State Takeovers of School Districts and Related Litigation: Michigan as a Case Study

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In 2011, I published an article in which I argued that state takeovers of school districts are the best of the various legal mechanisms available to school districts in fiscal crisis—better than a general state receivership, and definitely better than municipal bankruptcy, which is not even available to school districts in twenty-six states.1 I contended that takeover mechanisms should be gradual and progressive, providing a school district with ample notice and opportunity to try to get its own financial house in order before it is divested of some or all authority over financial matters.2 One of the states I focused on as having a model takeover statute was my own state, Michigan.3 As that article was going to press, Michigan changed its emergency financial manager statute drastically, extending the authority of an emergency financial manager over the local government she or he manages and giving the governor substantially more autonomy when selecting the individuals whose new title, “emergency managers,” reflected that their authority was no longer limited to financial matters.4 These changes gained national attention.5

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2. Id. at 953-58.
3. Id. at 925-30, 953-58.
Michigan citizens’ resistance and challenges to the state’s new emergency manager statute were substantial, sometimes taking place in courtrooms and, in November, 2012, at the ballot box. As this paper was going to press, Michigan enacted yet another emergency manager statute, and although that statute curtails emergency managers’ authority in some respects, it retains many of its predecessor’s shortcomings.

The question of the proper role of a state in school districts’ fiscal crises is an important one. Like Michigan, numerous states have been grappling with that same question—Indiana, Missouri, and Rhode Island, for example. Accordingly, learning about what has been happening in Michigan provides an exceptional opportunity for legislators, attorneys, academics, and advocates from across the country to reflect on how their own states should assist school districts in fiscal crisis, and when state intervention goes too far. Part I of this paper briefly discusses the various legal mechanisms for state intervention in school districts’ and other municipalities’ fiscal crises; it also analyzes Michigan’s 1988, 1990, and 2011 takeover statutes and the litigation and other public opposition to those statutes. Part II focuses on four substantial shortcomings contained in Michigan’s 2011 takeover statute, which was ultimately rescinded by Michigan voters.

7. See Bowman, supra note 1, at 927-30.
10. See Anderson, supra note 9. Michelle Wilde Anderson is one of the few scholars to focus on Michigan’s new statute.
I. Michigan’s Takeovers of School Districts

The question of if or how states should intervene in local governments’ fiscal crises has presented itself often in recent years, which have been financially very challenging times for state and local governments including school districts. In 2011, Michigan responded to this economic situation by modifying one of the legal mechanisms it makes available to local governments in fiscal crisis: its state takeover statute. Michigan now has three school districts under the control of an emergency financial manager.

A. Bankruptcy, Receivership, and State Takeover

Three legal mechanisms that may be available to a local government in fiscal distress are regulated by the state in which that local government entity is located. The first option, a Chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy, is a restructuring bankruptcy. It is not a liquidation bankruptcy because school districts, unlike for-profit businesses, cannot merely wind up their affairs without substantial public impact. Bankruptcy is a creature of federal law, and states must explicitly give permission for their local government entities to declare bankruptcy—only twenty-four states do so, including Michigan. A Chapter 9 bankruptcy can be advantageous to a school district because the school district continues operations while its major expenditures are modified. Bankruptcy courts’ powers are limited due to federalism concerns, and because of this limitation, often a bankruptcy court cannot require the changes that would address the school district’s underlying cause of fiscal distress. Moreover, bankruptcy is a costly process.

Second, states may have parallel provisions to municipal bankruptcy, generally known as municipal receivership statutes. Only two states authorize school districts to enter into municipal receivership. The authority of a court-appointed receiver is more far-reaching than that of a bankruptcy court, but receivership is almost never used.

