A CHIP OFF THE OLD BLOCK OR A NEW DIRECTION FOR PAYMENT CARD SECURITY?
THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF THE U.S. TRANSITION TO EMV

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ABSTRACT

Several high-profile data breaches that compromised consumer payment cards information have generated high levels of public concern as well as regulatory attention and extensive litigation. In response to growing concerns about payment fraud, payment card networks in the United States have moved toward the rapid replacement of traditional magnetic-stripe payment card technology to new EMV (Europay, Mastercard, and Visa) computer chip-based technology. At the same time, technological developments in contactless payments, such as ApplePay, and new methods of cardholder verification, such as biometrics and Big Data triangulation, point to the growing obsolescence of legacy payments security techniques. This technology creates a unique encrypted identifier for each transaction, thereby making it more difficult for thieves to steal card numbers and create counterfeit cards. Notably, however, U.S. card issuers and networks have chosen not to adopt the personal identification number (PIN) method of customer verification that has been standard in the United Kingdom and much of Europe for the past decade or so but instead have chosen signature verification as the preferred method. Many large retail chains and retail trade associations have nevertheless lobbied for regulatory or statutory action to impose a PIN-verification requirement in addition to the inclusion of EMV chips. This Article conducts an economic

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analysis of the regulation of consumer payment cards and payment card fraud. We examine the marginal benefits from heightened levels of payment card security as well as the marginal costs. We examine the dynamic evolution of payment card anti-fraud technology over time and suggest that there is little evidence of market failure in the provision of payment security by card networks and issuers and little reason to believe that mandating one exclusive, decades-old, static verification technology (namely, chip and PIN) would be likely to improve overall consumer welfare and economic efficiency today. We conclude that rather than blindly adopting the particular verification technology that Europe put into place many years ago, U.S. regulators should be alert to the evolving and contemporary nature of consumer payments and the fluid nature of threats to data privacy and thus should not freeze or hamper the adaptability of the payment system. We also offer an alternative explanation for the debate over the lack of a PIN requirement in the U.S. rooted in Dodd–Frank’s regulation of interchange fees. In this manner, the debate over PIN verification is just the latest front in the ongoing war between the payment card networks and merchants over interchange fees.

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INTRODUCTION

In the fall of 2015, consumers began to encounter something new when they checked out at their local Starbucks. Rather than swiping their cards in a familiar motion, they were asked to perform something subtler: dip and wait. Although this new motion runs counter to years of muscle memory, it’s for our own good. With multi-million dollar breaches occurring at an alarmingly increasing frequency, the payment card networks (e.g., VISA, MasterCard, American Express) and the banks that issues these payment cards (e.g., Citbank, Capital One, Bank of America) decided it was time to move the U.S. to the Europay-Mastercard-Visa (EMV) standard.1 By October 2015, card issuers were expected to replace their legacy magnetic stripe cards with new “chip” cards that contain a tiny microprocessor, which makes it harder for data thieves to steal credit card information.2 On the same schedule, merchants were expected to have terminals that read the new chip cards or face liability for fraudulent transaction—a change in the status quo, which places liability, in most cases, on the issuing bank.3

The EMV standard was first employed in Europe in the 1990s and, in addition to adopting the chip card, required consumers to enter a Personal Identification Number (PIN) for most payment card transactions.4 Indeed, for this reason, “Chip & PIN” has become the

colloquial moniker for the EMV standard. In the U.S., however, the EMV rollout maintained signature as the primary point-of-sale (POS) authentication method, and in December 2017, the four major payment card networks announced that by April 2018 they would make the signature requirement optional for EMV-enabled cards.

This transition has been costly and not without controversy. According to one estimate, chip-enabled cards cost as much as two dollars each to manufacture, compared with “pennies” for magnetic-stripe cards. Large card issuers may have tens of millions of cards outstanding at any given time because many consumers have multiple bank-issued credit cards, in addition to debit cards and certain store credit cards. Thus, issuing new cards alone is likely to end up costing issuers at least tens of millions of dollars. It is estimated that a new EMV sales terminal costs roughly $500 to $1,000, a nontrivial cost for a very small business. For a larger business with more than one checkout register, the investment in new equipment could add up to several thousand dollars—and potentially millions of dollars for the largest chains. In addition, many consumers and merchants have complained about the additional complexity and time it takes to checkout when using EMV cards, including the aggravation of canceled sales when the consumer removes the card prematurely.

7. See Olga Kharif & Blanca Vázquez Toness, Target Breach Spurs Retail Rush to Accept Tougher Credit Cards, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 12, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-04-10/target-breach-spurs-retail-rush-to-accept-tougher-credit-cards [https://perma.cc/2B2W-MLUN]. These estimated cost disparities may shrink over time due to economies of scale in card production, but chip cards will remain more expensive to produce than magnetic stripe cards. See id.
8. See id.
9. Id. (“We’ve got 10 million cards in inventory out in the field . . . . At $2, we are probably looking at a $20 million investment, which I am going to defer for as long as possible.”).
10. See id. Other estimates say the range is as wide as $100 to $1,500 per terminal. See How Much Will Chip/PIN Cost to Implement?, BLUEPAY BLOG (Feb. 23, 2015), https://www.bluepay.com/blog/how-much-will-chippin-cost-implent/ [https://perma.cc/FTQ2-45D5].
Many of the merchants initially balked at these costs, complaining especially that what they will spend in precautions far exceeds the benefits from reduced fraud for their small shops.\textsuperscript{12} According to a survey by Wells Fargo’s small business group in July 2015, only 29% of merchants had planned to upgrade to EMV-enabled card processors.\textsuperscript{13} Twenty-one percent stated that they never intended to adopt EMV-compatible terminals, and another 16% did not know whether they would do so.\textsuperscript{14} Of those who stated that they did not intend to upgrade before October 2015, 21% stated that they never planned to upgrade and would simply stop accepting payment cards at the POS.\textsuperscript{15} Forty-six percent stated that they did not want to pay for the EMV terminal, and 41% stated that they were not concerned about the liability shift.\textsuperscript{16} Despite these gripes, EMV adoption has spread very quickly. By June 2016, 88% of MasterCard-branded credit cards already had chips\textsuperscript{17} and by June 2018 69% of Visa’s cards had chips;\textsuperscript{18} Visa reports that by June 2018, 67% of U.S. storefront merchants have installed EMV compatible terminals and 97% of overall U.S. payment volume was on EMV cards.\textsuperscript{19} Importantly, this adoption appears to
accompanied by a concomitant reduction in fraud. Visa reports that counterfeit transactions have fallen by 66% since 2015 for EMV-compliant merchants.\textsuperscript{20}

Although some merchants complained about having to move to the EMV standard, others argued that it came too slowly and did not go far enough. For example, in federal litigation alleging antitrust violations, Home Depot has alleged that “Visa and MasterCard have long recognized that the magnetic stripe technology . . . is inherently insecure and fraud-prone.”\textsuperscript{21} As evidence of market power, and to increase interchange fees through fraud chargebacks, Visa and MasterCard allegedly “perpetuated the use of magnetic stripe technology and delayed taking steps to implement more secure technologies.”\textsuperscript{22}

The decision not to require PINs as part of the EMV rollout also has spawned litigation. Merchants have strenuously objected to this provision, maintaining that PINs should be required. Some large merchants and a class of small merchants have filed suit alleging various legal theories as to why the maintenance of signature verification violates the law.\textsuperscript{23} In \textit{Home Depot Inc. v. Visa Inc.}, for example, Home Depot alleged an antitrust conspiracy in which “Visa and MasterCard have acted to keep a defective product in place—signature-authenticated cards—in order to maintain their supracompetitive profits that are tethered to this faulty technology.”\textsuperscript{24}

Similarly, in \textit{Kroger Co. v Visa, Inc.}, Kroger alleged that the requirement that POS terminals allow non-PIN transactions for chip cards was “motivated by an intention to restrain competition” and


22. \textit{Id.} at 50.


24. Home Depot Complaint, \textit{supra} note 21, at 49.
violates the Durbin Amendment to Dodd–Frank.25 In addition to these private cases, state attorneys general have advocated in favor of a “chip and PIN” standard.26

Against this backdrop, this Article has two primary aims. First, we present a positive theory of payment card security to explain the U.S. experience. Rather than an anticompetitive exercise of market power, we argue that the late adoption of EMV and the maintenance of signature verification are best understood as an efficient response to cheaper network costs in the U.S. We employ a model of optimal care in which a payment card network chooses a level of care that minimizes the sum of fraud costs and friction costs. Steps to reduce fraud inevitably introduce friction into the system.27 For example, consider a regime that requires a consumer to present three types of identification for every payment card transaction—this measure clearly would decrease fraud, but, at the same time, it would dramatically increase the cost of making even the simplest transaction.

Not only do the networks balance friction and fraud, but they also choose between reducing fraud through the network or at the POS. For example, requiring more types of identification at the POS acts as a substitute for information on whether the card has been reported lost or stolen. Conceptually, this second level of analysis of how to best provide security is nested within the higher level of analysis of the optimal level of security overall. At the same time, these two questions are intermingled: While the relative marginal costs and productivities of different security measures will determine their relative utilization, the absolute values of these marginal costs and productivities will determine the optimal tradeoff between security and friction. We show that in making this balance, jurisdictions with higher network costs will rely more heavily on POS methods and vice versa.

We use this framework to explain the late U.S. migration to EMV. Because of comparatively lower telecommunications costs, the U.S. traditionally has enjoyed far lower costs of verifying transactions


through the network process than the European Union (EU), which has meant that EU merchants typically cannot rely on network as a real-time measure against fraud. As such, it is efficient for EU merchants to take extra measures at the POS to assure that the person presenting the card is an authorized user, which is exactly what chip and PIN provides. On the other hand, in the U.S. nearly 100% of transactions are checked through the payment card networks. This allows the merchant to know—nearly instantaneously—if the card has been reported lost or stolen, if the user is over the credit limit, or if the transaction is sufficiently out of the ordinary for the authorized user that it raises red flags. Further, we find that using a liability shift rather than a government (or private) mandate to move to EMV is efficient when there is heterogeneity in the benefits from adopting certain security measures. Thus, by adopting a rule that allows firms to opt into a security standard only if doing so reduces total fraud losses and costs of care, the U.S. would harness private information and maximize network value.

Because the optimal allocation between network and POS measures will vary depending on costs and productivity, our framework implies that no particular security technology (such as Chip and PIN) is likely to be universally efficient across different economies or even within the same economy over time. For this reason, moving to EMV without the PIN verification appears to be cost justified in the U.S. Although requiring a PIN would add an extra layer of protection, the marginal costs of doing so do not appeared justified by the benefits in a world with nearly 100% network authentication. The inclusion of PIN authentication adds only marginal protection against unauthorized use of lost or stolen cards that have yet to be reported as such—with real time network authentication.

authentication, cards reported as lost or stolen will be rejected. At the same time, a PIN requirement will increase transaction times and false rejections due to forgotten PINs. We hasten to add that we are not arguing that chip and signature is the one uniquely efficient security regime; instead, it should be seen as one of a possible range of approaches, any of which might be reasonable and none of which imply the presence of a market failure. Although it is theoretically possible that chip and PIN—now twenty years old and developed in an era before cheap telecommunications costs, smart phones, and biometrically authenticated payments—is the single efficient and ideal technology for today’s payments environment, it is by no means obvious. In short, there is no reason to believe that the decision to adopt EMV without PIN verification is the result of a market failure or monopoly power instead of reflecting a reasonable accommodation of marginal benefits and costs in a highly dynamic market. This conclusion seems especially compelling given the rapid changes in the consumer payments market, such as the rapid growth of contactless payments, including things like ApplePay and new methods of cardholder verification, such as biometric identifiers or usage of Big Data-based methods of triangulation, for instance geolocating consumer phones or other unique individual identifiers.

The second goal of this Article is to offer an alternative explanation for the debate over the lack of a PIN requirement in the U.S. rooted in Dodd–Frank’s regulation of interchange fees. Although couched as an issue of consumer protection, the true driver of these controversies over PIN can be explained by public choice. While credit transactions and signature debit transactions are routed through the major payment card networks, merchants can route debit transactions through third-party networks, which tend to charge lower interchange fees. Viewed through this prism, the calls for a PIN verification mandate are less about protecting consumers from fraud and more about interchange fees. That is, merchants appear to be using the EMV rollout as a fulcrum to steer consumers through cheaper PIN

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32. See Merchant Credit Card Fraud Prevention Tips, AUTHORIZE (Feb. 26, 2018), https://support.authorize.net/s/article/Merchant-Credit-Card-Fraud-Prevention-Tips [https://perma.cc/5YGE-9KAP].


debit networks. In this manner, the debate over PIN verification is just the latest front in the ongoing war between the payment card networks and merchants over interchange fees.

