REDEFINING INFERTILITY AFTER
OBERGEFELL V. HODGES: WHY THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT WARRANTS
INFERTILITY INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR
SAME-SEX COUPLES TO ACHIEVE
BIOLOGICAL PARENTHOOD

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ABSTRACT

Oppression comes in many shapes and sizes. Although various, noteworthy forms of oppression have plagued this nation for centuries, same-sex couples have experienced a type of oppression unlike any other. However, the Obergefell decision is a significant development toward the equalization of same-sex couples’ rights, as the fundamental right to marry is now extended to the equally deserving homosexual community. Yet, an important aspect of marriage is the ability to grow a family, and same-sex couples cannot capitalize on that opportunity as easily as heterosexual couples. Blame science. Therefore, same-sex couples should be considered infertile, by definition, and should be afforded infertility insurance coverage to provide them with the ability to achieve biological parenthood. This Comment will explore the abundance of reasons why infertility insurance coverage for same-sex couples is imperative.

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**INTRODUCTION**

Erin and Marianne Krupa (the Krupas) are a same-sex married couple who, like many other married couples, want desperately to start a family.¹ However, the Krupas face barriers that set them apart from the vast majority of married couples—they cannot naturally conceive a child without the assistance of either an opposite sex counterpart or Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART).² Erin Krupa, the designated gestational carrier, was denied infertility insurance coverage because, by definition, she did not meet the statutory threshold.³ According to the denial letter that the Krupas received from their insurance company, a woman under the age of thirty-five is only eligible to receive infertility insurance coverage by participating in unprotected heterosexual intercourse for at least two years.⁴ The denial letter aligns with New Jersey’s insurance statute,

¹. See Complaint at 4-5, Krupa v. Badolato, No. 16-CV-4637 (D.N.J. Aug. 1, 2016). This cause of action also involves two other same-sex couples—Sol Mejias and her wife, Yanassa Hernandez, as well as Sarah Mills and her partner, Gloria Torres. See id. at 3. All parties reside in New Jersey and are experiencing the same infertility struggles. See id. However, for the purpose of this Note, the Krupas’s story shall be the focus.

². See id. at 2-3 (“Accordingly, because Plaintiffs are women in same-sex relationships and do not engage in sexual intercourse with men, notwithstanding the fact that their doctors have determined by way of noncontroversial, medically-accepted diagnostic techniques that they do indeed suffer from infertility, New Jersey law leaves them with no way to qualify as infertile for purposes of insurance coverage whatsoever.”).

³. See id. at 5. This denial was given notwithstanding the fact that Erin Krupa’s doctor determined she could not conceive without the use of infertility treatment. See id.

⁴. See id. (“[T]he denial letter specifically stated, in relevant part, that ‘[i]nfertility means the disease or condition that results in the abnormal function of the reproductive system such that: . . . [a] female under 35 years of age is unable to conceive after two years of unprotected sexual intercourse,’ and ‘[i]t’ to be labeled as
which limits infertility coverage to individuals who have been unsuccessful in getting pregnant after having unprotected sexual intercourse with a member of the opposite sex for a period of not less than two years.5 Because the Krupas are in a committed lesbian relationship, they are automatically disqualified from receiving infertility insurance coverage because they do not participate in sexual intercourse with a member of the opposite sex.6 The overarching purpose of the Krupas’s lawsuit is to pursue “the right of all New Jersey women who dream of becoming mothers to access the reproductive health care they need to realize that dream on an equal basis.”7

Like many Americans, the Krupas struggle with infertility—but the type of infertility experienced by the Krupas, and same-sex couples in general, is vastly different than that of heterosexual couples.8 Infertility experienced by heterosexual couples is medical infertility, which is generally defined as “infertility attributable to disease, condition, illness, or injury,” and is what the majority of the population understands infertility to be.9 However, same-sex couples experience structural infertility, which describes those who are not structurally able to naturally conceive a child through unprotected sexual intercourse.10 The overwhelming majority of insurance

having infertility and being eligible for infertility treatments, [the insurance] policy based on the New Jersey mandate requires that a patient age less than 35 years fail to conceive after two years of trying.”

5. See id. at 2-3; see also N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17B:27-46.1x(a) (West 2001); see also infra notes 260 and 261.

6. See Complaint, supra note 1, at 5. Notably, Erin Krupa had endometriosis and uterine cysts. See id. at 4. Typically, insurance providers cover infertility treatment for women with endometriosis. See id. However, since Erin failed to satisfy New Jersey’s other requirement—having unsuccessful, unprotected sex with a male counterpart for a period of two years or more—her insurance provider denied infertility treatment insurance coverage. See id. at 5.