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15. See Bowman, supra note 1, at 918-20.
16. Id. at 919.
17. Id. at 922.
18. Id. at 921-22.
19. Id. at 923. These states are Kentucky and Pennsylvania. Id.
Receivership requires substantial expenditures by a school district due to the judicial nature of the mechanism and, moreover, receivership involves procedures often more stringent than a school district needs. Neither federal bankruptcy nor state judicial receivership were designed for school districts, thus it is not entirely surprising that those options are not a solid fit for addressing school districts’ fiscal crises.

The third and final legal mechanism available to school districts in fiscal crisis is a state takeover mechanism. Although general municipalities can be subject to state takeovers, statutes usually regulate the takeover of school districts separately from the takeover of other municipalities. Thirty-three states permit a state takeover of a school district for academic and/or fiscal reasons. The most comprehensive statutes: (1) specify factors that trigger various levels of state involvement, (2) contain a series of escalating types of state involvement with a takeover being the most extreme form of state involvement, (3) make clear the extent of the state’s authority at the various levels of involvement, and (4) contain criteria for terminating the state’s involvement. At least seventy-six state takeovers of school districts have occurred in the past thirty years, and school districts regularly emerge from takeovers with increased fiscal stability.

Although takeovers regularly produce greater fiscal stability in school districts, they consistently are unable to produce academic gains. Additionally, local communities often resist state intervention and sometimes express this resistance through litigation. I do not intend to suggest that either the resistance or the litigation that flow from a state takeover are entirely illegitimate, though—takeovers do replace elected officials in whole or in part with an agent appointed by the state, and the proper balance between state and local control is an important and controversial issue.

20. Id. at 924.
21. This is sometimes referred to as receivership, although it is different than the statutory authorization of a judicially imposed receivership. Thus, I designate this type of intervention as a takeover.
22. Bowman, supra note 1, at 925.
23. Id. at 926-27; see Anderson, supra note 9, at 584.
24. See Joseph O. Oluwole & Preston C. Green, III, State Takeovers of School Districts: Race and the Equal Protection Clause, 42 Ind. L. Rev. 343, 363-94 (2009). The takeover of public school districts in Detroit, Highland Park, and Muskegon Heights occurred after the publication of this article. That brings the total to 76, by my count, not including takeovers since 2009 in states other than Michigan.
25. Bowman, supra note 1, at 927.
26. Id. at 927-30; see cases cited infra Part I.B.2.

1. THE LEGISLATION

Since the late 1980s, four Michigan statutes have regulated state intervention in local governments in fiscal crisis.27 The first, the Local Government Fiscal Responsibility Act,28 was enacted in 1988. It created Michigan’s fiscal crisis early warning system and gave the state more extensive and clearer authority to intervene in fiscally troubled municipalities.29 The 1988 statute did not apply to school districts, prompting a state senator to introduce a bill in 1989 that would repeal the statute and “re-enact it under the same name, containing virtually identical language for local units of government but adding similar provisions for school districts.”30

Proponents of the second piece of legislation contended that the state’s existing means of monitoring and addressing school districts’ fiscal difficulties were “inadequate” because the state could require a district to submit a plan for eliminating a deficit, but the only sanction the state could impose on a district that failed to comply was withholding the per-pupil state allocation in whole or in part.31 The then-existing state statutory and regulatory framework did not permit any earlier, or any other, involvement by the state.32 The need for state involvement was not abstract—nearly thirty school districts had a deficit in the 1988-1989 school year, including the Detroit Public Schools, which had a deficit of about $150 million that amounted to 19% of its operating expenses.33 The bill introduced in 1989 became the state’s second municipal takeover statute in 1990 and has since been known in Michigan as Public Act 72.