This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we lay out the basic economic tradeoff between security and payment friction. Part II introduces our model of bilateral precautions and derives some comparative static results that help explain why certain jurisdictions may rely on relatively higher levels of POS or network security. Part III examines recent U.S. and EU experiences with EMV through the lens of our model. Part IV uses our framework to examine the relative costs and benefits of including PIN verification as part of EMV in the U.S., finding strong reasons to doubt that a PIN mandate would improve welfare. Given our findings in Part IV, Part V examines the political economy of the ongoing merchant litigation and lobbying efforts to mandate PIN as the cardholder verification method (CVM) for EMV cards, finding that these attempts are more easily explained as an attempt by merchants to leverage the Durbin Amendment to Dodd–Frank for financial gain rather than to reduce card fraud. The final section summarizes the Article and offers some conclusions.

I. PAYMENT Friction AND PAYOUT SECURITY: THE ECONOMIC TRADEOFF

Assessing the optimal set of rules and institutions governing the payment card system is extremely complex. As noted, the inquiry involves tradeoffs at two interrelated levels of analysis: first, to find the optimal level of security (the fraud-friction tradeoff) and second, once the optimal level of security is established, to identify the optimal mix of security technologies that will provide the highest level of security at the lowest cost. The global payment card system is one of the most complex and efficient financial institutions in the history of the world: a twenty-four hour, secure, globally interconnected, instantaneous network of consumers, card networks, issuers, and merchants that reaches to the farthest corners of the world. Merchants gain access to near-instantaneous payments without the risk, delay,
and cost associated with checks and cash.\textsuperscript{38} Consumers gain the flexibility and safety of not having to carry cash, thereby avoiding the risk of theft or loss as well as the cost and inconvenience of acquiring cash from an automated teller machine (ATM) or bank teller.\textsuperscript{39} In addition, in higher interest-rate conditions, the process enables consumers to keep their funds in interest-bearing accounts instead of carrying depreciating cash in their wallets.\textsuperscript{40} Governments gain from the widespread use of electronic payments by not having to print cash, and they also benefit from the reduction of crime and tax evasion as consumers transition away from cash payments.\textsuperscript{41} Worldwide, billions of payment card transactions occur every day with an astonishing degree of accuracy, speed, and security.\textsuperscript{42} In addition, for many consumers in the U.S., access to this system has been virtually free, as for several decades most consumers have been able to acquire credit cards with no annual fee and no interest charge if the cardholder pays his or her bill in full every month.\textsuperscript{43} Indeed, once cash back and other rewards are considered, some consumers may actually be paying a negative price for the ownership and use of their cards.\textsuperscript{44}

When cardholders interact with the payment card system, they experience a near-seamless and simple transaction.\textsuperscript{45} A consumer swipes or inserts a card, and within seconds the transaction is approved and the consumer is on his or her way.\textsuperscript{46} But like the proverbial tip of the iceberg, the simplicity of the consumer experience obscures the massively complicated system that lies beneath.\textsuperscript{47} In particular, behind this simple consumer interface rests a series of tradeoffs that crucially determine the efficiency of the payment card system.\textsuperscript{48}

From an economic perspective, at the most fundamental and overarching level, the efficiency of the payment card system rests on a tradeoff between the speed and flexibility of the system (often called the \textit{friction} of using the system) and the security of payment card use on the other.\textsuperscript{49} Consumers, merchants, card issuers, and card networks

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
38. \textit{See id.} at 2.
39. \textit{See id.} at 1.
40. \textit{See id.} at 17.
41. \textit{See id.} at 21.
42. \textit{See id.} at 1.
43. \textit{See id.} at 6.
44. This phenomenon, in which consumers pay a subsidized, zero, or even negative price, is common in two-sided markets such as payment cards, newspapers, Internet search engines, and the like. \textit{See id.} at 32.
45. \textit{See id.} at 36.
46. \textit{See id.}
47. \textit{See id.} at 36-37.
48. \textit{See id.} at 36.
\end{thebibliography}
seek a payment experience that is as frictionless as possible—that is, the fastest possible speed and convenience of payment.\textsuperscript{50} This minimization of friction has many elements, but they all rest on the basic observation that no one goes to Macy’s, Starbucks, or Amazon.com to partake of the payment experience.\textsuperscript{51} The payment part of a transaction is the prototype of what economists refer to as transaction costs—namely, the necessary costs of accomplishing the parties’ central goal, which is to buy and sell goods and services.\textsuperscript{52}

Payment friction takes several basic forms.\textsuperscript{53} First is the speed of payments (how quickly they can be authenticated) and the final decision whether to approve or decline a transaction.\textsuperscript{54} Second, friction increases when there are higher levels of incorrect declinations of legitimate transactions (for example, when consumers incorrectly enter their PIN numbers or the card network incorrectly rejects a transaction as fraudulent, which require additional time and effort to reprocess the transaction).\textsuperscript{55} A third form of payment friction is the direct cost to the consumer and merchant—for example, the cost to consumers of transacting business (such as the costs of carrying a card or replacing a lost or damaged card) and the cost to the merchant of maintaining payment-processing equipment.\textsuperscript{56} The merchant’s cost includes not only the direct costs of acquiring and maintaining certain equipment and dealing with repairs to broken equipment, but also the costs associated with the location of terminals in stores and the payment experience of consumers and merchants as part of a transaction.\textsuperscript{57}

In this Section, we first examine the types of security risks attendant to payment card use. We then consider the frictions introduced by some security measures.

A. Security Risks

Payment card fraud broadly can be defined as any improper charge to an account made without the cardholder’s awareness and consent.\textsuperscript{58} The channels through which payment card fraud occur vary.

\textsuperscript{50} See id. at 6.
\textsuperscript{51} See id. at 39.
\textsuperscript{52} See id. at 36.
\textsuperscript{53} See id. at 5.
\textsuperscript{54} See id.
\textsuperscript{55} See id. at 19.
\textsuperscript{56} See id. at 11.
\textsuperscript{57} See id.
Ultimately, though, all channels involve an unauthorized user having access to sufficient account information to pose as an authorized user. Such information may include the credit card number, the expiration date, and the customer verification number on the back of a card. Fraudsters can get this information through a variety of channels. First, a card may be lost or stolen. Second, credit card information may be compromised without loss or theft of the physical card. This form of access can occur through physical interaction (e.g., a waiter or clerk writing down a credit card number) or through more technologically sophisticated means. For example, “skimming” occurs when a thief places a small device at an ATM or a merchant’s card reader that collects the information on cards’ magnetic strips. The thief later returns to retrieve the device.

Similarly, large databases of credit card information held by merchants increasingly have become the target of identity thieves, as was the case in the widely publicized breaches at Michaels, Home Depot, and (probably most prominently) Target. Each of those breaches came about as a result of inadequate security precautions by the retailers. With respect to Michaels, for example, the attack was remarkably low tech: It has been reported that the criminals physically replaced devices at cashier checkout lanes at eighty Michaels locations in nineteen states. The terminals were infected with malware that collected the card numbers and expiration dates of approximately 2.6 million cards over an eight-month period before the breach was detected.

The Target breach, by contrast, was much more elaborate. Hackers tapped into the computer network of one of Target’s heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) vendors, stealing the

59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id.
64. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id.
vendor’s credentials and installing malware on its system. The hackers then used the vendor’s credentials to gain access to an area of Target’s computer network, where they installed malware on Target’s system. Because Target lacked adequate firewalls and other security devices between vendor operations and the consumer sections of Target’s system that held consumer data, the hackers were able to install malware initially only on Target’s vendor system but then were able to use that point of entry to obtain consumer data. The hackers then sent the malware through Target’s computer system to cashier stations in all domestic Target stores. Soon, credit card numbers started flowing out of the registers and into several servers in the U.S. before they were apparently routed to Moscow. The outflow of card numbers continued for several days despite alarms within Target’s system that a breach had occurred. In the end, the Target data breach resulted in the theft of approximately 40 million credit card numbers. The breach affected all 1,797 of Target’s U.S. stores.

Home Depot’s breach was similar to Target’s in that its network was compromised by gaining access through a third-party vendor’s stolen credentials. Once the hackers gained access to the system, they were able to install “unique, custom-built malware” on self-checkout systems in the U.S. and Canada. They used that malware to steal information on approximately 56 million credit and debit cards and to steal email addresses for another 53 million consumers. Home Depot did not confirm that the breach had occurred until a week after credit card data linked to its customers went up for sale on the black-market.

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70. See Riley et al., supra note 69.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. Id.
76. See id.
77. See Vijayan, supra note 69.
78. See id.
website Rescator.cc. The breach continued for months and occurred despite the fact that Home Depot had software that could have encrypted consumer data and thereby reduced the risk of the theft. In addition, just months before the major breach, the company had suffered two minor breaches yet still chose not to deploy software that could have prevented the consumer data from being stolen. It has also been reported that Home Depot was using outdated antivirus software in its stores.

When data are skimmed or breached, there is likely to be a longer lag time between theft and discovery than for stolen cards. It will almost always take the card owner less time to discover that a physical card is missing than to discover fraudulent charges, which may not be evident until the bill is viewed. As discussed later in this Article, fraud-detection techniques are helping to close this gap.

Thieves use stolen payment card information in various ways. Criminals commit so-called card-not-present (CNP) fraud, which occurs when card information is used to purchase goods or services online, over the phone, or in other circumstances in which the seller doesn’t need access to the physical card. When only the card information is compromised, such as through skimming or data breaches, the information is often sold in bulk on the so-called dark web.

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81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See id.
85. See JFC, The Life of a Stolen Credit Card, DEEPDOTWEB (June 27, 2016), https://www.deepdotweb.com/2016/06/27/life-stolen-credit-card/ [https://perma.cc/K7VC-MEKX]. The marketplace for this type of information is saturated such that a single account sells for no more than $10. See id. One survey of dark-web credit card sites in 2015 claimed that more than 1.4 million U.S. credit cards were available for sale at that time. See Joseph Cox, We’ve Never Seen a Stolen Credit Card Market as Slick as This, MOTHERBOARD BLOG (Nov. 9, 2015), http://motherboard.vice.com/read/weve-never-seen-a-stolen-credit-card-market-as-slick-as-this [https://perma.cc/UX7Y-XUJL]. Although an in-depth analysis found that claim to be exaggerated, it did verify that at least 50,000 card numbers were available for sale at that time. See id.
Stolen numbers also can be encoded onto counterfeit cards with easily obtainable technology. According to a report by the Aite Group produced prior to the liability shift, counterfeit fraud was the largest category of credit card fraud, accounting for 45% of losses, followed by CNP fraud, which accounted for 38% of losses. Lost and stolen cards accounted for only 9% of losses. According to the Federal Reserve’s analysis of fraud losses on debit cards, in 2015 lost and stolen fraud losses accounted for about 1.0–1.5 basis points as a share of transaction value for PIN and signature debit. By contrast, “the majority of fraud losses for single-message debit transactions [i.e., PIN debit] were attributed to counterfeit fraud.” Overall, fraud losses from counterfeit cards were 3.1 basis points per transaction value for PIN debit and 5.4 basis points for signature debit. For signature debit, by contrast, 56% of fraud losses were from card-not-present fraud, amounting to roughly seven basis points per transaction value.

B. Types of Security

Payment card networks use a variety of means to reduce card-present (CP) fraud (e.g., fraud at a physical point of sale), including protections at the merchant POS as well as through the network. Broadly, POS methods focus on verifying the identity of the card presenter, whereas network security focuses on whether the card itself is valid or whether the transaction suggests fraud.

86. See JFC, supra note 85 (discussing how a thief may create a counterfeit credit card).

87. See THAD PETERSON & JULIE CONROY, CHIP CARDS IN THE UNITED STATES: THE PIN, PINLESS, DEBIT, CREDIT CONUNDRUM 12 fig.2 (2016).


89. Id. at 20.

90. Id.

91. Id. at 35. Overall, fraud rates for signature debit are higher than for PIN debit. See id. at 20. But this may be only partially or slightly attributable to PIN’s being a more secure system than signature debit. Differential fraud rates between PIN and signature also reflect the reality that many higher-fraud transaction settings—such as online shopping—accept only signature debit or non-PIN credit cards. See id. As a result, the higher rate of fraud for signature cards reflects that signature is accepted much more widely, including in contexts that have higher baseline fraud rates unrelated to the particular verification method.
A Chip Off the Old Block

1. Point of Sale

When a card is presented for payment at a merchant terminal, the merchant can use several nonmutually exclusive techniques to verify that the user of the card is authorized. For example, the merchant can check the ID of the person presenting the card or examine the signature on the receipt or device capture to see if it matches the signature on the back of the card. In some cases (primarily for debit cards), the presenter also may have to enter a PIN or other identifying information, such as a zip code. Biometric identifiers, such as fingerprints, retina scans, and facial recognition, increasingly are being used as identifiers as well.

