case is there a substantial increase among the States parties prior to 1989, and the sharpest increases come after 1992. It thus seems that General Recommendations 12 and 19 had a decisive effect in motivating States parties to take action.

Enacting laws and creating institutions are not, however, the same as taking effective action. Laws may be poorly enforced, for instance, and institutions may be underfunded and understaffed. Furthermore, the mandate to change deeply held attitudes and practices that lead to violence against women is ambitious, and may exceed the capacity of many states. Thus, we turn next to evaluating the effectiveness of state action.

III. THE EFFECTS OF STATE ACTION

To what degree has state action been effective at reducing violence against women? There are substantial obstacles to assessing this empirically. Cross-national data is likely to be confounded by differing definitions of violence against women used in different jurisdictions and by differences in rates of reporting that are linked to cultural stigmas, trust in police and other government institutions, and a host of other factors. Ideally, we would like to track changes over time within countries to elucidate the temporal dynamics of any changes associated with implementing General Recommendations 12 and 19. However, little time-series data is available. Furthermore, in cases where successful action has been undertaken, the data are likely to be confounded by the paradox of reporting: as women become aware that laws exist to help them and as the stigma against reporting such crimes declines, reporting rates go up, making it appear that the incidence of violence against women is increasing regardless of what may actually be happening.

Rather than abandoning any attempt to address the question of effectiveness, the best data available is analyzed here. Its limitations must, however, be kept firmly in mind as the question of effectiveness is explored in a preliminary way.

To explore the incidence of violence against women, the weighted rape score available from Womenstats is employed here.

This variable is meant to mitigate the well-known problems of comparing rape statistics across countries. It is based on official rape statistics, but weights them according to varying legal definitions of rape and the strength of taboos and other impediments to reporting. The weighted scale ranges from 0 (little or no rape) to 4 (high incidence of rape).\textsuperscript{20} The primary limitation of this data is that it is only available for a single year (2011). This means that we cannot use it to track changes over time in response to the Committee’s General Recommendations. It can only be used to compare countries in that one year.

The primary explanatory variables in the models in Table 1 and Table 2 are the laws and institutions created by countries.\textsuperscript{21} As we have seen in Figures 1–4, states are far more likely to create such laws and institutions if they are party to CEDAW.\textsuperscript{22} Here laws and institutions are represented as dummy variables, with 0 indicating that a country does not have a qualifying law/institution and 1 indicating that it does.\textsuperscript{23} A dummy variable for CEDAW ratification is also included to test whether ratification of CEDAW has an effect even without the creation of a violence-specific law or institution.

In addition, three control variables are included in the models: tax as a proportion of GDP, GDP per capita, and urbanization. Tax as a proportion of GDP is employed as a measure of state capacity, reflecting each state’s ability to enforce laws and operate institutions effectively.\textsuperscript{24} GDP per capita is included as a measure of economic development, which has widely been found to influence respect for human rights in general.\textsuperscript{25} Urbanization is included because crime tends to be higher in urban areas, and a higher proportion of urban residents would, therefore, lead to a higher incidence of rape, all

\textsuperscript{20} For details on the construction and weighting of the score, see Codebook, WOMENSTATS, http://womanstats.org/CodebookCurrent.htm#LRW (last updated Mar. 2014).

\textsuperscript{21} See infra Tables 1–2.

\textsuperscript{22} See infra Figures 1–4.

\textsuperscript{23} See infra Tables 1–2.

\textsuperscript{24} For a discussion of tax as a proportion of GDP as an indicator of state capacity, see Neil A. Englehart, State Capacity, State Failure, and Human Rights, 46 J. PEACE RES. 163, 168 (2009). The data used here are an updated version of the data employed in that article.

\textsuperscript{25} This finding goes back to the earliest quantitative work on human rights. See Neil J. Mitchell & James M. McCormick, Note, Economic and Political Explanations of Human Rights Violations, 40 WORLD POL. 476, 478-79 (1988). It has been replicated in innumerable subsequent studies. For replication in the context of CEDAW, see generally Englehart & Miller, supra note 1.
other things being equal. The variable indicates the proportion of the population of each country living in urban areas.26

As Table 1 shows, the Womenstats data offers limited and inconsistent support for the idea that Recommendations 12 and 19 have significantly affected the incidence of rape, although the results are somewhat inconclusive.27 Table 1 separately assesses statutes and programs against gender violence and domestic violence. None of these has a statistically significant effect. Furthermore, the coefficients for laws and institutions against gender violence are positive, indicating that they are associated with higher incidence of rape. Law and institutions against domestic violence, which are more numerous, have negative coefficients. Domestic violence laws are significant at the .10 level, indicating that they are associated with less rape.

It is impossible to interpret statistically insignificant results, since by definition they could be the product of random variation and not indicative of real relationships. On the other hand, there are reasons we might give some weight to these results. The small number of cases (N) contributes to the inconclusive results, since it is difficult to derive statistically significant results from small samples. On the other hand, the data covers a large proportion of existing states—approximately two-thirds of the countries in the world—suggesting the results may be somewhat more reliable than normal with such a small sample.