27. The most recent statute was signed into law as this article was going to press. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
31. See id. at 1. Although withholding funding may seem to be a draconian measure that would penalize a financially troubled school district, this is the same remedy that provides the federal government with substantial authority to enforce compliance with Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1972). It does not appear, however, as though Michigan’s involvement in school districts’ fiscal crises was anywhere as extensive or effective as the federal government’s Title IX enforcement.
33. Id. at 1.
Public Act 72 contained three parts. Article I explained the necessity of the program and the valid public purpose underlying it; Article II reenacted the 1988 statute under the section heading “Governmental Provisions”; Article III adapted the substance of Article II for school districts and was titled “School District Provisions.” Article III contained a series of detailed procedures regulating state involvement in financially troubled school districts, beginning with limited state involvement—primarily investigation, and the potential negotiation of a consent agreement between the district and the state—and, if a financial emergency did not abate, ultimately escalating to the appointment of an emergency financial manager. The state superintendent of public instruction was involved throughout all stages of state intervention; for example, although the governor appointed the emergency financial manager, the governor chose that person from a short list provided by the state board of education, and the state board selected its candidates from a longer list provided by the state superintendent of public instruction. The emergency financial manager’s authority was delineated in the statute and included actions specific to school districts such as recommending school district consolidation to the governor. The manager’s authority was substantial: it included the “authority and responsibilities affecting the financial condition of the school district that are prescribed by law to the school board and superintendent of the school district” and the ability to authorize the school district to proceed in a Chapter 9 federal bankruptcy.

Proponents of Public Act 72 contended that the statute would give the state a series of progressive steps that would constitute a meaningful way to help both local governments and school districts maintain their solvency. This authority was, and is, especially important in school districts because, as the legislative history notes, “educational reform cannot be achieved in an environment of educational insolvency.” Opponents of Public Act 72 contended that the legislation undermined local control and reduced or eliminated the public’s role in, and knowledge about, the operations of local government.

34. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 141.1231-44 (Public Act 72 was repealed following the 2012 election).
35. Id. §§ 141.1233-35, .1238, .1242.
36. Id.
37. Id. § 141.1241.
38. Id. §§ 141.1241(2)(t), 141.1241(3).
40. Id. at 8.
41. Id.
These arguments were magnified in 2011 when a state representative introduced a proposal to repeal Public Act 72 and implement new fiscal accountability measures for municipalities and school districts. This bill, the Local Government and School District Financial Accountability Act, became effective on March 16, 2011. It was the state’s third municipal takeover statute, known in Michigan as Public Act 4.

Public Act 4 differed from Public Act 72 in many ways. Although Public Act 4 contained many controversial provisions, some aspects of Public Act 4 were improvements to Public Act 72. First, Public Act 4 contained specific criteria for determining whether a local government, including a school district, was in severe financial stress, in mild financial stress, or under no financial stress. Second, it contained measures that required more frequent and extensive public reporting by an emergency manager. Public Act 4 also retained a basic principle from Public Act 72: state intervention escalates over time.

What was most controversial about Public Act 4 was reflected in the change of title from “emergency financial manager” to “emergency manager”; thus, Public Act 4 vested substantially more authority in managers than Public Act 72 had. Under Public Act 4, when a school district was under emergency management, neither the school board nor the superintendent could “exercise any of the powers of those offices except as may be specifically authorized in writing by the emergency manager and are subject to any conditions required by the emergency manager.” Instead, the emergency manager could “[e]xercise

43. Id.
44. There is also a substantial structural change that appears to make almost no difference in substance: Public Act 4 contains one set of rules and procedures to govern municipalities and school districts alike, with some parallel sub-provisions for municipalities and school districts and one short additional section for school districts alone. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 141.1520; see, e.g., id. § 141.1512(2)(o)-(p). Public Act 4 does not explicitly allow an emergency manager (“EM”) to recommend to the governor that school districts consolidate. Nevertheless, this appears to be the only way in which a school district EM’s authority is more limited under Public Act 4 than under Public Act 72.
45. Id. § 141.1514; see Anderson, supra note 9, at 586-87.
46. Mich. Comp. Laws § 141.1522; see also Anderson, supra note 9, at 587-88 (discussing the “financial and operating plan” the emergency manager is required to present to the public).
48. Anderson, supra note 9, at 588-89, 591.
the authority and responsibilities affecting the financial condition of the school district that are prescribed by law to the school board and superintendent of the school district.\textsuperscript{50} This included \textquote[Id. \textsection 141.1241(2)(t).]{\textquotedblleft}issuing\textquoteto the appropriate local elected and appointed officials and employees . . . orders for the timely and satisfactory implementation of a financial and operating plan . . . including an academic and educational plan for a school district.\textquoteright\textsuperscript{51} Additionally, the emergency manager could unilaterally modify collective bargaining agreements,\textsuperscript{52} suspend collective bargaining for up to five years, and remove all pension board members if the pension plan is not sufficiently funded.\textsuperscript{53} These changes and others were summarized in a provision toward the end of Public Act 4, which stipulated that \textquote[Id. \textsection 141.1519(2).]{\textquotel}[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this act . . . the authority of the chief administrative officer and governing body to exercise power for and on behalf of the local government under law, charter, and ordinance shall be suspended and vested in the emergency manager.\textquoteright\textsuperscript{54}