8. See infra Part II. Notwithstanding the fact that Erin Krupa had medical issues preventing her from conceiving, she and her partner were denied insurance coverage because they did not meet the threshold of having unprotected sexual intercourse with a person of the opposite sex. See Complaint, supra note 1, at 5. This, by definition, encompasses structural infertility. See id.


10. See Melissa B. Jacoby, The Debt Financing of Parenthood, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 149 (2009) (“[A]ssisted reproduction is also important to
Redefining Infertility After Obergefell

11 However, since the gravamen of Obergefell v. Hodges was to position same-sex couples on equal footing with heterosexual couples, the decision raises challenging questions about what else needs to be done under the law to accomplish that equality.

As Justice Kennedy so profoundly stated in Obergefell, the constitutional right to marry encompasses a multitude of aspects—one being childbearing. While strides have been made in recognizing the fundamental right to marry for same-sex couples, there are a variety of laws that require amendments to fully equalize the rights of same-sex couples. Particularly, as it pertains to the current definition of infertility in most insurance statutes, same-sex couples cannot claim infertility for the reason that they are anatomically incapable of naturally conceiving a child. Thus, notwithstanding their structural infertility, same-sex couples are essentially precluded from obtaining the necessary infertility insurance coverage to assist them in starting a family and to alleviate the financial burden associated with infertility treatments.

Aside from those with ‘structural infertility’—that is, those who want to be parents but do not want to engage in heterosexual intercourse—see also Lisa C. Ikemoto, The In/Fertile, the Too Fertile, and the Dysfertile, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1007, 1009, 1033 (1996) (coining the term “dysfertile” to define the type of infertility same-sex couples face).

11. See Erez Aloni & Judith Daar, Marriage Equality: One Step Down the Path Toward Family Justice, 57 ORANGE CTY. LAW. 22, 24 (2015) (discussing how same-sex family formation is essentially prohibited by statutory language). Only fourteen of fifty states have insurance statutes that offer or address infertility insurance coverage. See, e.g., Valarie Blake, It’s an ART Not a Science: State-Mandated Insurance Coverage of Assisted Reproductive Technologies and Legal Implications for Gay and Unmarried Persons, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 651, 662 (2011) (discussing the effects of the fourteen states that provided infertility insurance at the time of the writing).


13. See generally Complaint, supra note 1.

14. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601 (“The constitutional marriage right has many aspects, of which childbearing is only one.”).

15. See Aloni & Daar, supra note 11, at 22-23 (discussing that other issues need to be addressed after the legalization of same-sex marriage).

16. See, e.g., Jacoby, supra note 10, at 149 (“The traditional and common definition of infertility covers those who have not conceived after a designated period of unprotected heterosexual intercourse.”).

17. See Blake, supra note 11, at 653-54 (“Of the fourteen states with some form of insurance mandate, none explicitly excludes gay or unmarried persons from
from scant federal regulations, such as the Affordable Care Act (ACA), states are left to determine the insurance laws within their respective states. Therefore, federal regulations should be put in place to mandate that states, especially those that offer infertility insurance coverage for heterosexual couples, also offer coverage for structurally infertile same-sex couples. Obergefell is a major stride toward the equalization of homosexual rights, but in many ways it is just the beginning. Where the next developmental focus will be is ultimately a mystery, but equal access to childbearing is undoubtedly on the horizon.

Part I of this Comment discusses the history and evolution of same-sex couples’ rights and provides a detailed outlook on the
applicability of the landmark decision—*Obergefell v. Hodges*. It then concludes with the constitutional implications of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses in denying same-sex couples infertility services. Part II of this Comment examines the infertility treatment options—also known as ART—available to same-sex couples.\(^\text{22}\) It also explores state statutes that mention, provide for, or offer infertility insurance coverage generally, but explicitly or implicitly exclude same-sex couples. It then examines the two state statutes—California and Maryland—that do explicitly account for same-sex couples within their insurance codes. Part III of this Comment assesses the legal foundation pertaining to same-sex couples’ fundamental right to marry—and have a family—and evaluates the infertility hurdle they face. It then outlines the necessity of redefining infertility and why *Obergefell* and the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses warrant redefinition.

I. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE

Throughout history, same-sex couples have faced oppression and prejudice in their fight for equality.\(^\text{23}\) The history and evolution of homosexual individuals’ rights has been marked by significant court considerations and legislation.\(^\text{24}\) However, equalization in the eyes of the law is coming to fruition in the twenty-first century.\(^\text{25}\) Notably, the *Obergefell* decision is the most recent case that has dramatically reshaped the landscape of homosexual rights under the law.\(^\text{26}\) With this decision, same-sex couples have been afforded the right to marry through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses—the far-reaching implications of which have yet to be seen.\(^\text{27}\)

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22. The treatments are applicable to individuals and heterosexual couples as well, but this Comment focuses on same-sex couples.