Most of the control variables behave as expected in these models. Urbanization is associated with more rape, although its impact is very small and not statistically significant. Tax as a proportion of GDP and GDP per capita are both statistically significant and associated with less rape, probably reflecting better law-enforcement capabilities on the part of higher-income and higher-capacity states.

Surprisingly, CEDAW ratification is not only not significant, but also has a positive coefficient, indicating it is associated with more rape. This result is somewhat puzzling, like the positive finding for anti-gender violence laws and institutions. One possible reason for both findings may be that the models presented in Table 1 do not


27. See infra Table 1.
allow enough time for the effects of the treaty and gender-violence measures to become effective.

Table 1 shows results with a one-year lag, so the models predict the incidence of rape one year after the independent variables were measured. Laws and institutions may, however, only produce measureable results after a longer period of time. Indeed, the positive coefficients for gender-violence institutions and laws could indicate that they tend to be created in places where they are especially needed and that they take more than one year to be implemented. To test for this, Table 2 shows results for a five-year lag: the independent variables predict results five years into the future.

In Table 2 all the variables of interest—gender violence laws and institutions, and domestic violence laws and institutions—have negative coefficients. They are therefore associated with less rape. However, none are statistically significant, except for domestic-violence institutions. Once again, the problem of a small N is probably interfering with the results, making it more difficult to achieve statistical significance. Again, however, the data captures a relatively large proportion of the universe of existing countries, suggesting we might have more confidence in the results than we ordinarily would with such low-significance scores.

CEDAW also takes on a negative coefficient in these models and is statistically significant across all four models. Again, it appears that one year is not sufficient time for the Treaty’s effects to become manifest, but they do become apparent after a longer time span.

The other control variables again behave much as expected. Urbanization has a positive effect, but it is very small and not statistically significant. Tax as a proportion of GDP and GDP per capita are both significant again, and have negative coefficients.

The rape data thus does not offer strong confirmation that States parties efforts to comply with the CEDAW Committee’s General Recommendations 12 and 19 have reduced violence against women, but neither does it rule out that possibility. The difference between the one- and five-year-lagged models does suggest that the impacts of these laws and institutions take some years to become effective. This conclusion makes considerable intuitive sense: it takes time for bureaucracies to gear up to enforce new laws and

28. See infra Table 2.
29. Compare infra Table 1, with infra Table 2.
30. See infra Table 2.
formulate new programs, for public awareness to spread, and for people to change their behavior. However, the absence of statistical significance indicates that the findings for gender-violence laws and institutions, as well as for domestic-violence laws, must be treated with extreme caution, even in the five-year-lag models. Although they generally point in the expected direction in the five-year-lagged models in Table 2, the lack of statistical significance indicates that the findings could be due to random variation rather than real causal patterns.

CONCLUSION

In sum, States parties have done a lot to comply with General Recommendations 12 and 19, but with limited effect. CEDAW States parties are far more likely to pass laws against gender and domestic violence than non-parties and are more likely to create anti-violence laws and programs. However, this has only been true since the CEDAW Committee’s General Recommendations were issued, providing strong evidence that these new initiatives are a direct product of the General Recommendations. However, those laws and programs have an uncertain, and at best modest, effect on violence against women. Furthermore, these effects take several years to become manifest.

The finding that States parties have complied with General Recommendations 12 and 19 is interesting from the perspective of international law. In the literature on treaty compliance, there is a tendency to treat international agreements as static. Once States parties ratify and accept the obligations entailed in the treaty, attention generally focuses on what States parties do or do not do to comply. However, treaties such as CEDAW that have committees and reporting requirements are not complete at the moment of ratification. Rather, they provide for ongoing consultation and negotiation among States parties about the meaning of the text. In some cases, such as the CEDAW Committee’s recommendations about gender violence, this may lead to important changes in the expectations for the behavior of States parties, even without any


32. See, e.g., CEDAW, supra note 5, at 22.
formal renegotiation of the text. Indeed, States parties cannot even lodge reservations against such changes.

The second finding, that the actions of States parties have only a modest effect on the incidence of gender violence, and only after several years, presents an important caution against inflated expectations of the impact of treaty law. This is especially pertinent to the newer wave of human rights treaties, such as CEDAW, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which require not just that States parties abstain from abuse, but also that they seek to transform social structures and individual attitudes associated with discrimination and abusive practices. States parties may often lack the ability to effect such transformations, regardless of how willing they may be to make the attempt.

Treaty compliance is often framed, rather simplistically, as a matter of state will. The presumption is that if States parties wish to comply, they will and that failure to comply must indicate that governments have ratified for cynical reasons, without intending to comply. However, the results above point to a more complex reality. Many States parties were willing to comply with General Recommendations 12 and 19 by passing laws and creating institutions. However, these institutions and laws have at best a modest effect on gender violence.