In addition to expanding the authority of emergency managers, Public Act 4 gave the governor substantially greater autonomy when appointing emergency managers than the governor had under Public Act 72. Under Public Act 72, the emergency financial assistance loan board appointed an emergency financial manager for a municipality,\textsuperscript{55} and the governor appointed an emergency financial manager for a school district with the advice and consent of the state senate after provided with input from the state superintendent and the state board of education.\textsuperscript{56} Under Public Act 4, the governor appointed emergency managers for municipalities and school districts without the advice and consent of the senate and without input required from other government officials, elected or appointed.\textsuperscript{57}

2. APPLICATION AND LITIGATION

Between 1990 and 2011, when Public Act 72 was in force, emergency financial managers were appointed in seven municipalities and in one

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\textsuperscript{50} Id. \textsection 141.1241(2)(t).
\textsuperscript{51} Id. \textsection 141.1517(1); see also id. \textsection 141.1518(1)(e) (explaining, among other requirements, the financial and operating plan shall provide an academic and educational plan for school districts).
\textsuperscript{52} Id. \textsection 141.1519(1)(k).
\textsuperscript{53} Id. \textsection 141.1519(1)(m).
\textsuperscript{54} Id. \textsection 141.1519(2).
\textsuperscript{55} Id. \textsection 141.1218.
\textsuperscript{56} Id. \textsection 141.1238 (1).
\textsuperscript{57} Id. \textsection 141.1515(4).
school district: Detroit Public Schools.\textsuperscript{58} Emergency financial managers’ authority was often contested publicly and sometimes even in court.\textsuperscript{59} At least two lawsuits involved the Detroit Public Schools’ 2009-2011 emergency financial manager Robert Bobb, who acted under the authority of Public Act 72. In the first lawsuit, Bobb’s compensation was challenged because his salary was subsidized in part by the Eli Broad Foundation, and the circuit court held that the salary subsidy was valid.\textsuperscript{60} In the second lawsuit, the Detroit Public Schools Board of Education sued Bobb, claiming that he had exceeded his authority by making academic decisions and seeking to enjoin him from doing so in the future.\textsuperscript{61} The school board initially won in the circuit court under Public Act 72.\textsuperscript{62}

Bobb’s successor, Detroit Public Schools emergency manager Roy Roberts, was also involved in litigation. First, unions representing Detroit teachers, paraprofessionals, and office employees challenged the provision of Public Act 4 that gave emergency managers authority to unilaterally change collective bargaining agreements, and the case was ultimately settled.\textsuperscript{63} Second, an individual requested that the Michigan Attorney General oust Roberts from his office because Roberts had not taken an oath of office in a timely manner.\textsuperscript{64} This matter eventually