An additional dimension of CP security involves securing the data transmitted from the card to the terminal at the time of the transaction. As previously noted, fraud is primarily from card information captured during transmission or stolen from databases. As will be discussed in more detail later, EMV is a POS security method that reduces the fraudsters’ ability to complete a transaction with a counterfeit card by transmitting a transaction-specific number rather than a static account number. Mobile devices reduce the ability of thieves to capture account information by encrypting it during transmission.\(^{92}\)

2. Network

Security is also performed at the network (or issuer) level. For example, the issuing bank will deny a card that has been reported as lost or stolen or if there is evidence that it has been compromised. Further, algorithms are used to determine whether a transaction is inconsistent with normal use (for example, because the card is being used in a different area or for a very large purchase).

C. Frictions from Security

Security is necessary to deter fraudsters, but it comes at a cost. Obviously, there are direct fixed costs to employing security, such as building (or upgrading) network infrastructures and purchasing EMV terminals. However, there are also marginal costs—precaution costs per transaction—that have important implications for determining the

optimal level of security. Broadly, these costs are associated with frictions introduced into the payment system, and they fall into two bins: (a) reductions in speed and convenience and (b) an increase in false positives.

1. Payment Speed and Convenience

Consumers and merchants seek a speedy, convenient, and low-cost method of making payments. Speed is of particular importance for many merchants as they seek to maximize the throughput of their customer experience and minimize the store’s labor costs of dealing with the transaction of processing payments. Consider a simple intuitive example: Assume that it takes ten seconds longer for a merchant to process a payment using a slower payment device like a check, than a faster one like a credit card. Even at this small marginal difference in time, if there are six people in a checkout line, this delay will increase the checkout time for the sixth person in line by one minute, and so on. From the perspective of the merchant, however, the effect is even larger: For a large merchant who conducts hundreds or thousands of transactions a day, these small increments could add up to hundreds or thousands of dollars of additional labor costs each year as employees simply wait for transactions to clear. The increments may also require a retailer to maintain additional registers and may lead to some abandoned sales.

Over time, the coevolution of information technology, telecommunications infrastructure, and consumer and merchant demand for faster payment times has dramatically reduced the friction associated with the consumer payments system. In the U.S., for example, the average transaction time to make a payment of less than twenty-five dollars at a quick-service restaurant is only four to five seconds for a payment card, which is substantially faster than even cash (eight to ten seconds). For payments at discount stores or grocery stores, a recent estimate was that the average time was approximately seventeen seconds for a cash payment, seventeen to nineteen seconds for a debit card transaction, and fifty-seven seconds for a check. This reduction in processing time has contributed to the increased ubiquity in the acceptance of payment cards.

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94. Id. at 51.
95. See id. at 7.
in 2003, McDonald’s made the decision to accept payment cards.\(^96\) As a result of that decision, the value of McDonald’s stock increased by 2.7%\(^97\). Other quick-service restaurants have also benefited from accepting payment cards, both because of reduced costs of handling cash and also because of faster throughput and so-called ticket lift from increased size in the average sale.\(^98\) These effects can be significant; according to one estimate, each ten-second increment that can be cut from the average drive-through time is worth approximately $1,000 in revenue for a typical restaurant.\(^99\)

This desire to reduce the friction of payments and the costs to the consumer and merchant explains many important retail trends of recent years. For example, consider the development of self-checkout lines at many stores (e.g., grocery stores, drugstores, and hardware stores) or transactions with unmanned kiosks at locations such as gas stations, train stations, and vending machines. In all these locations, the ubiquity of electronic payments has enabled some consumers to forgo an interaction with a sales clerk, thereby speeding the checkout process, enabling the merchant to reduce the number of employees assigned to the routine work of ringing up consumers and freeing up employees for other, more important tasks.\(^100\) Paying at the pump at gas stations, for example, (a) saves the consumer the time and effort of walking to and from the cash register (usually twice in the case of a payment card transaction), (b) saves time and reduces lines at the checkout counter (especially during busy times), and (c) allows the station to reduce the number of employees.\(^101\) Self-checkout at grocery stores also speeds up checkout time, permits reductions in employee staffing and redeployment of employees to other useful activities, and even takes up less floor space than traditional checkout lanes.\(^102\)

The switch to EMV illustrates the tradeoff between security and friction. It was expected that, as consumers and merchants became more familiar with EMV payments, average checkout times would not
be much longer than when using traditional magnetic-stripe technology.103 Yet according to an article in the Wall Street Journal in August 2016, it still took twice as long to pay with a chip card than with a swipe or mobile payment—on average, thirteen seconds versus six seconds; over the span of a year, a consumer could spend eighty-five extra minutes standing in line to pay.104 But note—that is just the extra time it takes for one person to pay. If there are, say, five people in line, the person at the end of the line could wait more than half a minute longer in line just because of the delay in payment times. According to one estimate, the average consumer will spend five and a half hours per year waiting for EMV transactions to go through, and businesses will experience 116 million hours of additional checkout time as a result of EMV.105

A similar economic tradeoff applies to analyzing the rapidly growing world of e-commerce and online shopping. Consider the decision of whether to store one’s credit card number with Amazon.com, iTunes, or some other online merchant. The costs of such a decision are obvious: It is possible that the merchant’s website might get hacked and one’s payment card information might be compromised. On the other hand, the benefits of permitting Amazon.com to store your payment card information are sizable: access to Amazon’s “1-Click Ordering” feature and the ability to make purchases without having to reenter one’s payment card number for each transaction.106 Many consumers are willing to accept the slight risk of a possible compromise of their credit card number to capture the efficiency and convenience of storing one’s credit card information online, as long as they feel that the merchant is credible and committed to security.

On the other hand, at the same time that these innovations have reduced payment friction and enabled additional efficiencies related to payments, they have also raised novel problems of fraud. For example, when a credit card is stolen, often the first place the thief


104. See id.


106. See About 1-Click Ordering, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=201889620 [https://perma.cc/7SD4-45QC] (last visited Dec. 17, 2018) (indicating that customers can bypass the “shopping cart” and automatically charge the purchase to the credit card associated with the customer’s 1-Click settings).
tries to use it is at a self-service gas station or subway ticket kiosk. Why? Because the impersonal nature of the interface enables the thief to verify whether the card is still active without risking a confrontation with a sales clerk if the transaction is declined. Thus, although these sorts of innovations present huge benefits to consumers and merchants in terms of reducing payment friction, this reduction in friction for legitimate transactions also can come at a cost of increasing the potential for illegitimate transactions.

This tradeoff between the costs and benefits of reducing payment friction at the risk of some higher incidence of fraud is also reflected in the decision by payment card networks to adopt policies that permit many merchants to waive CVM requirements for transactions below a certain size to speed the checkout process. Granted, elimination of this authentication requirement would be expected to increase the incidence of payment card fraud overall. However, apparently the payment networks and merchants who choose to forgo CVM have implicitly decided that the costs of increased fraud with respect to some small-dollar transactions are outweighed by the benefits of faster throughput at the register and the small size of the transactions. Moreover, as detailed later in this Article, the elimination of the signature requirement for some small-dollar transactions does not mean an absence of any security protocols whatsoever—instead, merchants are just eliminating the marginal cost and marginal benefit of requiring a signature authentication. At the same time, the network retains its full apparatus of authorization and authentication protocols. Moreover, the application of these waivers and exceptions to ordinary procedures is highly calibrated and is tied to specific merchants, industries, geographic locations, and the like, all of which affect the tradeoffs between reducing payment friction at the margin and the marginal impact on payment security.

Finally, consumers seem to understand the tradeoff as well. Although consumers express support for EMV as a means to increase data security, they also have expressed frustration with it, mainly from increased friction in transactions and longer checkout times.107 According to one analysis conducted soon after the liability shift occurred, the time needed to pay using a chip card was on average seven to ten seconds, as compared with two to three seconds using a magnetic-stripe card.108 The survey also found that 20% of users said

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108.  See id.
that EMV payments “take too long.”109 In addition, after having had experience with chip cards, “nearly four times as many survey respondents [were] worried about speedy processing times over chip card security or availability of EMV terminals.”110 Consumers also have had to deal with extended hassles and delay from removing the card from the reader prematurely and having the transaction canceled, resulting in further delay and frustration.111 A survey by the Mercator Advisory Group in November 2015 found that 28% of EMV cardholders were bothered or confused by the EMV card or tried to avoid shopping at stores that required them to use it.112 A September 2016 survey by Square found even higher levels of discontent, reporting that 91% of debit card users and 87% of credit card users were “frustrated” with EMV cards, primarily because the cards increase checkout time.113

Frustration with the slow nature of EMV transactions spurred efforts by card issuers, networks, and merchants to make transactions speedier. But the steps taken to speed up EMV transactions identifies the essential tradeoff between friction and security—rather than authenticating every transaction in real-time, acquirers periodically upload data to card terminals in stores, which permits localized authentication of transactions.114 Locally stored data is later periodically uploaded to the network from the local terminal.115 While this process increases the speed of processing transactions, at the same time it also increases the potential for fraud because data stored on the local terminal can often be several hours old before the local terminal communicates with the network.

109. See id.
110. Id.
115. See id.
2. Accurate Authentication of Payment Card Transactions

Minimizing payment friction also includes accurately processing and approving transactions. In particular, as a first approximation this means that the payment system must approve all legitimate transactions the first time they are attempted. If a legitimate transaction is incorrectly declined and must be attempted a second time, the costs and friction of the system increase. Again, at an intuitive level, consider a card transaction that is improperly declined, thereby leading the consumer to have to pull another card from his or her wallet and reattempt the transaction. Having to repeat the transaction increases the transaction costs of making the payment and the attendant costs in terms of inconvenience to customers as well as labor and other costs to the merchant.

The costs of payment friction, especially for inaccurate declinations of legitimate transactions, can be especially high in some contexts. For the average consumer, for example, the cost of a declination of an attempted transaction using a debit card is higher than that of a declination using a credit card. This is because, although many consumers carry more than one credit card (and thus can simply pull an alternative card from their wallet), few consumers carry more than one debit card. In addition, many households (especially younger and lower-income households) do not have a credit card and therefore rely almost entirely on using their debit card to conduct electronic transactions. In that situation, as a result, an improper transaction declination can have high costs in terms of wasted time and energy for both the consumer and the merchant.

Approval of payment card transactions thus presents a classic tradeoff between type I and type II errors—that is, false positives and false negatives. One can easily see that when a thief uses a stolen card to make an improper payment, there is a cost to the payments system that must be allocated in some fashion among the consumer, merchant, issuer, and card network. Yet it should be recognized that there is also a cost when a legitimate payment is declined. Most trivially, there is a cost in terms of the time needed to try the transaction again using the same card or a different card. But in some instances there may be a larger cost—the cost of not being able to conduct the transaction at all if the consumer has no other payment device available. For example, if the card is being used to buy baby formula, medicine, or gasoline to


\[117. \] See id.
get to work in the morning, there can be a substantial cost to a consumer if that payment is incorrectly declined as fraudulent.

Thus, a substantial part of the cost of the payment system is the development of the complex network of computer systems and complicated algorithms that payment networks, card issuers, and merchant acquirers use to more accurately distinguish legitimate from illegitimate transactions—that is, to minimize the joint costs of each transaction in terms of reducing the costs of false positives (incorrect declinations) and false negatives (approving improper transactions). As should be readily apparent, the more vigilant the card networks are about trying to prevent unauthorized transactions, the more likely they will also be to inadvertently block valid transactions.

This tradeoff is illustrated in Figure 1. The payment system can take additional care, $c$, to avoid fraud, which is measured on the horizontal axis. As it takes more care, fraud losses, $L(c)$, decrease. At the same time, however, as efforts to avoid care increase, so do costs from increased frictions, $f(c)$.