Sally Engle Merry argues that human rights treaties are important for the cultural work they do, shaping the perceptions and worldview of elites to conform to a vision of international modernity. The finding that states rapidly conformed to General Recommendations 12 and 19, despite their rather loose basis in the treaty itself, suggests that Engle is correct about elite responsiveness. The wider cultural and social changes that might follow from this shift in elite attitudes are beyond the scope of this paper; the data do not support the analysis of such long-term change. The fact that the


34. See Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1823, 1842 (2002).

35. See id. at 1841-43.

coefficients for laws and institutions become negative with a five-year lag is, however, suggestive of a deeper change. Not surprisingly, international law—at least in the case of violence against women—appears to require some time to trickle down from elite commitments and through national institutions before it can produce social and cultural change at the grassroots.
Figure 1:
Number of Countries with Anti-Gender Violence Laws, 1980-2012

Source: Country CEDAW reports, Secretary General’s Database on Violence Against Women

Figure 2:
Number of Countries with Anti-Gender Violence Institutions, 1980-2012

Source: Country CEDAW reports, Secretary General’s Database on Violence Against Women
Figure 3:
Number of Countries with Anti-Domestic Violence Laws, 1980-2012

Source: Country CEDAW reports, Secretary General’s Database on Violence Against Women

Figure 4:
Number of Countries with Anti-Domestic Violence Institutions, 1980-2012

Source: Country CEDAW reports, Secretary General’s Database on Violence Against Women
Table 1:
Predictors of Womenstats Weighted Rape Score, one year lag

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender Violence Law</th>
<th>Domestic Violence Law</th>
<th>Gender Violence Institution</th>
<th>Domestic Violence Institution</th>
<th>Urban Population</th>
<th>Tax/ GDP</th>
<th>CEDAW</th>
<th>GDP per capita</th>
<th>Constant</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>R²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>.07 (.18)</td>
<td>-26† (.16)</td>
<td>.08 (.15)</td>
<td>-.11 (.17)</td>
<td>.00 (.01)</td>
<td>-2.89** (92)</td>
<td>.13 (.89)</td>
<td>-.43** (.11)</td>
<td>6.70** (1.20)</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Violence Law</td>
<td>.00 (.01)</td>
<td>.00 (.01)</td>
<td>.00 (.01)</td>
<td>.00 (.01)</td>
<td>-3.02** (.91)</td>
<td>.01 (.87)</td>
<td>-.40** (.11)</td>
<td>6.72** (1.18)</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Violence Institution</td>
<td>.00 (.01)</td>
<td>.00 (.01)</td>
<td>.00 (.01)</td>
<td>.00 (.01)</td>
<td>-2.80** (.92)</td>
<td>.12 (.88)</td>
<td>-.43** (.11)</td>
<td>6.62** (1.19)</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Violence Institution</td>
<td>.00 (.01)</td>
<td>.00 (.01)</td>
<td>.00 (.01)</td>
<td>.00 (.01)</td>
<td>-3.34** (.96)</td>
<td>.04 (.88)</td>
<td>-.39** (.12)</td>
<td>6.57** (1.19)</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>.44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OLS regression: **p < .01; *p < .05; †p < .10. Numbers in brackets are standard errors. Sources: Womenstats, World Bank World Development Indicators, United Nations.37

37. See supra notes 20, 24-26.
Table 2: Predictors of Womenstats Weighted Rape Score, five year lag

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender Violence Law</th>
<th>Domestic Violence Law</th>
<th>Gender Violence Institution</th>
<th>Domestic Violence Institution</th>
<th>Urban Population</th>
<th>Tax/ GDP</th>
<th>CEDAW</th>
<th>GDP per capita</th>
<th>Constant</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>R²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-0.07 (.20)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.17 (.16)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.00 (.01)</td>
<td>-2.58** (.82)</td>
<td>-1.25* (.62)</td>
<td>-0.40** (.11)</td>
<td>-7.82** (.96)</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Violence Law</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.17 (.16)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.00 (.01)</td>
<td>-2.63** (.83)</td>
<td>-1.19† (.62)</td>
<td>-0.38** (.11)</td>
<td>-7.59** (1.00)</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Violence Institution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.00 (.01)</td>
<td>-3.08** (.91)</td>
<td>-1.17† (.61)</td>
<td>-0.34** (.11)</td>
<td>-7.38** (1.00)</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Violence Institution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.00 (.01)</td>
<td>-2.63** (.82)</td>
<td>-1.23* (.61)</td>
<td>-0.37** (.11)</td>
<td>7.59** (.96)</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>.46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OLS regression: **p < .01; *p < .05; †p < .10.
Numbers in brackets are standard errors.
Sources: Womenstats, World Bank World Development Indicators, United Nations.38

38. See supra notes 20, 24-26