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{61} Mark Brush & Jennifer Guerra, \textit{Detroit Board of Education wins lawsuit against Robert Bobb}, \texttt{MICHIGAN RADIO} (Dec. 6, 2010, 5:15 PM), \url{http://michiganradio.org/post/detroit-board-education-wins-lawsuit-against-robert-bobb}.
  \item \textsuperscript{62} Judge gives Robert Bobb total return of Detroit Public Schools due to new financial manager law, \texttt{MLIVE} (Mar. 19, 2011, 10:02 AM), \url{http://www.mlive.com/news/detroit/index.ssf/2011/03/judge_gives_robert_bobb_total.html}.
  \item \textsuperscript{64} \textit{See Davis}, 810 N.W.2d 555.
\end{itemize}
came before the Michigan Supreme Court, but by that time Governor Rick Snyder had reappointed Roberts to the position, and Roberts immediately took an oath of office.65 Third, Roberts decided to shift fifteen Detroit Public Schools—containing about 7,000 students—to a statewide school district composed of the state’s poorest-performing schools.66 The school board contested that decision in court, but the decision was upheld.67 The teachers’ union stated that it may sue to contest the termination of 400 union employees under a process established by the emergency manager, but as of late 2012, no suit was filed.68

After the enactment of Public Act 4, emergency managers were appointed to oversee two additional school districts, Highland Park and Muskegon Heights.69 Highland Park School District exists as a figuraiine island in the middle of Detroit, while Muskegon Heights School District is located adjacent to the city of Muskegon on the west side of the state. Both districts have since turned over their academic programs to charter school companies.70 In both districts, this decision was made by the emergency manager alone.71 A Highland Park school board member who is himself the subject of federal corruption charges described this decision as essentially “dissolving the [school] district” and asked the Michigan Court of Appeals, in a separate ongoing lawsuit, to remove Highland Park’s emergency manager.72 State Board members expressed concern about the pattern of school districts under emergency management becoming districts of charter schools.73

65. Id. at 555.
69. Id.
73. Dave Murray, Emergency manager recommends Highland Park become a charter school district, as state educators fear plan will spread to others, MLIVE (June 18, 2012, 5:52 PM), http://www.mlive.com/education/index.ssf/2012/06/emergency_manager_recommends_h.html.
During this time, other litigation challenged whether a governor-appointed financial review team was a public body subject to the open meetings act (an appellate court held in 2012 that it was not); 74 whether the state could refuse certain discovery requests in a case that challenged the facial validity of the law (an appellate court held in 2012 that it could); 75 and—most significantly—whether a petition to initiate a public recall of Public Act 4 by placing the question on the November 2012 ballot complied with statutory requirements about the petition’s typeface (the Michigan Supreme Court held in Stand Up for Democracy v. Secretary of State that it did). 76 The petition contained 203,238 valid signatures, far in excess of the number required for a ballot recall. 77

The Michigan Supreme Court issued its Stand Up for Democracy decision on Friday, August 3, 2012, 78 putting the recall question on the November 2012 ballot. Three days later, on Monday, August 6, 2012, Michigan Attorney General Bill Schuette issued an advisory opinion concluding that Public Act 4 was suspended until the results of the November 2012 ballot referendum were certified. 79 In the interim, Public Act 72 was “temporarily revived.” Furthermore, the Attorney General opined that if the voters were to nullify Public Act 4, which included a legislative repeal of Public Act 72, then Public Act 72 would be permanently revived. 80 A lawsuit subsequently challenged the Attorney General’s advisory opinion, arguing that the effect of staying Public Act 4 was not to revive Public Act 72, but rather to leave the state without an emergency manager statute. 81 Eight days after the Attorney General’s advisory opinion was issued, a circuit court judge held that the then-temporarily-revived Public Act 72 vested power in the Detroit Public Schools’ board and superintendent.