**Figure 1. Optimal Level of Fraud Precaution**

The goal of the system, therefore, is not to minimize fraud. Instead, it is to minimize the sum of fraud and friction costs, $TC(c)$, which in the case of Figure 1 occurs at $c^*$. In the next section, we explore more deeply how a payment system allocates care between the network and merchants, which is at the heart of the movement to the EMV standard and the chip-versus-PIN debate.
II. UNDERSTANDING OPTIMAL NETWORK SECURITY: A MODEL OF JOINT CARE

Taking cost-effective fraud precautions will increase the network value to merchants and consumers and hence the profitability of the entire payment card ecosystem. Value maximization requires identifying the optimal fraud–friction tradeoff as well as the optimal mix of security technologies to provide the desired level of security at lowest cost. Of course, these two questions are interrelated, as the optimal tradeoff between security and friction will in part be a function of the cost of security technologies. Every time a consumer uses a payment card, there is a risk that the information will be stolen and used to make illicit purchases. Although consumers generally are not directly responsible for fraudulent charges, those charges are a cost to the system that ultimately gets passed on in a competitive market. For example, interchange fees, which are borne by merchants and passed onto consumers to some degree, are in part a function of the level of fraud. Therefore, a payment card network has an incentive to minimize the total costs from fraud—both the direct costs of illicit transactions and the costs of preventing fraud.

Broadly, one can imagine that networks have two leverage points to combat fraud: at the POS or through the network. This problem can be couched in a stylized joint care model in which the payment care industry would like to avoid losses from fraudulent transactions, $L$, which can be reduced by action at both the point of sale, $P$, and through the network, $N$. These actions have marginal costs $\phi$ and $\theta$ respectively. A consumer’s marginal willingness to pay

118. According to the Federal Reserve, for example, in 2015 consumers absorbed only 3% of the losses from debit card fraud, whereas issuers absorbed 58% and merchants 39% (mainly from CNP fraud). See Bd of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., supra note 88, at 22. Although consumers are not directly responsible for fraud losses, they can experience costs in terms of inconvenience and indirect loss (such as changing credit card numbers and more closely monitoring against unauthorized charges), which suggests that their effective cost from card fraud is nonzero. In addition, consumers pay indirectly in higher card fees or higher prices for goods and services from fraud losses.

119. For purposes of simplification, we largely ignore the potential role of consumers in preventing fraud. The basic model of joint care that we develop could be generalized to create a three-way system of allocation of fraud prevention and insurance costs among issuers/networks, merchants, and consumers. But the underlying analysis is largely identical; therefore, little use is gained through that additional complexity. In addition, many of the actions that consumers can take are largely captured in the costs incurred by merchants and overall friction costs.

120. $P$ and $N$ are a decomposition of $c$ (care) shown in Figure 1.
for a payment card transaction is $u$, and his or her net value from using the payment card network is:

$$u - L(P, N) - \phi P - \theta N,$$

under the assumption that the marginal cost of network $(L(P, N) + \phi P + \theta N)$ is the price paid by the consumer in the form of monetary and time costs.\(^{121}\) Rearranging the conditions for optimality (shown in the appendix) gives rise to the following expression, which provides insight into the substitution between network and POS security measures:

$$-\frac{L_P}{L_N} = \frac{\phi}{\theta}.$$

This equality states that the ratio of the marginal reduction in fraud losses from POS and network care is equal to the ratio of each method’s marginal cost. This relationship implies that as the relative marginal cost of POS verification rises, payment card networks will choose greater reliance on network authentication and vice versa. To see this, suppose that the marginal cost of POS precaution rises. To maintain optimality, $L_P$ must also rise. Because of diminishing marginal returns to increased precaution, a reduction in the use of POS services will lead to an increase in $L_P$, while substitution to network care simultaneously will reduce $L_N$ until the equality of the ratios is reestablished.

The graphical solution to the joint care problem can be represented in two dimensions in Figure 2.\(^{122}\) \(\bar{L}(P, N)\) is an iso-loss curve, representing the minimum achievable loss.\(^{123}\) Point A, along a $45^\circ$ line, represents an equal use of POS and network care. The slopes of the tangent lines represent the relative costs of network and POS

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121. Nonsecurity marginal costs are normalized to zero.

122. See James Cooper & Todd Zywicki, A Chip Off the Old Block or a New Direction for Payment Cards Security? The Chip & Pin Debate, Apple Pay, and the Law & Economics of Preventing Payment Card Fraud 19-20 (Geo. Mason U. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 17-09, 2017), https://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/publications/working_papers/1709.pdf [https://perma.cc/TGK7-37P7]. The three-dimensional solution is shown in Figure A1 in the appendix. See id. at 49 fig.A1.

123. See id at 19. Slopes of isoloss curve come from total differentiation of the loss function holding loss constant:

$$L(P, N) \frac{dP}{dN} + L(P, N) \frac{dN}{dN} = 0$$

$$\frac{d(P)}{d(N)} = -\frac{L_P}{L_N}.$$
authentication with the steeper curve representing relatively more expensive network costs and the flatter curve representing relatively cheaper network costs. The optimal mix of network and POS service occurs at the tangency point, which is where the slope of the iso-loss line—which represents the technical ability to substitute POS for network authentication—equals the ratio of network and POS costs or, more technically, where $$\frac{L_P}{L_N} = \frac{\phi}{\theta}$$.

As one can readily see, the solutions to the cost-minimization problem are intuitive: If POS and network costs are equal, then the solution is at point A, where the tangent bisects the 45° line, meaning that both security measures are used equally. Systems with relatively higher network costs (point C) rely more on POS authentication and vice versa for systems with relatively more expensive POS costs (point B). Importantly, not only do higher network costs lead to less reliance on network methods of authentication, but they also lead to higher overall losses.

124. See supra fig. 2. The equality of use based on equality of marginal costs is based on the assumption in the model that each security input has equal marginal product. See id. If the marginal products of fraud prevention were different, equal marginal costs would not imply equal use. See id.
The solution shown in Figure 2 captures only the substitution effect from relative price changes. There is also a second-order impact on harm: Because the cost of POS services does not fall to compensate for higher network costs, the payments system is devoting fewer resources overall to fraud prevention, which leads to higher losses. To illustrate the full effect of more expensive network care, we conducted a simulation by parameterizing the joint-care model to derive equilibrium levels of care and fraud. POS costs are held constant at 1 with network costs ranging from 0.25 to 3. Results are shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Simulation Results

When the POS and network costs of care are equal, they are employed in equal amounts to combat fraud. When the marginal cost of network authentication is one-fourth the cost of POS, network use is four times that of POS use. As network costs are increased, not only is there a marked substitution to POS authentication, but total harm also rises because substitution is imperfect. Although the payment system can shift from network to POS authentication, the marginal POS precautions are not as productive as the lost network precautions because of diminishing marginal returns.

In the next section, we examine the model’s predictive capability against the EU and U.S. experiences with payment card security, focusing primarily on the recent transition to EMV. In brief, we find that this model of payment security is consistent with the way in which

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125. See supra fig.3. This assumes equal marginal products.
payment security has developed in the U.S. and around the world.\textsuperscript{126} The model explains the peculiar status of the U.S. as a historical outlier with respect to payment security and particularly the divergent paths in payments taken by Europe (which adopted EMV Chip and PIN technology in the early 2000s) and the U.S. (which remained standardized on magnetic-stripe technology until 2016 and even then adopted a new standard using Chip and Signature technology instead of Chip and PIN).\textsuperscript{127} The analysis suggests that the addition of PIN verification in the U.S. may not be consistent with network value optimization.

III. NETWORK COST MINIMIZATION AND EMV ADOPTION IN THE US

In this Section, we use the model presented in Part II to help explain the timing and method of adoption of the EMV liability shift standard in the U.S. as well as to analyze the debate over the use of PINs to authenticate transactions. First, we examine the historical role that telecommunications costs have played in determining different mixes of POS and network security measures. Next, we examine the underlying forces that have led the U.S. to follow the EU in adopting the EMV standard, which puts a greater reliance on POS security. We also use our joint-precautions model to suggest an explanation for the fact that the networks did not mandate EMV but rather have created incentives for merchants and issuers to adopt EMV technology by shifting the liability for fraudulent transactions. Finally, we examine the case for requiring PINs as an additional method of POS authentication, and we find reasons to suggest that this requirement may not hold up to a benefit-cost analysis.

A. The Role of Telecommunications Costs

In recent years, the payment security debate has focused in large part on the extent of the security devices built into cards (chips) and the verification method required by consumers and merchants (PINs, signatures, some other form of verification, or none at all).\textsuperscript{128} Ironically, however, the friction and cost of these forms of POS security have not been the determining factor as to whether they are required.\textsuperscript{129} Instead, the degree of security and verification required by

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{126} See infra Section III.A.
  \item \textsuperscript{127} See infra Section III.A.
  \item \textsuperscript{128} See, e.g., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 4, at 11 (2016).
  \item \textsuperscript{129} See Adam J. Levitin, Private Disordering? Payment Card Fraud Liability Rules, 5 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 1, 28-29 (2010).
\end{itemize}
consumers and merchants has been an indirect manifestation of a more fundamental factor—the speed and cost of a country’s telecommunications technology.\textsuperscript{130}

Authentication of payment card transactions can take place in two distinct frameworks: online and offline. In an online system, payment card authorization takes place online and in real time.\textsuperscript{131} Essentially, once a consumer swipes or dips a card, the information on the stripe or chip is transmitted from the payment card terminal to the issuing bank.\textsuperscript{132} The issuer applies a set of highly complex computer algorithms and accesses information about the consumer’s unique account—for instance, by validating the cryptogram (in the case of a chip card) and by determining (a) whether the transaction would exceed the consumer’s authorized credit limit, (b) whether the card has been reported lost or stolen, or (c) whether the transaction appears odd in relation to normal consumer habits—to either authorize or reject the payment.\textsuperscript{133} Over time, of course, telecommunications have become speedier, more reliable, and less expensive, enabling authorization to be made even faster.\textsuperscript{134} The transaction is approved or rejected within seconds.\textsuperscript{135}

In an offline system, by contrast, final authorization from the issuer does not take place in real time.\textsuperscript{136} Instead, the transaction is made and held by the merchant—perhaps for days—and is later “batched” and sent for approval.\textsuperscript{137} In this sense, an offline system resembles the credit card imprinters of earlier eras when the merchant made an imprint of the consumer’s credit card and then submitted it to the financial institution for clearing.\textsuperscript{138}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}

\bibitem{OnlineAuthorization} See id.

\bibitem{Transmission} See id. The transmission goes through several stages, such as the acquirer and the card network, to reach the issuer. See id.

\bibitem{RealTime} See id.


\bibitem{EMVFAQs} See Papadimitriou, supra note 130.


\bibitem{EMVFAQs} See id.

\end{thebibliography}
Traditionally, the determining factor for whether a country’s consumer payment card system standardized on online or offline authorization was the cost and reliability of the country’s telecommunications system. In particular, countries where telecommunications technology has been fast, reliable, and inexpensive have been late adopters of higher-cost cards and increased POS verification methods by consumers and merchants. In countries where telecommunications technology has been slow, unreliable, and expensive, consumers and merchants traditionally have had a greater responsibility and a greater cost for preventing fraud. In other words, countries where low-cost telecommunications have enabled card issuers and networks to prevent fraud at a comparatively lower cost have been able to avoid requiring cards with more secure technologies built in (such as chips) and the increased payment friction that accompanies such methods.