23. *See infra* Section I.A; *see also* *Obergefell v. Hodges*, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596-97 (2015) (outlining the evolution of homosexual rights).

24. *See infra* Sections I.A, I.B.

25. *See Obergefell*, 135 S. Ct. at 2604-05 (granting the fundamental right to marry to same-sex couples).

26. *See infra* Section I.B.

27. *Obergefell*, 135 S. Ct. at 2604-05 (implicating the possibility of more developments).
A. History and Evolution of Homosexual Rights: Pre-Obergefell

Homosexual individuals’ rights have evolved significantly over the past hundred years. The demise of homosexual discrimination is not yet comprehensive, but society and the law have significantly progressed from where they were well into the twentieth century. Until the mid-twentieth century, homosexuality was categorized as criminal and immoral wrongdoing. For much of the twentieth century, homosexuals were considered outcasts who had no dignity or value in society. This characterization caused many homosexuals to remain closeted in order to avoid the social discomfiture and condemnation associated with admitting their immutable sexual orientation.

Post-World War II, the criminalization of same-sex sexual activity persisted in the majority of states, and openly gay and lesbian individuals experienced discrimination within many facets of their lives. During this post-World War II era, homosexuality was also classified as an illness, such that it was listed as a mental
disorder in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). It was not until the onset of the political and social reforms of the late-twentieth century that same-sex couples comfortably expressed and openly depicted their homosexual lifestyle. Thus, the beginning of the twenty-first century brought momentous strides towards the equalization of same-sex couples’ rights.

Initial legal decisions rationalized the denial of marriage equality for same-sex couples by interpreting the Constitution as offering no legal basis for same-sex marriage. With a narrow interpretation of the Constitution, the breadth of marriage was limited to the unity of a man and a woman. The first decision involving homosexual rights came in 1986 in Bowers v. Hardwick, which stemmed from a challenge to a state statute that criminalized homosexual sexual contact and conduct—specifically, homosexual sodomy. In Bowers, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of

35. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596; Brief for American Psychological Association et al., supra note 32, at 7 (elaborating on the DSM classification of homosexuality as a mental disorder in 1952).

36. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596 (“In the late 20th century, following substantial cultural and political developments, same-sex couples began to lead more open and public lives and to establish families.”); The History of Psychiatry & Homosexuality, supra note 34.

37. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597 (stating that after Massachusetts invalidated same-sex marriage bans, other states followed suit).

38. See id. at 2612 (Roberts, C.J., Scalia, J., & Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing how the Constitution does not provide a basis for the precedent set by the majority).

39. See id. at 2595 (majority opinion) (discussing how marriage was deemed a male–female partnership since this nation’s founding).

40. 478 U.S. 186, 188 (1986) (dealing with homosexual rights in terms of relationship autonomy). However, the first case addressing a homosexual-related claim generally was in the 1950s when the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court considered an injunction against the Los Angeles, California, Postmaster, Otto K. Olesen, because of his refusal to mail a homosexual magazine through the mail. See One, Inc. v. Olesen, 241 F.2d 772, 773 (9th Cir. 1957), rev’d, 355 U.S. 371 (1958) (per curiam). The Ninth Circuit said that the magazine lustfully incited the homosexual reader and was obscene material. Id. at 778. However, the Supreme Court ultimately reversed the circuit court in a one-sentence opinion and
whether the Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to participate in homosexual sexual activity. The Supreme Court reasoned that because homosexual sodomy is a non-procreative form of sexual intercourse, and the decision to engage in that sexual conduct is not for the purpose of marriage or family, homosexuals do not have the fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy. The Supreme Court arrived at that decision notwithstanding the fact that the conduct involved two consenting adults within the privacy of their own home.

Homosexual rights seemed to be on an upward trajectory, comparatively, upon the onset of the 1990s. In 1996 in Romer v. Evans, the Supreme Court invalidated a state constitutional amendment that attempted to politically exile homosexual individuals strictly because of their sexual orientation. Because the amendment did not further a legitimate state interest and instead discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation, the Supreme Court found that the law was at odds with the Equal Protection Clause and invalidated it. Nevertheless, also in 1996 and during the Clinton regime, Congress ratified the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which further restricted the acceptance of a homosexual lifestyle.
However, in 2013, the Supreme Court ruled in *United States v. Windsor* that DOMA was unconstitutional to the extent that it served as an obstacle for federal recognition regarding the validity of same-sex marriages. The Court stated that DOMA impermissibly targets same-sex couples and strips them of the dignity involved in their committed relationship, which forces even their own children to feel inferior. The Supreme Court grounded its decision in the liberty granted to persons by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and found that DOMA had an unconstitutional, disparate effect on lawful same-sex marriages.