77. Id. at 161.
78. Id. at 159.
80. See id.
to exercise control over the district’s academics, and gave the emergency manager control over the district’s finances.\footnote{Chambers, supra note 67.}

On November 6, 2012, Michigan voters voted to rescind Public Act 4 via a ballot referendum by a slim margin; 52% of the votes cast were in favor of rescinding, 48% were against.\footnote{Paul Egan, After Emergency Manager Law Repeal, Any New Legislation Will Be Balancing Act, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Nov. 8, 2012, http://www.freep.com/article/20121108/NEWS15/311080112/After-emergency-manager-law-repeal-any-new-legislation-will-be-balancing-act.} Under the Attorney General’s advisory opinion, Public Act 72 was then reinstated, though this reinstatement was brief. During the Michigan legislature’s lame duck session in mid-December 2012, the legislature passed the state’s fourth emergency manager statute. On December 26, 2012, the governor signed the bill into law.\footnote{Local Financial Stability and Choice Act, 2012 Mich. Pub. Acts 436.}

II. Lessons from Michigan

As the long stream of litigation and the successful ballot recall effort make clear, Public Act 4 was the subject of substantial resistance by Michigan citizens. Even though Public Act 4 was rescinded in November 2012, various states—including Indiana, Michigan, Missouri, and Rhode Island—continue to actively examine the role they should play in local governments’ and school districts’ fiscal crises.\footnote{See Egan, supra note 11.} Thus, it is still important to consider what we can learn from Public Act 4 about best practices for state intervention in school districts mired in fiscal crisis.

A. Comprehensive Takeover Triggered by Financial Crisis Alone

Some states’ statutes permit a state to engage in a comprehensive academic and fiscal takeover of a local school district.\footnote{Bowman, supra note 1, at 925.} When a comprehensive takeover occurs, it is common for that takeover to be triggered by both the district’s financial shortcomings and its academic inadequacies.\footnote{See generally MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-17-6, 37-18-7 (2012); (Mississippi’s takeover statute); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 69 § 1J, 1K (2012); 603 MASS. CODE REGS. § 2.01-2.06, 2.03 (2012) (Massachusetts’s takeover statute).} Public Act 72 authorized fiscal takeovers, and as such, it only considered a district’s fiscal situation when considering whether state involvement was appropriate.\footnote{MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1233.} Public Act 4 contained more spe-
cific criteria than Public Act 72 did for determining whether a district is in fiscal crisis, and it continued to focus on a district’s fiscal situation when deciding whether a takeover is appropriate. Under Public Act 4, however, a district’s fiscal crisis alone triggered a comprehensive takeover. Fiscal crisis and academic crisis often do go hand in hand, but a high correlation between the two does not justify using a district’s fiscal crisis to trigger a comprehensive takeover. A fundamental legal principle is that a remedy should be tailored to the violation. Moreover, education is, as the United States Supreme Court stated in Brown v. Board of Education, “perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.” To remove local control over a district’s educational program without evaluating the quality of that academic program is to unfairly impose a radical executive branch remedy for a violation that has not been proven.

B. Where Do Finances Stop and Academics Begin?

In the past three years, the Detroit Public Schools’ board of education sued two different emergency managers, contesting each manager’s authority over academic affairs. Under Public Act 72, the school board and superintendent had authority over academics and the emergency financial manager had authority over finances; the division was straightforward but, as a circuit court judge who adjudicated one of these cases noted, “the devil is in the details.” Under Public Act 4, school districts’ emergency financial managers had comprehensive authority over districts “academic plan[s]” as well as their finances. The question of authority thus had a clear-cut answer under Public Act 4, but easy answers are not always the best solution.

School districts are local government entities whose primary purpose is education. Emergency managers of school districts may or

89. Id. § 141.1518.
93. See supra Part I.B.
may not be well-versed in the pedagogical advantages and disadvantages of various academic policies, but their foremost function, even under Public Act 4, is to bring financial stability to a district; therefore, managers should have both municipal finance and budgetary expertise. Some changes a manager may make are clearly non-academic: exposing corruption, streamlining administrative operations, and contracting out non-academic services will not affect a district’s educational mission.95 Those types of changes, however, can only take a manager so far. Sooner or later, discussion will turn to topics regarding the district’s instructional program, such as class size, length of school year, curriculum and materials. At a certain level, this discussion is appropriate because a manager should push a district to reevaluate whether the district is getting the most academic bang for its buck. Yet, classifying a policy change as financial or academic is difficult and sometimes impossible. The following excerpt from a 2010 Time magazine article about former Detroit Public Schools and emergency financial manager Robert Bobb illustrates the overlap:

Bobb acknowledges that cost-shaving measures have made some high school classrooms “look like lecture halls.” They have also raised the potential for clashes between students from rival schools and neighborhoods suddenly thrown together under the same roof; as a result 137 guidance counselors cut by Bobb were later hired back. Bobb had a similar change of heart after 20 piano teachers were dismissed. “You go back to your apartment and think, how can you have a school of music without a piano teacher?” Bobb says. So he hired them back too. Barbara Byrd-Bennett, Bobb’s chief academic officer and a former CEO of Cleveland’s public schools, says she often greeted Bobb’s proposed cuts with a single question: “Is this good for the kids?”96

To answer that question, a manager ideally would work cooperatively with the school board, superintendent, and administrative staff—people who have devoted years and careers to a school district and who have a long-term investment in the education that district provides. But a cooperative relationship between a manager and the superintendent/board rarely seems to develop, and a manager is left making decisions about academics without the benefit of the people in the district who may know the district, and the education, better than the manager. A constant stream of litigation often results. Even though granting managers complete authority over a school district’s academics—as

Public Act 4 required—would end that stream of litigation, that broad grant of authority can result in dangerous consequences.

For example, as previously mentioned, two Michigan school districts under the control of emergency managers became districts of charter schools during summer 2012. In both districts, the decision to convert all public schools to charter schools was made by the emergency manager alone—not by the superintendent, not by the school board. Admittedly this is a financially creative approach because the charter schools will operate on state funding alone while the local property tax revenues will be applied to each school district’s debt.97 But, these decisions demonstrate what Michelle Wilde Anderson has termed “democratic dissolution”: a local government’s “municipal corporate form” is preserved, but its self-rule is “functionally dissolve[d].”98 Public Act 72 did not go so far that it essentially dissolved the local government aspect of public education. Public Act 4 did, and the consequences of this remain visible in Highland Park and Muskegon Heights.

C. The Students in the School Districts in Fiscal Crisis

In Michigan, and quite likely in other states, school districts subject to state takeover are not a random sample of all of the districts across the state. The general municipalities under emergency managers’ authority in Michigan are disproportionately full of African-American citizens.99 The Michigan school districts under emergency managers’ control share this disparate impact, which may be particularly troubling given our nation’s history of disenfranchising African-Americans.100 Table 1 provides the most recent demographics not only for the three now-taken-over districts, but also for all Michigan public schools.