This technologically motivated decision explains the variation among countries in their migration toward EMV systems. Consider the vast differences between EU and U.S. telecommunications costs. In 2000, the cost of a ten-minute local call was five times more expensive in major EU countries than in the U.S., and the cost of the same long-distance call was between two and three times more expensive. As the model would predict, while 99% of U.S. transactions were authenticated online in real time, only 25–40% of EU transactions were authenticated online. The absence of real time

139. See generally Julie Conroy, EMV: Lessons Learned and the U.S. Outlook (2014), https://aitegroup.com/report/emv-lessons-learned-and-us-outlook [https://perma.cc/925D-7ZKH]. Ronald Mann has also noted that countries with relatively more expensive telecommunications costs should be predicted to have higher fraud rates ceteris paribus, although he does not discuss the joint care model we discuss here or the use of alternative authorization technologies. See Ronald J. Mann, Credit Cards and Debit Cards in the United States and Japan, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 1055, 1069 (2002).
140. See Mann, supra note 139, at 1069-70.
141. See id. at 1070.
142. See id. at 1069.
143. See id. at 1070.
144. The prices for (local, long-distance) in 2004 Euros: U.S. (£0.09, £0.43); Germany (£0.43, £1.24); France (£0.42, £1.19); UK (£0.47, £0.95). See Eurostat, Price of Fixed Telecommunications, 2000-2010 (1) (EUR per 10-minute Call), https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=File:Price_of_fixed_telecommunications,_2000–10_(1)_(EUR_per_10-minute_call)_YB14.png [https://perma.cc/8FGG-EXMW].
online verification in Europe made it essential to strengthen verification procedures at the time of purchase.\textsuperscript{146} Because the payment might not be authorized or rejected for hours or even days, merchants and financial institutions needed some alternative system to reduce fraud at the time of purchase.\textsuperscript{147} As a former European MasterCard executive explained, key in designing the EMV standard to be introduced in the EU was the need “to continue to allow the off-lying authorization or approval of credit cards in an environment where telecommunication costs were rather expensive and people were talking about 30 or 40 cents per call to authorize a credit-card transaction.”\textsuperscript{148} The goal was to reduce fraud but “stay down in the 25 to 40 percent [online authorization] rate that they were used to in the European market.”\textsuperscript{149} Evidencing the substitution between POS and network authentication, the MasterCard executive noted that, after France completed its migration to the EMV standard, it had reduced its online authorization from close to 40\% to about 10\%.\textsuperscript{150}

As a result, they developed the concept of Chip and PIN as a substitute for real-time authorization.\textsuperscript{151} Note that at that time, online authorization (with magnetic-stripe cards) was the preferred authorization method because of the low cost and high convenience of real-time authorization.\textsuperscript{152} In offline-authorization countries, however, eventually it was thought that, although Chip and PIN was more expensive and less convenient, the additional expense was justified in light of the difficulty of preventing fraud in other ways.\textsuperscript{153}

Consistent with the joint-precautions model’s predictions, the burden on consumers and merchants for security at the POS, therefore, historically has been a negative function of the degree to which the networks and issuers themselves can engage in timely and accurate verification of payments.\textsuperscript{154} As will be discussed, the recent adoption of chip technology in the U.S. in its particular form (i.e., without required PIN) reflects the economic tradeoffs embedded in this underlying economic model.\textsuperscript{155}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}

\bibitem{146} See id.
\bibitem{147} See id.
\bibitem{148} See id. (stating how the need for offline authentication drove the development of EMV).
\bibitem{149} See id. (clarifying that the goal was to decrease fraud without increasing online verification).
\bibitem{150} Id.
\bibitem{151} See id.
\bibitem{152} See id.
\bibitem{153} See id.
\bibitem{154} See id.
\bibitem{155} See id.
\end{thebibliography}
B. Explaining Timing and Method of EMV Adoption in the U.S.

The model predicts that fraud losses will rise as the cost of security rises. Accordingly, we should expect jurisdictions with high telecommunications costs to have higher fraud rates than those in the U.S. and other jurisdictions with low telecommunications costs. The data tend to support this prediction.156

For example, at the time that EMV was adopted in the United Kingdom (UK), the fraud rate in that country was fourteen basis points—almost three times higher than the fraud rate in the U.S. at the time (just five basis points).158 As noted earlier, telecommunications costs in the UK were very high at that time; therefore, the country used offline authorization.159 In the short run, the UK’s adoption of EMV had the desired effect of reducing POS fraud.160 For example, losses from counterfeit fraud dropped from £129.7 million in 2004 (immediately before the country’s liability shift) to £43.4 million in 2013.161 Losses from lost or stolen fraud fell from £114.4 million in 2004 to £58.9 million in 2013.162

On the other hand, fraud rates in the U.S. have been relatively low because of the sophistication of data analysis by processing networks and the availability of real-time online transaction authentication.163 Between 2011 and 2013, however, U.S. credit card fraud losses increased by 31%.164 This increase primarily was driven by counterfeit fraud, which increased from $1.652 billion to $2.41 billion in 2013.165 Ironically, another factor in the increase in U.S. fraud was the introduction of EMV verification in Europe and other parts of the world, which pushed criminal activity involving counterfeit cards to the U.S.166

The increase in fraud was not lost on consumers, who have expressed concern regarding security in the wake the high-profile data

156. See CONROY, supra note 139, at 8.
157. See id.
158. Id.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. Id. at 9.
162. Id.
163. See id. at 28.
164. Id. Lost or stolen fraud, by contrast, was less than half the size of counterfeit fraud in 2011 ($811 million), had increased to only $825 million in 2013, and was projected to rise to only $850 million in 2015. Id. Unlike counterfeit fraud, lost or stolen fraud is not easily scalable by criminals. See id. at 9.
165. See id.
166. See id. at 5.
breaches.167 According to one consumer survey, 90% of consumers were aware of the data breaches at major retailers and 93% were concerned about the security of their credit card information.168 Another survey found that 77% of consumers were anxious about their financial information and social security numbers being stolen or compromised.169 Industry surveys of consumers also found some significant support for the adoption of EMV cards.170 The primary reason consumers stated for wanting EMV cards was the increased security that those cards provide.171

This rapid increase in fraud, with its attendant consumer reaction, was a primary impetus for the U.S. adoption of EMV.172

Again, this pattern is consistent with the model predicting that exogenous shocks to expected harm—such as increases in fraudsters’ technological capabilities—would lead to improvements to security. Moreover, to the extent that the marginal product of POS precautions is likely to be larger than that for network precautions—for example, in preventing the interception of credit card data at the POS or preventing the ability to use counterfeit cards—the increase in precautions primarily will be along the POS dimension.173


171. See id. at 2.

172. See CONROY, supra note 139, at 5.

173. See infra CONCLUSION & APPENDIX. In the context of our model, this will occur as long as $L_P$ is sufficiently larger than $L_N$, which would be the case if a system were using a large level of network security in relation to POS security.
An interesting facet of the U.S. movement to EMV was that it was accomplished not only without any government involvement, but also without being privately mandated. Before EMV, the status quo provided that as long as merchants abided by contractually obligated security measures, issuers would be liable for counterfeit and lost or stolen fraud. This rule was akin to a strict liability rule on issuers. In a bilateral care context, strict liability is known to create a moral hazard on the part of the non-liable party. However, if POS measures were unlikely to contribute much to security or were too expensive to be cost justified, a strict-liability rule would be superior to others because it would economize on administration costs. Further, contractual obligations for network memberships could be used to mitigate moral hazard through direct regulation of behavior.

Rather than requiring merchants to adopt the EMV standard as a condition for network membership, the major networks moved to what can best be described as a rule of strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence: The issuers remain strictly liable for counterfeit fraud unless the merchant has failed to adopt the EMV standard.

175. See In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 903 F. Supp. 2d 942, 951-52 (S.D. Cal. 2012). For example, merchants were required to adhere to the Payment Card Industry Security Standards to guard against data breaches. Merchants experiencing a breach because of suboptimal security would potentially be liable to the issuer for fraudulent charges. Indeed, this is the subject of lawsuits arising from the Target breach and from the massive Wyndham breach.
177. See id. at 45.
178. See id. at 82.
179. See id. at 54.
180. See Visa, Visa Core Rules and Visa Product and Service Rules, 179 (2015), https://usa.visa.com/dam/VCOM/download/about-visa/15-April-2015-Visa-Rules-Public.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7EP-853V] (stating that, in the Visa network, merchants not adopting EMV are liable for (a) losses due to data stolen from chip cards at non-EMV compliant terminals and (b) losses resulting from use of a counterfeit card at a non-EMV- compliant terminal); Mastercard, EMV/Chip Frequently Asked Questions for Merchants 1, https://www.mastercard.us/content/dam/mccom/en-us/documents/merchant-emv-chip-faqs.pdf [https://perma.cc/9WR8-5DKN] (last visited Dec. 17, 2018) (“After October 1, 2015, the party that does not support EMV—which can be either the issuer or the merchant—assumes liability for counterfeit card transactions.”); Am. Express, EMV Chip Cards 5 (Feb. 2018), https://network.americanexpress.com/globalnetwork/dam/jcr:cefc28a9-4c6d-4c8c-8e99-a60d8a7a210c/GNW_Amex_EMV_Chip_Cards_FAQS_Feb2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/FC6Y-MKVS] (“For EMV, FLS transfers liability for certain types of fraudulent transactions away from the party that has the most secure form of EMV technology.”). Networks similarly place liability on the
known that this rule will lead each party to adopt optimal care.\textsuperscript{181} The victim will choose to take due care because otherwise he or she will be stuck with the full costs of accidents, which are less than the cost of optimal care.\textsuperscript{182} Knowing that the victim will never be contributorily negligent, the injurer internalizes all the accident and avoidance costs and therefore has an incentive to take optimal care.\textsuperscript{183}

The liability-shift solution to the EMV migration highlights the decentralized nature of the optimal-care problem. Although our model couches this as a joint-care problem with a uniform optimal POS solution, the reality is that it may not be optimal for every merchant to adopt EMV when expected damages are heterogeneous.\textsuperscript{184} In this manner, a uniform EMV mandate would force small merchants facing minimal risks from counterfeit fraud to engage in care that would not be cost justified. The liability-shift rule, then, could be thought of as an efficient way to use the decentralized nature of the POS-care

party who took the least precaution. \textit{See U.S. PAYMENTS FORUM, UNDERSTANDING THE U.S. EMV LIABILITY-shifts 5} (2017), \url{http://www.uspaymentsforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/EMV-Fraud-Liability-Shift-WP-FINAL-July-2017.pdf} [\url{https://perma.cc/P97V-JC3L}]. For example, if a merchant is EMV compliant but a customer’s bank has yet to issue EMV-compliant cards, losses from data stolen from this card would be the issuer’s responsibility. \textit{See id.} (stating that if a consumer’s bank has no issued EMV compliant cards but the merchant is EMV-compliant, the issuer is liable).


\textsuperscript{182} \textit{See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra} note 181, at 1669.

\textsuperscript{183} \textit{See id.} at 1669-70.

\textsuperscript{184} Formally, suppose that the amount of fraud damages that a merchant faces is represented by a parameter $\delta$, which is distributed $f(\delta)$. The optimal level of POS care for each merchant, $P_i^*(\delta)$, will be a positive function of expected damages. This can be seen from the individual merchant’s loss maximization problem, in which the merchant selects $P$ taking $N$ as a given: max $q_i[u_i - L(P_i; N) - \phi P_i]$. Assuming that $\delta$ is a scaling factor for $L$, differentiating the first-order conditions with respect to $\delta$ yields: $\frac{\partial P_i^*}{\partial \delta} = \frac{-L_p}{L_{pp}} > 0$. Comparing this result with expression A9 in the appendix, which does not hold $N$ constant and depends on the substitutability of network for POS care in light of changed damages, highlights the divergent incentives of network managers and individual merchants. Even though a uniform EMV mandate ($P^*(\delta)$) may be optimal if one rule has to be applied to the entire population, those suffering harm away from the average ($\bar{\delta}$) are forced to take too much or too little care. Consider the small merchant who is unlikely to be a victim of counterfeit fraud located at $\bar{\delta} < \delta$. This merchant will be better off if she is able to opt out of EMV as long as expected liability from fraud damages without EMV is less than the increase in precaution costs associated with adopting EMV, which is more likely to hold at lower levels of expected harm: $L(P^*(\delta)) < \phi[P^*(\delta) - P^*(\bar{\delta})]$. \textit{See generally KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra} note 181.
decisions to harness private information about damages. Small merchants who view their risk of being targeted by fraudsters for data theft as small and who also view the potential losses from customers using counterfeit cards as small rationally may decide to forgo EMV adoption because the marginal benefits are less than the marginal costs of precaution. Importantly, this reticence to adopt EMV is optimal from a network point of view as well. If those merchants were forced to adopt EMV, the higher costs would be passed along to consumers without sufficient offsetting benefits in terms of reduced risk of payment card fraud.

By allowing self-selection, this approach has an added dynamic benefit. Today, the largest underpenetrated market in the U.S. for acceptance of payment cards is these very small businesses. It is estimated that some twenty million small businesses today that do not accept payment cards could convert a mobile phone or tablet into a card reader or cloud-based payment device using a payment dongle such as Square. Not only does the inability to accept payment cards increase payment friction for both consumers and these businesses, but it is also a primary source of tax evasion because cash transactions are largely untraceable. Thus, to the extent that certain elements of payment security increase the cost to particular merchants (such as small merchants) of accepting cards, that expense can deter the general spread of electronic payments in the economy. As analysts at J.P. Morgan observed:

In other words, mobile phone and tablet card readers could do to the physical world what PayPal did to the online space over 15 years ago, by [providing] casual merchants that previously couldn’t afford to maintain a merchant account with a cost effective means of taking credit or debit cards.