In 2003, Massachusetts broke the mold and became the first state to make significant strides toward the equalization of same-sex marriage. In *Goodridge v. Department of Public Health*, the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that its state Constitution

laws, but not to state laws. See Andrew Koppelman, *Dumb and DOMA: Why the Defense of Marriage Act Is Unconstitutional*, 83 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 1-2 (1997). However, in 2013, the Court declared this provision of DOMA unconstitutional in *United States v. Windsor*, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). Critics suspect that DOMA was enacted as a response to the growing acceptance of a homosexual lifestyle. See Abrams, et. al., *supra* note 28, at 89. The two predominant objectives of DOMA were (1) to defend the sanctity of marriage by limiting it to and defining it as the union of one man and one woman, notwithstanding the marriage’s lawfulness where it was performed, and (2) to authorize states with the right to refuse to recognize lawful marriages that were performed across state lines. See Koppelman, *supra* note 47, at 1-2.


49. Id. at 2696. The Court found that no legitimate government purpose accompanied DOMA, as it disparaged and injured citizens who sought protection by state marriage laws that protected their “personhood and dignity.” Id.

50. Id. at 2695 (“While the Fifth Amendment itself withdraws from Government the power to degrade or demean in the way this law does, the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment makes that Fifth Amendment right all the more specific and all the better understood and preserved.”).

51. See Abrams, et. al., *supra* note 28, at 82-83. Thus, Massachusetts amended its Constitution to ensure that the laws and procedures that govern marriages equally apply to same-sex couples and that no special procedures should be applied to a homosexual marriage that are not applied to a heterosexual marriage. See Massachusetts Laws About Same-Sex Marriage, Mass. Ct. Sys., http://www.mass.gov/courts/case-legal-res/law-lib/laws-by-subj/about/gaymarriage.html [https://perma.cc/3UD5-67H8] (last visited Oct. 9, 2017).
permitted same-sex couples to legally marry within the state; thus, Massachusetts became the first state to allow same-sex couples to marry. Before 2004, when the first same-sex couple legally married within the state of Massachusetts, no state had entered this unchartered territory. In some respects, Goodridge paved the way for other states to follow suit and enact similar same-sex marriage legislation. Finally, in 2015, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether same-sex couples have a fundamental right to marry under the Constitution.

B. The Obergefell v. Hodges Decision

By the time Obergefell reached the United States Supreme Court, many state and federal courts had already considered same-sex marriage. The Obergefell decision has done more than legalize

52. 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003). The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled that the Massachusetts state Constitution required the allowance of same-sex couples to civilly marry. See id. Using a rational basis test, the Court determined three legislative policy rationales that belie the prohibition of same-sex couples’ right to marry. Id. at 961. First is the societal preference for “providing a ‘favorable setting for procreation;’” second, that the ideal environment for childrearing encompasses a two-parent family; and third, marriage helps maintain the sparse financial resources of State and private institutions. Id.

53.  See ABRAMS, ET. AL., supra note 28, at 83; supra text accompanying note 51. See generally Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d 941.

54.  See Kailani Koenig, Ten Years Ago, Massachusetts Introduced Us to Gay Marriage, MSNBC (May 16, 2014, 6:02 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/ten-years-ago-massachusetts-introduced-us-gay-marriage [https://perma.cc/NPM8-2EDY] (reflecting on how Massachusetts became the first state to legalize same-sex marriage, which led to nearly twenty other states legalizing same-sex marriage); see also ABRAMS, ET. AL., supra note 28, at 83.

55.  See, e.g., Garden State Equal. v. Dow, 79 A.3d 1036, 1045 (N.J. 2013) (holding that sex couples in New Jersey are permitted to enter into a civil marriage); Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 889 (N.M. 2013) (holding that New Mexico’s marriage laws had the effect of discriminating against same-sex couples’ rights to marry); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 481-82 (Conn. 2008) (holding that Connecticut General Statute § 46b-38nn was a violation of Connecticut’s state Constitution to the extent that it permitted same-sex marriage).

56.  See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (addressing the issue of whether the fundamental right to marry should be extended to same-sex couples).