98. Anderson, supra note 9, at 600.
99. Id. at 590.
Table 1: 2010-2011 Racial/Ethnic Composition of Michigan School Districts Under Emergency Managers’ Authority in 2012*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Detroit Public Schools</th>
<th>Highland Park School District</th>
<th>Muskegon Heights School District</th>
<th>Michigan—all public schools</th>
<th>% of 2010-11 statewide students in 2012 EM districts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American Indian/Alaskan</td>
<td>&lt;1% (242)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>&lt;1% (4)</td>
<td>&lt;1% (14,423)</td>
<td>2% (246)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian/ Pacific Islander</td>
<td>1% (754)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>&lt;1% (2)</td>
<td>3% (42,419)</td>
<td>2% (756)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>87% (64,732)</td>
<td>100% (1,265)</td>
<td>93% (1,360)</td>
<td>19% (293,517)</td>
<td>23% (67,357)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>9% (6,616)</td>
<td>&lt;1% (1)</td>
<td>3% (50)</td>
<td>6% (89,911)</td>
<td>7% (6,667)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>3% (1,917)</td>
<td>&lt;1% (3)</td>
<td>3% (45)</td>
<td>70% (1,084,441)</td>
<td>&lt;1% (1,965)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two or more races</td>
<td>&lt;1% (15)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>&lt;1% (5)</td>
<td>2% (29,013)</td>
<td>&lt;1% (20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free and Reduced Lunch</td>
<td>80% (59,457)</td>
<td>72% (916)</td>
<td>92% (1,343)</td>
<td>46% (719,800)</td>
<td>9% (61,716)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited English Proficient/English Language Learner</td>
<td>9% (6,875)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4% (56,474)</td>
<td>1% (6,875)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total enrollment</td>
<td>74,261</td>
<td>1,269</td>
<td>1,461</td>
<td>1,552,046</td>
<td>5% (76,991)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Enrollments in all three districts are falling—and that is part of the problem, that each district receives less total state funding year after year because state funding is allocated primarily on a per capita basis, and districts’ debt mounts. When the 2011-2012 school year ended, the Muskegon Heights District had 1,331 students and the Highland Park District had 969 students. When the 2012-2013 school year began, Detroit Public Schools were projected to have about 52,000 students. Even though the enrollments are falling, it is highly unlikely that these three districts are becoming substantially more diverse. Thus, the 2010-2011 district demographics can be considered a rough approximation of the districts’ current racial/ethnic composition. In 2010-2011, students in the three districts now under the authority of emergency financial managers comprised 5% of all Michigan public school students, including 9% of the state’s students in poverty, as measured by those who receive a free or reduced lunch, and 23% of the state’s African-American students. This data can lead to a variety of conclusions. On one hand, if roughly a quarter of the state’s African-American students are in school districts that are in fiscal crisis, it would be unacceptable for the state to ignore those districts. On the other hand, the reality is that Public Act 4 permitted emergency managers so much authority over school districts that one emergency manager alone could turn control of a district’s


105. See supra Table I.
schools over to charter school operators. While that may be a choice that the school board or superintendent would make, it should not be a decision forced on students—especially students who are disproportionately African-American and Latino—without any involvement by elected officials or the professional educators they select. Both extremes are incredibly problematic, but they are not the only options. Public Act 72 provided more of a middle ground.

D. The Governor’s Appointment Authority

Under Public Act 72, the state superintendent and the state board of education respectively whittled down a list of nominees for emergency financial manager of a school district, and the governor made the final selection. Under Public Act 4, the governor could appoint the emergency manager for a school district without consulting with either the state board or the state superintendent, and without any regard for those officeholders’ preferred candidates.106

Like other aspects of Public Act 4, this part of Public Act 4 also squeezed out professional educators and those who were elected to make decisions about public education, including the state’s chief educational officer. This time, however, it was state level officials who were excluded from the process of the state takeover rather than just local level officials. Furthermore, Public Act 4 eliminated the requirement that emergency managers were appointed with the advice and consent of the state senate. There was no check on who the governor appointed to serve as a school district’s emergency manager, and the procedural loss was significant. Coupling these changes in how emergency managers were selected with the provision that expanded emergency managers’ authority to include academic matters illustrates that the four changes discussed in this section, working in tandem, undermined public education in Michigan.

III. Conclusion

School districts such as those in Detroit, Highland Park, and Muskegon Heights faced fiscal crisis. They needed outside help and, through Michigan’s state takeover statutes, they received some. But, did Public Act 4 require that districts receive too much “help”? I contend here

106. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1241(2)(t) (allowing the emergency manager to “exercise the authority and responsibilities affecting the financial condition of the school district that are prescribed by law to the school board and superintendent of the school district”).
that it did, and that other states would be wise to learn from Michigan’s legislative and political story. States should not leave school districts in fiscal crisis to fend for themselves. States also should be mindful of the strong tradition of local control over education, and what is often still a strong local investment in public schools by elected board members, appointed superintendents, parents, community members, and, of course, life-long educators. If public schools are to continue to be anchors for our communities, then state and especially local level educators and elected educational officials should not be completely cut out of the process of reforming them.107