A potential concern about employing EMV through a liability shift could be moral hazard on the part of issuers; if issuers perceive that merchants are unlikely to adopt EMV, then issuers will no longer be liable for losses and hence will have suboptimal incentives to take precautions (e.g., invest in fewer network-based tools or solutions). There are at least two reasons, however, to believe that moral hazard will be muted. First, cards are issued to customers to be used at myriad merchants. As long as merchants who view EMV adoption as an uneconomical proposition represent a relatively small proportion of

185. See Wells Fargo Survey, supra note 13.
187. See id.
charges made by issuers’ customers (which is likely to be the case), issuer incentives will remain essentially unchanged. Second, because the level of network care influences POS care, sufficiently low levels of issuer care may increase risks to a point that causes merchants to adopt EMV, which would shift liability back to issuers.

IV. CUSTOMER VERIFICATION AND EMV: PIN, SIGNATURE, OR . . . NOTHING?

The introduction of EMV into the U.S. has been contentious, in large part because of the costs of implementation (which, as discussed earlier, are substantial). Another major debate accompanying the EMV transaction is the appropriate CVM. When EMV was originally introduced, the system retained the traditional signature requirement as an acceptable form of CVM, with no CVM for transactions below certain thresholds or where the risk of fraud was likely to be low. By 2018, however, card networks announced plans to eliminate even a signature CVM for most transactions, in order to reduce the friction associated with card payments and because signatures provided little additional verification. At the time of the announcement in December 2017, Visa estimated that more than three-fourths of its POS transactions already did not require a signature, with no noticeable increase in fraud costs. Moreover, rapid technological innovation and the adoption of protections such as tokenization, multi-factor identification, and biometrics are making possible greater security at lower costs than the traditional signature requirement.

Some, however, have argued that PIN should be the required CVM. For example, federal lawmakers have held hearings on the matter, and bills about requiring PINs have been introduced at the state level. As noted, several state democratic attorneys general co-signed a letter to the major payment card networks and issuers asking that they adopt PIN as the required CVM instead of signature, and several merchant class actions have been filed that ask courts to impose PIN as the required CVM. Furthermore, although many small businesses

188. See Wells Fargo Survey, supra note 13.
189. See Egan, supra note 6.
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. See id.
194. See Letter from George Jepsen, Conn. Attorney Gen. et al., to Walter M. Macnee, Vice Chairman, MasterCard, Inc. et al. (Nov. 16, 2015) (available at https://portal.ct.gov/-
have complained about the cost of EMV, many big-box retailers and other special interests have argued that PINs should be adopted. In this Section, we examine the net worth of PIN verification from the point of view of maximizing network value, and we also explore the political economy of the PIN debate. Applying the foregoing model of the evolution of payment card security to the specifics of the Chip and PIN debate suggests that there is no evidence that the decision of card networks and issuers to provide a liability shift with respect to EMV adoption—but not to require PIN verification—reflects a market failure. Instead, as the foregoing analysis has suggested, the decision to incentivize EMV adoption but not PIN verification appears to be consistent with a desire to maximize the overall value of the system to all parties, taking into account the costs and benefits of greater security as well as the costs of alternative security precautions. Moreover, the dynamic nature of evolving payment security protocols with respect to consumer payments suggests that government should take great caution before second guessing these decisions.

A. Does PIN Increase the Value of the Network?

As shown in Part II, even if consumers are not financially responsible for losses from fraud, they end up paying for fraud and prevention costs indirectly through fees and transaction costs. Accordingly, consumers have an interest in the adoption of only those additional security measures that have a marginal value beyond their marginal cost.

Figure 4 puts the question of PIN adoption in the framework of the joint-care model, showing the curve representing the sum of fraud and precaution costs (TC) as a function of only POS care. The question is whether the status quo—EMV without PIN verification—is more like point A (where the marginal cost of care is less than the marginal benefit of additional precaution) or point B (the level of optimal care). If EMV alone gets us to point A, then adoption of PIN verification may move us closer to the optimal level because the additional friction introduced by PIN verification is less than the marginal benefit in terms of reduced expected fraud losses. On the
other hand, if the status quo is closer to point B, the optimal level of care, PIN adoption will result in too much care. Although using PINs will provide additional protection against fraud, this marginal benefit will be too small in relation to its marginal cost to be beneficial to society, moving us toward point C. We next explore the available evidence, which in our view suggests that although PIN may provide some temporary relief from lost or stolen fraud, this marginal benefit is likely to be meager in relation to its substantial marginal costs.

Figure 4. Marginal Costs and Benefits from PIN

1. Marginal Benefits

As previously discussed, the push to implement EMV in the U.S. was animated by the rising rate of fraud, particularly counterfeit fraud. That rapid increase in counterfeit fraud explains the move to adopt EMV in the U.S., notwithstanding its additional cost and payment friction. The introduction of EMV in the UK, for example, cut counterfeit fraud losses in that country to less than one-third of their prior rate—from £170 million in 2008 to £43 million in 2015. It is expected that once EMV is implemented in the U.S., counterfeit

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198. See discussion supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
199. CONROY, supra note 139, at 8.
fraud should drop dramatically there as well.200 Thus, implementing EMV alone addresses the largest source of preventable fraud. Moreover, adopting EMV appears to be having the intended effect already; according to MasterCard, merchants who have adopted EMV technology have seen a 54% year-over-year reduction in fraud in the first year.201 Further, Visa reports that counterfeit transactions fell by 66% from June 2015 to June 2017 for EMV-compliant merchants.202

EMV alone, however, provides little protection against lost or stolen fraud. A valid (not counterfeit) card in the hands of an unauthorized user will work until it is reported lost or stolen or until purchasing patterns result in the card being flagged as such. Although EMV, as implemented in the U.S., allows signature verification as the preferred method, a signature can be easily faked and is rarely checked. Further, many transactions do not require a signature or other CVM. The addition of a PIN works primarily on this margin. PIN verification adds a layer of security against lost or stolen fraud because a lost or stolen card is worthless without the PIN. Indeed, the experience in the UK illustrates this observation: After the introduction of Chip and PIN, lost or stolen losses fell from £68.5 million in 2006 to £44.4 million by 2010.203 Although some of this decline may have been associated with the overall reduction in economic activity during the financial crisis, the use of PINs appears to have had an effect.

Despite its potential to ameliorate some fraud, the overall impact from the addition of PIN to EMV cards is likely to be small; Aite Group estimates that only about 2% to 2.5% of fraud would be prevented by adding the PIN verification method to EMV.204 There are at least three factors behind this small marginal benefit.

First, criminals adapt. For example, the initial decrease in lost or stolen fraud after the introduction of PIN security in the UK was short lived. Lost or stolen fraud began a dramatic reversal, reaching £74.1 million in 2008.205

200. See id. at 28.
204. PETERSON & CONROY, supra note 87, at 30.
million by 2015, higher than before Chip and PIN was introduced. This reversal in lost or stolen fraud suggests that criminals sought new tactics as counterfeiting became more difficult: They focused on new ways of capturing both the card and the consumer’s PIN. For example, thieves use such methods as false keypads that overlay the POS checkout and capture consumer PINs, installation of small cameras focused on a store’s keypad, and even old-fashioned techniques such as looking over a consumer’s shoulder as he or she enters a PIN. Similar techniques have been used to capture consumer PINs from ATM transactions. Phishing scams also become more profitable if consumers can be tricked into providing their PINs. According to Financial Fraud Action UK, ATM attacks in the UK increased from 2,553 in the first four months of 2012 to 7,525 during a similar period in 2013.

Second, consumers who have their PINs captured in addition to their card numbers can suffer much greater loss than those who merely have their magnetic stripe compromised. In particular, not only can a criminal who captures a consumer’s PIN engage in fraudulent transactions, if it is a debit card, he or she can also go to an ATM and empty a consumer’s bank account. According to data collected by the Federal Reserve, the average loss per fraudulent transaction is approximately twice as large for PIN debit fraud as for signature debit. Moreover, many consumers reuse their PINs for multiple purposes to reduce the risk of forgetting them; thus, a consumer whose PIN is breached for one card may suffer other losses. So even though a PIN might provide a consumer with increased marginal protection from fraud—in this case only lost or stolen fraud because it is the EMV chip that prevents counterfeit fraud—this additional reduction in risk must be tempered by the cost of risking higher loss in the event of a breach or skimming of the consumer’s PIN.

Third, in addition to any change in criminal behavior, the fact remains that PINs will only help mitigate lost or stolen fraud, which remains the smallest portion of payment card fraud—about 9%.

205. Id. at 14 fig.3.
207. See CONROY, supra note 139, at 9-10; see also Krebs, supra note 206.
210. Id. at 35.
What’s more, a PIN will protect only cards that are not subject to online authorization, or that have not been reported lost or stolen, or whose use is sufficiently normal to avoid network algorithmic protections, because these cards will be rejected during the online authorization process. As noted, the largest component of fraud has been counterfeit cards, which EMV alone addresses; PINs offer no marginal benefit. And the most rapidly growing component of fraud is CNP fraud, which does not require a PIN. In the UK, between 2004 and 2008 CNP fraud increased from £151 million annually to £328 million annually. British issuers and merchants responded to this skyrocketing fraud by increasing protections for CNP. That step led to a decline in CNP fraud to £221 million annually in 2011. By 2013, however, this trend had reversed itself, and CNP fraud had increased to £301 million. Another avenue of fraud that a PIN will not impact is “application fraud,” which occurs when a criminal submits an application for a new card in the victim’s name. In Australia, for example, from 2011 to 2012 fraudulent application fraud rose threefold as the adoption of chip and PIN accelerated.

2. Marginal Costs

Although layering PIN verification onto an EMV card is likely to provide some additional protection against lost or stolen fraud, it also will add substantial new friction to the consumer payment system. First, and perhaps foremost, adding new terminals will increase implementation and certification time. Installing those terminals will also increase transaction time. For example, if a merchant sought not only to process EMV transactions but also to require a PIN, that would require still further security and other costs. For many small merchants, it is not uncommon to keep a small

211. As a report from the Federal Reserve notes, the low level of fraud for PIN debit is driven in part “by the fact that single-message transactions rarely take place online, where most card-not-present fraud originates.” Id. at 20.
212. CONROY, supra note 139, at 10.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
217. CONROY, supra note 139, at 14.
218. PETERSON & CONROY, supra note 87, at 17 fig.5.
219. See Cooper & Zywicki, supra note 122, at 37.
220. See id. at 15-16.
221. See id.
payment-processing terminal behind the sales counter and to physically swipe or dip the card for the consumer. If merchants were forced to accept chip and PIN verification, by contrast, the merchant would be required to (a) place the card terminal in a location that is easily accessible to consumers and (b) take proper precautions so that consumers can shield the keypad when entering their PIN to prevent unauthorized surveillance of that process. Sit-down restaurants would need one or more portable payment terminals for consumers to use which in turn would raise new security issues as well as the potential for damage to payment terminals. According to one survey, in June 2016 only 39% of “eating and drinking” establishments had PIN capability. Furthermore, certain types of CVMs may be excessively inconvenient, cumbersome, or even infeasible in many transaction contexts, such as trying to enter a PIN when paying at a fast-food drive-through window or paying a toll on the highway. Along with adding time and inconvenience to the transaction, PIN verification also increases the likelihood of a “false rejection” that occurs when a legitimate user forgets his or her PIN.

The ambivalence about PIN verification is reflected in consumer surveys. For example, in a survey of debit customers conducted in May 2016 by Visa, about half (47%) of Visa debit cardholders expressed concern about using their PIN to make debit card purchases, with 24% of respondents saying that they “don’t think it is safe to use [their] PIN,” 9% saying “it takes longer,” and 8% saying that they “don’t always remember their PIN.” Indeed, consumer experience with the choice between using signature debit or PIN debit shows a revealed aversion to PINs. In the U.S., consumers have traditionally preferred signature debit over PIN debit. For example, in 2014, 65% of debit transactions were made with signature debit, compared with only 35% for PIN debit. Many consumers who could use PIN debit obviously prefer to use signature debit.

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222. See id. at 37.
223. See id.
224. See id.
225. See id. at 37-38.
226. See id. at 38.
227. Visa Debit Cardholder Research Results (May 2016) (on file with authors).
228. After a major data breach, many consumers also state that they will no longer shop at the store because of security concerns, but many of them do not follow through on their claim. See id.
229. See J.P. MORGAN, supra note 186, at 32.
230. Id.
Further, according to a report by the Aite Group, one unnamed “sizable” U.S. card issuer initiated its migration with chip and PIN as its preferred CVM for credit cards.²³¹ The results of the experiment were revealing about consumer willingness to incur higher costs and friction in exchange for PIN verification:

[The issuer] only deployed EMV credit cards to a sample population to test the impact of the more cumbersome CVM. This issuer experienced an 8% drop in transaction volume among the pilot portfolio and is now working on a plan to transition to chip and signature for its credit card CVM.