57.  See id. at 2597 (“After years of litigation, legislation, referenda, and the discussions that attended these public acts, the States are now divided on the issue of same-sex marriage.”). For an exhaustive list of all of the prior state decisions relating to same-sex couples’ right to marry or their efforts to have their out-of-state
same-sex marriage—the language within the Supreme Court’s opinion has laid a foundation for a multitude of same-sex equalization laws to captivate the legal landscape. Obergefell addressed a circuit split regarding the legalization of same-sex marriage. Ultimately, the Court held that the right to marry is a fundamental right that is extended to same-sex couples, as it is an integral part of the liberty granted to persons under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. Obergefell explored the plethora of reasons why marriage is of transcendent importance and quoted Cicero in saying that “[t]he first bond of society is marriage; next, children; and then the family.” In exploring those reasons, the Supreme Court concluded that because of the divine importance of marriage and its sanctity, same-sex couples seek its privileges and responsibilities.

Justice Kennedy enumerated four principles of marriage to demonstrate why, pursuant to the Constitution, marriage equality is a fundamental right that must also be afforded to same-sex couples. First, precedential decisions signify that the decision to marry is embedded within personal autonomy. Second, marriage represents
a unique and committed two-person union that is incomparable to any other. 65 Third, marriage safeguards children and families, which is inherent in the interrelated rights of childrearing and procreation.66 Lastly, marriage is the keystone of American social order, as it is embedded in this nation’s history and tradition.67

Regarding the third principle—that marriage safeguards children and families—Justice Kennedy highlighted the integral nature of the liberty granted to persons by the Due Process Clause.68 Among other rights, the right to bring up children is at the core of due process.69 Additionally, in extending the right to marry to same-sex couples, children will enjoy the integrity and love associated with their family, in conjunction with other families among them.70 Moreover, allowing same-sex couples to marry provides the necessary permanency and stability associated with a child’s best interest.71

Justice Kennedy further highlights that same-sex couples already provide loving homes to thousands of children—whether biological, adopted, or foster—which solidifies that homosexual persons are equally fit to parent in the eyes of the law.72 However,
the Supreme Court does not want all married persons to feel the pressure to have children.73 Rather, the Supreme Court recognizes that the fundamental right to marry encompasses a multitude of characteristics—one of which is childbearing.74

The Supreme Court further identifies the vital role of the Equal Protection Clause in legalizing same-sex marriage.75 Analyzing years of jurisprudence, the Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the Equal Protection Clause is the constitutional hook that has and will continue to correct inequities found within the institution of marriage.76 Therefore, through the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, same-sex couples are granted the fundamental right to marry in all states.77

In addressing a counterargument regarding destroying the sanctity of the marital union as it pertains to “natural procreation and marriage,” the Supreme Court further addressed the relationship between marriage and parenthood.78 In recognizing that relationship, like many other decisions married couples encounter, same-sex couples are permitted to decide whether to have children.79 All married couples arrive at that decision after significant personal, romantic, and practical considerations.80 Pronouncing that no union

confirmation from the law itself that gays and lesbians can create loving, supportive families.”). 73. See id. at 2601 (“That is not to say the right to marry is less meaningful for those who do not or cannot have children.”).
74. See id. Thus, marriage is not just about procreation, but it often involves procreation, along with a multitude of other things. See id.
75. See id. at 2603-04 (discussing how the Equal Protection Clause has been used throughout history to accomplish equality).
76. See id. at 2603. The more that society transforms, the more inequities that are created that need to be corrected; thus, the Equal Protection Clause provides the legal basis for doing so. See id.
77. See id. at 2604-05. Because the right to marry is such a fundamental aspect of our system of ordered liberty, same-sex couples cannot be deprived of the right to marry any longer. See id. at 2604.
78. See id. at 2606-07 (“The respondents also argue allowing same-sex couples to wed will harm marriage as an institution by leading to fewer opposite-sex marriages. This may occur, the respondents contend, because licensing same-sex marriage severs the connection between natural procreation and marriage. That argument, however, rests on a counterintuitive view of opposite-sex couple’s decisionmaking processes regarding marriage and parenthood.”).
79. See id.
80. See id. (“Decisions about whether to marry and raise children are based on many personal, romantic, and practical considerations; and it is unrealistic to conclude that an opposite-sex couple would choose not to marry simply because same-sex couples may do so.”).
is more profound than the one experienced between two persons within a marriage, which exemplifies the paramount paradigms of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family, the Supreme Court avowed that same-sex couples are no longer unequal in the eyes of the law. Since the modern interpretation of liberty allowed for the legalization of same-sex marriage, the analytical framework of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses is essential to a full understanding of how courts utilize the Fourteenth Amendment to address constitutional protections.

C. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses

The liberty granted under the Fourteenth Amendment continuously allows for the correction of inequities within the fundamental aspects of personhood. The interpretation of liberty and what constitutes a fundamental aspect of personhood transforms as society continues to evolve. Whether the issue involves “vindicating precepts of liberty and equality” or identifying personal beliefs, the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses provide the textual support for such disputes.

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” The former clause—known as the Due Process Clause—acts as a safeguard against unfair government practices; whereas the essence of the latter clause—known as the Equal Protection Clause—is that states shall treat similarly situated

81. Id. at 2608 (“No union is more profound than marriage, for it embodies the highest ideals of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family.”).
82. See id. (“They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them that right.”).
83. See generally Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (addressing the issue of whether the fundamental right to marry should be extended to same-sex couples).
84. See infra Section I.C.
85. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597, 2603 (discussing the various uses of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses).
86. See id. at 2604.
87. See id. at 2597, 2604.
88. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (ratified in 1868).
persons equally, shall govern impartially, and shall not make distinctions against persons that are grounded in illegitimate governmental purposes. 90 Commonly used—either together or separately—to invalidate or uphold laws, the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses are fundamental to American personhood and maintaining the fabric of our society. 91

An analysis under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses is practically parallel in terms of safeguarding fundamental rights, as under either clause the Supreme Court must analyze whether an asserted liberty is sufficiently important so as to be classified as fundamental. 92 The notable difference in safeguarding fundamental rights under Equal Protection or Due Process hinges upon how the constitutional arguments are formulated. 93 Under Due Process, the issue is whether the government is justified in infringing upon a fundamental right by an adequate purpose. 94 Conversely,


91. See generally Equal Protection, supra note 90. See also David M. Smolin, The Jurisprudence of Privacy in a Splintered Supreme Court, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 975, 995, 997 (1992) (noting that the Court has thus evidenced a marked tendency to use the Equal Protection Clause to perform, in a sometimes hidden way, the substantive due process function of protecting unenumerated fundamental rights). Equality, in other words, has been used to serve the cause of protecting liberty. Id. at 995, 997. Autonomy theorists, who believe that “liberty” means “autonomy,” have thus wished to use “equality” as a means of protecting “autonomy.” See id.

92. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 934 (4th ed. 2013). Aside from the Bill of Rights, there are no rights explicitly enumerated in the Constitution. See id. Rather, the fundamental rights and constitutionally protected liberty interests that are accorded to and enjoyed by United States’ citizens are implicit in the Constitution through the ninth amendment, which provides “[t]he enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to disparage others retained by the people.” See id. at 935; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IX. While the Ninth Amendment does not grant any specific rights, it is utilized by the Supreme Court as textual justification for the recognition of non-textual rights implicit in this nation’s system of ordered liberty such that they shall be classified as fundamental. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, at 935.

93. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, at 934-35.

94. See id. at 935 (“If a right is safeguarded under due process, the constitutional issue is whether the government’s interference is justified by a sufficient purpose.”).
pursuant to Equal Protection, the issue is whether the governmental discrimination controlling who may or may not exercise a certain fundamental right is justified by an adequate purpose. The Supreme Court utilized both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment in Obergefell to invalidate laws that prohibited same-sex marriage. Thus, the framework is imperative to understanding how the Supreme Court arrived at that decision.

1. Equal Protection Framework

Equal protection is the best constitutional ground to use to assert a challenge against a law that grants a right to some individuals while denying it to others. Equal protection cases address whether the government’s classification is justified by a sufficient purpose. The overarching issue in equal protection cases is whether the government can identify a sufficient objective for its discrimination, which hinges upon the type of discrimination presented. The type of discrimination defines the level of scrutiny, or what standard of review, the court will use to analyze the issue at

95. See id. (discussing what the Equal Protection Clause is generally used for).
96. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015) (“These considerations lead to the conclusion that the right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of [the] right and [the] liberty [to marry].”).
97. See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 92, at 933-39 (detailing the Equal Protection and Due Process framework).
98. See Chemerinsky, supra note 92, at 935.
99. See id. at 712. In the original draft of the United States Constitution, there were no provisions guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. See id. at 711. The lack of an Equal Protection Clause in the original draft of the Constitution was unsurprising, seeing as the document was first drafted during a time of slavery and subordination of women. See id. It was not until after the Civil War of 1861 when extensive discrimination plagued the nation that the Equal Protection Clause was drafted, but it was not until after Brown v. Board of Education in 1954 that the Supreme Court utilized it. See id.; see also 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). However, since the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the states, there is technically no provision within the Constitution that serves as a directive to the federal government that it may not deny equal protection of the laws. See Chemerinsky, supra note 92, at 711. To solve that problem, the Supreme Court ruled in Bolling v. Sharpe that the Equal Protection Clause applies to the federal government through the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See id.; see also 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
100. See Chemerinsky, supra note 92, at 712 (“What constitutes a sufficient justification depends . . . on the type of discrimination. For instance, the Supreme Court has declared that it is . . . suspicious of race discrimination.”).
hand. In an equal protection case, three questions serve as
guideposts for the analysis. First, “what is the classification?”;
second, “what level of scrutiny should be applied?”; third, “does the
particular government action meet the level of scrutiny?”

a. What Is the Classification?

The analysis starts with a determination of what the
classification is, or how the government is distinguishing among
individuals. A classification can exist either on its face or as
applied. A facial classification simply means that the law, by its
very language, draws a blatant distinction among people based on a
specific characteristic. Conversely, an as-applied challenge deals
with a law that is neutral on its face, but has a discriminatory impact
or effect on the classification. Proving an as-applied challenge is
more difficult than a facial challenge, as the challenger must prove
that the law has a discriminatory impact or effect, but must also show
that the law has a discriminatory purpose.

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101. See id. at 712-14 (explaining the levels of scrutiny); see also Jason M. Skaggs, Justifying Gender-Based Affirmative Action Under United States v. Virginia’s “Exceedingly Persuasive Justification” Standard, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1169, 1172 (1998) (discussing the three levels of scrutiny and how Equal Protection challenges trigger the varying levels of scrutiny).
102. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, at 712 (explaining that a typical Equal Protection analysis follows a three-question analysis).
103. See id. 712-16 (detailing the framework for an Equal Protection analysis).
104. See id. at 712. Identifying the classification is not always simple, as
sometimes that may be the focal point of the pending litigation. See id.
105. See id. at 712-13 (explaining that the first question is broken up into a
two-part analysis to determine the next step in the analysis).
106. See id. (“For example, a law that prohibits blacks from serving on juries
is an obvious facial racial classification. Likewise, a law that says that only those 16
and older can have drivers’ licenses is obviously a facial classification.”).
107. See id. at 713 (“For instance, a law that requires that all police officers
be at least 5’10’ tall and 150 pounds is, on its face, only a height and weight
classification. Statistics, however, show that 40 percent of men but only 2 percent of
women will meet this requirement. The result is that the law has a discriminatory
impact against women in hiring for the police force.”).
108. See id. Therefore, “women challenging the height and weight
requirements for the police force must show that the government’s purpose was to
discriminate based on gender.” Id.
b. What Is the Appropriate Level of Scrutiny?

The level of scrutiny may be determined upon identification of the classification. The three types of scrutiny are strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis scrutiny. Strict scrutiny is the highest level of scrutiny and is difficult to satisfy, as it places the burden on the government to show that the law is necessary to achieve a compelling government interest. Additionally, under this standard, the government must prove that the law is the least discriminatory means available to achieve its compelling government interest, which is accomplished by narrowly tailoring the imposed legislation.

The second level of scrutiny is intermediate scrutiny, which places the burden on the government to show that the law is substantially related to an important government objective. Consequently, the means, which is the law in question, and the end, or the objective that is being sought, must have a sufficiently significant connection such that it is considered important. Lastly, rational basis scrutiny is considered the default standard of review, so any law that is challenged based on a classification that does not

109. See id.; see also Skaggs, supra note 101, at 1172 (explaining the different suspect classifications and their applicable levels of scrutiny).

110. See Chemerinsky, supra note 92, at 713-14 (enumerating the scrutiny standards of review); see also Russell W. Galloway, Means-End Scrutiny in American Constitutional Law, 21 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 449, 449-50 (1988) (“Means-end scrutiny has three components: (1) scrutiny of government interests; (2) scrutiny of the effectiveness of the means chosen to further the governments interests; and (3) scrutiny of alternatives to determine whether less restrictive methods are available for furthering the government interests.”).

111. See Chemerinsky, supra note 92, at 713. Strict scrutiny is applied to challenges involving race, national origin, and to cases involving aliens, unless the case deals with the democratic process or self-government. See id.

112. See id. By requiring the law to be the least discriminatory means, it requires narrow tailoring so that the law covers only what is necessary to accomplish the government’s objective. See id.