In other words, if consumers valued the added security of PIN verification, they should have used the issuer’s card more. Instead, the increased cost of using a PIN card caused consumers to push the PIN-based card to the back of their wallets in favor of other cards that lacked PIN functionality but that consumers evidently found easier to use, regardless of what they said they preferred.

In addition to the per-transaction marginal costs that a PIN regime would introduce, transitioning to PINs would cause large fixed expenditures that likely would be passed on to consumers. According to Aite’s estimates, it would cost approximately $3.1 billion to enable all non-PIN-accepting merchants (such as small merchants who lack PIN-capable devices) to accept PIN verification.²³² This figure excludes the cost for sit-down restaurants to purchase pay-at-table terminals (which cost about $500 each, amounting to about $665 million in aggregate).²³³ Merchants who currently accept PIN verification (for PIN debit cards) would spend approximately $380 million to upgrade.²³⁴ Finally, staff training time would likely cost about $389 million.²³⁵ Overall, Aite estimated that it would cost merchants $4.53 billion to transition to Chip and PIN.²³⁶

Mandating Chip and PIN technology also can be cumbersome for very small merchants who use small, convenient, and simple portable card-processing devices.²³⁷ Payment dongles such as Square

²³¹ Peterson & Conroy, supra note 87, at 12.
²³³ Id.
²³⁴ Id.
²³⁵ Id.
²³⁶ Id.
²³⁷ This cost to small businesses has produced something of a rift in the merchant community between smaller merchants who opposed the EMV migration and larger merchants who supported it, likely for reasons unrelated to consumer security or risk of loss. As Julie Conroy of Aite Group told Bloomberg, “[M]erchants
allow very small merchants—such as landscapers, handymen, or farmer’s market vendors—to accept card payments by affixing a small payment device to their smartphone or tablet. Those small devices enable merchants to quickly accept payment cards without the cost and inconvenience of a large, PIN-enabled payment machine. Newer dongle models that can accept EMV cards are larger and more expensive than traditional magnetic-stripe receivers, and adding a secure PIN pad would dramatically increase their cost still more and reduce their convenience. In particular, not only must equipment have a PIN pad available, but it must also contain the software to encrypt or tokenize the consumer’s PIN.238

What’s more, Aite Group estimates that it would also cost card issuers more than $2.6 billion to transition to universal PIN use.239 That figure includes the various costs and difficulties related to providing consumers with an initial, temporary PIN that consumers would then be able to reset.240 Overall, the Aite Group estimates that the total direct cost to issuers and merchants of adopting Chip and PIN would exceed $7 billion.241 Moreover, that figure excludes any costs from lost sales from payments failures. It also excludes the opportunity cost of slowing many small merchants from adopting technologies (such as Square) that would permit them to accept payment cards (because of the higher cost and size of PIN-enabled devices).

There are also potential dynamic and second-order costs associated with a PIN mandate. Issuers and networks are rapidly developing more secure and less expensive CVM methods that can improve security without the additional friction of PIN verification or other similarly high-friction technologies.242 For example, new methods of customer verification are being developed, including biometrics (fingerprint or retina scans), voice recognition, and device

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238. PCI security protocols prevent entering PINs directly into a business’s tablet, and moreover, consumers are likely to be uncomfortable doing so. See EMERGING TECHS. & PCI SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL, PCI MOBILE PAYMENT ACCEPTANCE SECURITY GUIDELINES VERSION 1.0 10 (2013) https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/Mobile_Payment_Security_Guidelines_Merchants_v1.pdf [https://perma.cc/D947-GRM4].


240. See id.

241. See id.

242. See EMERGING TECHS. & PCI SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL, supra note 238, at 8.
identification with smartphones (for example, verifying the presence of the consumer by geolocating his or her smartphone). 243

A PIN is often referred to as a static anti-fraud technology because once consumers establish a PIN, they rarely change that PIN and they frequently reuse it for multiple cards and across multiple platforms. In this sense, one can draw an analogy between a static transaction-and-authentication technology such as Chip and PIN and the infamous Maginot Line that France built and relied on following World War I. The Maginot Line was built to repulse German hostility through what was thought to be the most likely direction of a German attack—head on. That direction was chosen because it was generally believed that the German army would not be able to penetrate the Ardennes forest. The French military’s reliance on an expensive static defense technology turned out to be tragically shortsighted in the face of a dynamic threat. Instead of relying solely on chip and PIN (the card industry’s figurative Maginot Line), card-processing networks are investing major resources in biometrics and other forms of authentication such as fingerprint, retina, and voice scanners. 244 The card networks have introduced technology that uses a consumer’s cell phone to help authenticate a card transaction. In short, this service provides information about whether a cardholder’s cell phone is located near the merchant. 245 For example, a transaction in a foreign country—which might otherwise be flagged as potentially fraudulent—could be authenticated through cell phone geolocation. 246

Variety and experimentation in authentication measures provide for innovation—increased security at lower transactional friction—but constant experimentation also prevents the Maginot Line problem by reducing the ability for criminals to target one particular, static technology over time. In response to consumer frustration about the perceived slow nature and inconvenience of dipping an EMV card, financial institutions are already rolling out new cards that combine EMV technology with near-field communication (NFC). 247 In January

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244. Id.


246. See id.

2017, TCF Financial Corporation announced that it is adding NFC to all of its newly issued EMV cards to increase convenience and to speed checkout.\textsuperscript{248} Citigroup is also equipping all of its new cobranded Costco Visa credit cards with NFC, and other issuers are following suit.\textsuperscript{249} In many areas outside the U.S., contactless EMV cards “are increasingly becoming the norm.”\textsuperscript{250} Use of such cards is expected to grow rapidly in the U.S., further obviating the relevance of a traditional PIN authentication procedure.

Still more dramatic are payment technologies that do not require a physical card. Most notable, of course, is the booming popularity of near-field, contactless payment services such as Apple Pay.\textsuperscript{251} These services enable customers to make purchases with high security, without a physical card, and with minimal friction.\textsuperscript{252} With respect to Apple Pay, the magnetic-stripe information never comes in contact with the merchant’s terminal, and consumers need not run the risk associated with inputting one’s PIN.\textsuperscript{253} Indeed, technologies are being developed today that would eliminate any physical card or device presence, such as fingerprints, retina scans, or payments by “selfie.” The rapid adoption of contactless payment technologies as a replacement for traditional plastic cards casts further doubt on the wisdom of imposing expensive new mandates on what increasingly appears to be obsolescing and transitional technology.

At a still higher level, issuers and payment networks are creating ever-more-sophisticated and accurate authentication algorithms to verify transactions. In this sense, the traditional distinction between processing and authentication is increasingly being erased. In the world of big data, every transaction presented for processing also feeds new information into the database that processors and issuers use to analyze transactions and develop better models. The major processing networks and issuers are always working to develop better models of fraud prevention and protections for consumers. Increasingly, processing is authentication.

In light of the preceding discussion, there is little reason to believe that the decision not to mandate PIN as a required CVM is the result of a market failure or monopoly power. Instead, the decision not to mandate PIN reflects the estimate that the marginal benefit from the additional security of PIN authentication at the POS is just too small.

\textsuperscript{248} See id.
\textsuperscript{249} See id.
\textsuperscript{250} Id.
\textsuperscript{251} See Apple Pay Security and Privacy Overview, supra note 92.
\textsuperscript{252} See id.
\textsuperscript{253} See id.
to justify its marginal cost. All told, although Chip and PIN can be a valuable measure in fighting lost or stolen fraud, the marginal value overall is limited once other precautions (such as EMV) are adopted. As industry analysts Thad Peterson and Julie Conroy of Aite Group observe, “[S]ince implementation of EMV without any CVM dramatically reduces the incidence of counterfeit card risk, and since lost/stolen card risk accounts for approximately 9% of fraud losses in payment cards, the relative negative impact of implementing EMV without PIN was low.” Therefore, although using PINs likely will reduce lost or stolen fraud, these small—and potentially transitory—gains are likely to be small in relation to the friction from longer checkout times, forgotten PINs, and reduced innovation around payment card security.

V. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE PIN DEBATE: THE DURBIN AMENDMENT AND INTERCHANGE FEES

The foregoing analysis provides little reason to believe that adding PINs to EMV cards is likely to pass a benefit-cost test. PIN verification likely will be a passing technology with rapidly declining relevance to the world of electronic payments, and at best, most consumers are ambivalent toward a PIN mandate. Yet some merchants have run to the courthouses and legislatures in attempts to force the adoption of PIN verification. As we explain below, these battles over PIN verification appear to be merely the latest front in the ongoing war between merchants and payment card networks over interchange fees.

Some large merchants have filed suits against the payment card networks and issuing banks based on various legal theories. For example, Home Depot Inc. v. Visa Inc. centers around allegations that the payment networks and the issuing banks conspired through the EMV rollout to maintain signature verification:

Visa and MasterCard have acted to keep a defective product in place—signature-authenticated cards—in order to maintain their supracompetitive profits that are tethered to this faulty technology. Visa’s and MasterCard’s success in forcing merchants and consumers to accept and use technologically-inferior, and in fact defective, products—including products that Visa and MasterCard knew would increase fraud—is further evidence of their substantial market power.

A pair of cases have centered on the Durbin Amendment to Dodd–Frank and its implementing regulations, which were designed

to reduce interchange fees paid by merchants for debit transactions.\textsuperscript{256} In addition to directly capping debit interchange rates, the Durbin Amendment prevent payment card networks or issuing banks from requiring network exclusivity or from otherwise “inhibit[ing] the ability of any person that accepts or honors debit cards for payments to direct the routing of electronic debit transactions for processing over any payment card network that may process such transactions.”\textsuperscript{257} Specifically, the Durbin Amendment require that a merchant must have access to at least two independent networks for debit-card routing.\textsuperscript{258}

The grocery chain Kroger filed suit against Visa in the Southern District of Ohio alleging that the requirement that POS terminals allow non-PIN transactions for chip cards was “motivated by an intention to restrain competition” and, in addition to contract damages, asked for declaratory judgment that Visa’s contractual prohibition on Kroger requiring PIN verification for Visa debit cards violates the Durbin Amendment.\textsuperscript{259} The plaintiff’s theory is that by not requiring PIN verification with the EMV rollout, Visa is preventing Kroger from configuring its POS terminals to require PIN debit; hence in violation of the Durbin Amendment’s prohibitions on limiting merchants’ access to a non-Visa PIN network.\textsuperscript{260} For example, Kroger cites the following passage in the statement of basis and purpose for the regulations implementing the Durbin Amendment to support its claim: “[M]erchants may not be inhibited from encouraging the use of PIN debit by, for example, setting PIN debit as a default payment method or blocking the use of signature debit altogether.”\textsuperscript{261} Thus, Kroger argues that by not requiring PIN authorization, the networks and issuing banks are hindering the merchants’ legal entitlement to “block

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{257} 12 C.F.R. § 235.7(a)-(b) (2018).
\item \textsuperscript{258} See § 235.7(a).
\item \textsuperscript{260} See id.
\item \textsuperscript{261} See id. at 30-33 (quoting 75 Fed. Reg. 81, 722, 81, 752 (2010)) (emphasis added).
\end{itemize}
the use of signature debit altogether,” even if consumers prefer to use this method.262

Wal-Mart also brought suit against Visa in New York state court under an almost identical theory.263 In preparation for the EMV roll-out, Wal-Mart began to install chip-reading terminals that required cardholders with chip-enabled debit cards to verify their transaction with a PIN.264 Visa views this action as a breach of its agreement with Wal-Mart, which requires merchants to continue to allow consumers to use signature authentication for Visa-branded debit cards.265 Wal-Mart sued Visa, seeking declaratory judgment that Visa cannot enforce its contractual provisions in a manner that would prohibit Wal-Mart’s adoption of the chip and PIN protocol.266 Like Kroger’s suit, Wal-Mart relies heavily on the Durbin Amendment’s provisions that allow merchants to steer consumers toward the network of their choice.267

In addition to these private cases, state attorneys general have advocated in favor of a “chip and PIN” standard.268 In November 2015, nine Democratic state attorneys general sent a letter to the CEOs of eight major financial services companies “urging” them “expedite the implementation of chip and PIN technology in the United States” by acting collectively “to move to the full chip and PIN technology as soon as possible.”269 While noting that they are not suggesting that chip and PIN technology “should be enshrined in federal or state law as a legal mandate,” the Democratic attorneys general argued that adoption of full “chip and PIN” technology would be “an important security improvement” that would provide enhanced protections for consumers and ask for its voluntary adoption.270

Why are some large merchants so adamant about their support and intensive lobbying efforts in favor of a PIN mandate, including launching several major class-action lawsuits? This intensive and expensive effort seems especially puzzling in light of the fact that

262. See id. (noting that the Federal Reserve rejected the objections of networks and issuing banks that the regulations would have the effect of allowing merchants “block[] the use of signature debit.”) (quoting 76 Fed. Reg. 43, 394, 43, 453 (2011)).
265. See id.
266. See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 263, at 2.
267. See id. at 21.
268. See Letter from George Jepsen, supra note 194.
269. See id.
270. See id.
merchants that install EMV devices bear no risk of loss from lost or stolen fraud, the only source of fraud that PIN verification addresses. Further adding to the puzzle is that PIN transactions are slower than non-PIN transactions and much more likely to result in improperly denied or failed transactions. Not to mention the reality that PIN verification is rapidly being overtaken by faster, more effective technologies such as biometric identification and use of Big Data methods to verify transactions.

One possible explanation for merchants’ support of PIN verification relates less to the risk of fraud or merchant fraud losses than to long-standing efforts by merchants to steer consumers toward increased use of PIN networks, which tend to charge lower interchange fees than signature networks. Those savings are passed through to merchants in lower merchant discount rates. Annual data collected by the Federal Reserve reveals this cost differential. Debit card interchange fees today are set on a two-tier system: (a) large banks (with more than $10 billion in assets) that are subject to the price controls imposed by the Durbin Amendment to the Dodd–Frank financial reform legislation, and (b) exempt banks (with less than $10 billion in assets) that are not subject to the Durbin Amendment’s interchange price controls. According to the Federal Reserve, exempt banks provide about 38% of the total volume of signature debit card transactions in the U.S. annually and about 35% of the PIN debit transactions. For transactions made by cards issued by Durbin-covered banks, the average interchange fees for signature and PIN debit transactions were virtually identical: $0.22 and $0.24, respectively. For exempt banks, however, the differences were dramatic: the average interchange fee for signature debit was approximately $0.52, compared with $0.25 for PIN debit. Thus, with respect to signature debit transactions made with cards from exempt banks (approximately 38% of all transactions), merchants could save substantial sums of money if consumers were compelled to use PIN debit instead. In addition, 93% of the transaction volume for prepaid cards (which constitute a rapidly growing segment of the market) is exempt from the Durbin Amendment’s interchange price controls.

273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
Thus, it appears that merchants’ primary goal in their litigation and lobbying efforts is to increase the overall use of PIN networks. Indeed, it makes economic sense for merchants to push for a requirement that would allow them to route a larger proportion of their electronic payments through cheaper networks.

There also appears to be a division between small and large merchants with regard to the EMV rollout. For example, in a survey of merchants during June 2016, Aite Group found that 77% of very large merchants (with more than $50 million in revenue) favored implementation of Chip and PIN, but only 50% of smaller merchants (with $500,000 to $2.4 million in revenue) did so. Although lower interchange fees for PIN debit versus signature debit explain why merchants as a whole would prefer the former, that does not explain the difference between large and small merchants’ support for PIN as part of the EMV rollout. One answer to this conundrum may be found in the way that interchange fees are structured, which causes larger merchants to benefit disproportionately when consumers use PIN versus signature verification for electronic transactions. For larger merchants, discount rates are typically set by cost-plus pricing, composed of the relevant interchange fee with certain costs added on. Smaller merchants, by contrast, typically have bundled pricing models, in which they are quoted an overall cost for a package of services, including debit and credit card payments. As a result, interchange fees are marginal costs for large merchants and tend to be passed through much more rapidly and completely for large merchants than for smaller merchants.

It is important to note that, even with the EMV rollout, consumers have a choice: If they prefer the additional security of entering their PIN, they frequently have that option. Nonetheless, as noted earlier, signature debit remains very popular with consumers in

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279. See id. at 24.

280. See id. at 23.

281. See id. at 25.

282. See J.P. Morgan, supra note 186, at 32. In fact, they universally have that option at the very large retailers that are lobbying and suing to require PIN verification. See id.
Several factors may explain this popularity. First, consumers are averse to the inconvenience of paying with debit (the time and friction of remembering and entering a PIN), and they are afraid that PIN-skimming could dramatically increase their losses if it ended up draining their bank accounts. Second, consumers are simply unable to use PIN debit for many transactions, such as online transactions and those in sit-down restaurants. Third, consumers may have a heightened sense of confidence in the Visa or MasterCard processing networks as compared with the myriad PIN-debit networks that many consumers do not recognize. In this manner, merchants pushing a PIN mandate are actually asking government to limit consumer choice by eliminating the popular option of signature debit. This observation suggests that the attempt to use the courts and state houses to require the adoption of PIN may have little to do with reducing their fraud losses or protecting consumers but instead may have been aimed at increasing their bottom lines with lower interchange fees.

**CONCLUSION**

The evolution of payment card security has been driven by an economic logic of maximizing the value of the network for consumers, which is accomplished when network participants choose the mixture of POS and network-level security that minimizes transaction costs of using payment cards, while also adapting to a rapidly changing technological and threat environment.\(^{284}\) Consistent with experience, the joint-care model developed in this Article predicts that the EU would prefer to rely primarily on POS security because of higher telecommunication costs, whereas the U.S. would prefer to rely primarily on network authentication. The model predicts that an exogenous increase in the level of counterfeit fraud—largely a result of technological advances by fraudsters—would increase the use of POS security measures, a condition which is consistent with the timing of the adoption of the EMV standard by the U.S. Moreover, the use of a liability shift model as opposed to a mandate is likely to act as an efficient selection tool: Smaller merchants that are unlikely to be targets of counterfeit fraud can opt out if the risk of fraud is less than the cost of adopting EMV.

The U.S. adoption of EMV was not full-throated in that signature rather than PIN remains the means for consumer verification.\(^{285}\) This decision makes sense from the perspective of network value.

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\(^{283}\) See id. fig.28.

\(^{284}\) See, e.g., *How Much Will Chip/PIN Cost to Implement?*, supra note 10.

\(^{285}\) See J.P. MORGAN, supra note 186, at 32.
maximization. There are strong reasons to believe that the marginal benefit from PIN verification—almost solely a reduction in lost or stolen fraud—is too meager to justify its adoption. Nonetheless, some large merchants have pushed for a PIN mandate. These proposals for government intervention with a PIN mandate now would likely disrupt the dynamic and evolving ecosystem of the evolution of payment cards and payment card security, imposing costs on consumers and merchants with very few benefits. In fact, there is some reason to believe that the recent push for command-and-control mandates on payment card security—particularly lobbying and litigation efforts in the U.S. by special interests to require chip and PIN technology—are driven by financial self-interest in lower interchange fees, not by consumer welfare.

Before regulators intervene in a market, they must first determine that (a) there is a market failure, (b) an effective solution to that market failure can be identified, and (c) the benefits of any proposed solution exceed the costs of the intervention, including the unintended consequences. To date, it is difficult to see that there is a market failure in the consumer payment system. Instead, it appears that the system has evolved somewhat spontaneously over time in light of available technology and efforts to reduce payment friction while also protecting consumer security. It seems to make little sense to mandate a particular technology that will soon become obsolete rather than to allow the payment system to continue to evolve.
APPENDIX: JOINT-CARE MODEL AND SIMULATION RESULTS

The payment care industry would like to avoid losses from fraudulent transactions, \( L \), which can be reduced by action both at the point of sale, \( P \), and through the network, \( N \). These actions have marginal costs \( \phi \) and \( \theta \), respectively. A consumer’s marginal willingness to pay for a payment card transaction is \( u \), and his or her net value from using the payment card network is:

\[
\text{Max } V_{P,N,q} = q(u - L(P, N) - \phi P - \theta N). \tag{A1}
\]

Maximization implies that the following conditions will hold in equilibrium:

\[
-L_P = \phi \tag{A2}
\]
\[
-L_N = \theta \tag{A3}
\]
\[
u = L(P, N) + \phi P + \theta N. \tag{A4}
\]

These conditions simply indicate that each type of precaution will be used until its marginal benefit (\(-L_P \) and \(-L_N \), which are avoided fraud losses from additional care) equals its marginal cost (\( \phi, \theta \)). The third condition, equation A4, shows that network value is maximized when the marginal value to a consumer from a transaction, \( u \), is equal to the marginal cost, which here is fraud and precaution costs. Clearly, by minimizing the right-hand side of this condition—the sum of fraud and fraud-avoidance costs—welfare is maximized. Because the optimal level of POS and network care is unrelated to output, we focus on the loss-minimization problem.

Comparative Statics

How a change in POS usage affects optimal network usage and vice versa can be found by differentiating the first-order conditions with respect to \( N \):

\[
L_{PP} \frac{\partial P^*}{\partial N} + L_{PN} \frac{\partial N^*}{\partial N} = 0 \tag{A5}
\]
\[
L_{NP} \frac{\partial P^*}{\partial N} + L_{NN} \frac{\partial N^*}{\partial N} = 0. \tag{A6}
\]
A Chip Off the Old Block

Solving yields: \( \frac{\partial P^*}{\partial N} = -\frac{L_{PN}}{L_{PP}} \). Because \( L_{PP} > 0 \), network and POS care are substitutes as long as \( L_{PN} > 0 \), which implies that the marginal product of POS rises with increase in network care.

The impact of an increase in price of network care on the use of both network and POS care can be found by differentiating the first-order conditions with respect to \( \theta \):

\[
L_{PP} \frac{\partial P^*}{\partial \theta} + L_{PN} \frac{\partial N^*}{\partial \theta} = 0
\]

\[
L_{NP} \frac{\partial P^*}{\partial \theta} + L_{NN} \frac{\partial N^*}{\partial \theta} + 1 = 0.
\]

Solving yields the following two expressions:

\[
\frac{\partial N^*}{\partial \theta} = \frac{-L_{NN}}{SOC} < 0 \quad (A7)
\]

\[
\frac{\partial P^*}{\partial \theta} = \frac{L_{PN}}{SOC} > 0, \quad (A8)
\]

where \( SOC \) is the determinant from the second-order condition matrix, assumed to be positive for minimum. Because of symmetry in the model, these results imply that \( \frac{\partial P^*}{\partial \phi} < 0 \), and \( \frac{\partial N^*}{\partial \theta} > 0 \).

Finally, we examine the impact of an exogenous increase in losses associated with any level of care. To formalize this, consider a parameter \( \delta > 0 \) that represents an exogenous shock to \( L(P,N) \):

\[
L(P,N)\delta + \phi P + \theta N.
\]

(A9)

First, we can see from the envelope theorem that total costs increase with \( \alpha \):

\[
\frac{\partial TC(P^*,N^*)}{\partial \delta} = L(P^*,N^*) > 0. \quad (A10)
\]

Differentiating the first-order conditions with respect to \( \delta \) yields the following:

\[
L_{PP} \frac{\partial P^*}{\partial \delta} + L_{PN} \frac{\partial N^*}{\partial \delta} + L_N = 0,
\]
\[ L_{NP} \frac{\partial P^*}{\partial \delta} + L_{NN} \frac{\partial N^*}{\partial \delta} + L_P = 0, \]

Solving yields the following:

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{\partial N^*}{\partial \delta} &= \frac{L_P L_{PN} - L_{PP} L_N}{SOC} \leq 0 \quad (A11) \\
\frac{\partial P^*}{\partial \delta} &= \frac{L_N L_{PN} - L_{NN} L_P}{SOC} \leq 0. \quad (A12)
\end{align*}
\]

The signs of A11 and A12 are ambiguous because the change in optimal POS and network care in response to a change in potential damages will depend on their relative substitutability.

Simulation

The simulation was based on the following baseline model:

\[ TC(P, N) = (PN)^{-0.5} + P + N. \quad (A13) \]

In A1, \( L = (PN)^{-0.5} \), and \( \emptyset = \theta = 1.286 \) The solution to minimizing (A13) with respect to \( P \) and \( N \) yields the following values:

- \( P^* = 0.71 \)
- \( N^* = 0.71 \)
- \( TC(P^*, N^*) = 2.82 \)
- \( L(P^*, N^*) = 1.40 \)

The solution is shown graphically in figure A1.

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286. It can easily be confirmed that \( L_P < 0 \) and \( L_{PP} > 0 \).
To generate the data underlying figure 3, $\theta$ was varied from 0.25 to 3.0, holding $\emptyset$ constant at 1.0. The results are listed in table A1.

Table A1. Simulation Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marginal cost of network ($MCr$ held constant at 1)</th>
<th>$P^*$</th>
<th>$N^*$</th>
<th>Total costs at $P^<em>$ and $N^</em>$</th>
<th>Losses at $N^<em>$ and $P^</em>$</th>
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<tr>
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