114. See Chemerinsky, supra note 92, at 713. Intermediate scrutiny applies to laws that discriminate on the basis of gender or against non-marital children. See id.
fall into a heightened scrutiny category must satisfy the minimal level of rational basis review. Per rational basis, the burden is on the challenger, rather than the government, to show that the law is not rationally related to a legitimate government objective. There is extreme deference accorded to the government within challenges made under rational basis, but under each standard the government has certain requirements it must satisfy.

c. Does the Government Action Meet the Level of Scrutiny?

Within this prong, courts shall analyze and evaluate both the means and the end to determine if the law satisfies the applicable level of scrutiny. In doing so, the focal point of the analysis is the applicable level of scrutiny, which serves as the analytical guidepost and overarching rule of law for the challenge. Courts shall determine whether the end is compelling, important, or legitimate and whether the means are necessary and least restrictive, substantially related, or rationally related—depending on the level of scrutiny. The applicable standard can be determinative in addressing the adequacy and legality of a challenged law.

A determination of the applicable level of scrutiny is equally vital in a due process claim. Due process requires the government to have an adequate reason and to employ proper procedures when

115. See id. at 714 (“Rational basis review is the minimum level of scrutiny that all laws challenged under equal protection must meet.”).

116. See id.; see also Skaggs, supra note 101, at 1172 (referring to rational basis as the “so-called traditional approach”).

117. See Chemerinsky, supra note 92, at 714; see also Sandefur, supra note 89, at 160 (explaining that the leniency of the rational basis standard has permitted the government to enact irrational laws).

118. See Chemerinsky, supra note 92, at 715. An analysis is entirely different under all levels of scrutiny. See id.

119. See id.; see also Galloway, supra note 110, at 449-50 (“Means-end scrutiny is . . . the most common and important form of constitutional analysis. To grasp how means-end scrutiny works, one must understand the components of levels of the process.”).

120. See Chemerinsky, supra note 92, at 716; see also Galloway, supra note 110, at 449 (“Means-end scrutiny is an analytical process involving examination of the purposes (ends) which conduct is designed to serve and the methods (means) chosen to further those purposes.”).

121. See Chemerinsky, supra note 92, at 712; see also Galloway, supra note 110, at 449 (“Means-end scrutiny is a systematic method for evaluating the sufficiency of the government’s justification for its conduct.”).

122. See Chemerinsky, supra note 92, at 938.
infringing upon or restricting a fundamental right or constitutionally protected liberty interest. While the four-question due process framework differs from the equal protection framework, much of the substance overlaps in both analyses.

2. Due Process Framework

The Due Process Clause is broken up into two categories: substantive due process and procedural due process. Substantive due process queries whether the government has an adequate reason to deprive an individual of life, liberty, or property. It requires the government to provide ample justification that the infringement upon the fundamental right at issue is adequately related to a sufficient justification. Conversely, procedural due process denotes the proper procedures that the government shall follow when it does deprive an individual of life, liberty, or property. The focal point of procedural due process tends to be the kind of notice and the type of a hearing that the government shall provide when it deprives an individual of life, liberty, or property. Due process is generally the

123. See id. at 603, 935; see also Russell W. Galloway, Basic Substantive Due Process Analysis, 26 U.S.F. L. Rev. 625, 625-26 (1992) (indicating that substantive due process came around in the late 1800s after the Supreme Court concluded that “deprivations of life, liberty, or property be substantively reasonable”).

124. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.

125. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, at 603.

126. See id.; see also Sandefur, supra note 89, at 148 (“When a government action does not meet the[] standards, that action does not qualify as ‘law,’ and thus to enforce it in a way that deprives individuals of life, liberty, or property would by definition deprive them of these rights without due process of law.”).

127. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, at 935. Substantive due process is the focal point of this Comment.


129. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, at 603; see also Due Process, supra note 128:

The clause also promises that before depriving a citizen of life, liberty or property, government must follow fair procedures. Thus, it is not always enough for the government just to act in accordance with whatever law there may happen to be. Citizens may also be entitled to have the government observe or offer fair procedures, whether or not those procedures have been provided for in the law on the basis of which it is acting. Action denying the process that is ‘due’ would be unconstitutional.

Id.
best constitutional basis to challenge a law that denies a right to all individuals equally.130

A due process analysis consists of four questions.131 First, does a fundamental right exist?132 If a right is deemed fundamental, the government must satisfy a strict scrutiny analysis in order to prevail.133 However, rational basis—which is fairly easy for the government to satisfy—is generally applied when fundamental rights are not at issue.134 Second, is the constitutional right infringed?135 The infringement, however, must be more than minimal—it must be both direct and substantial.136 Third, is there a sufficient justification for the government’s infringement of the right?137 When a right has been deemed fundamental, there must be a valid, compelling governmental purpose for its infringement, which may be satisfied by the government showing that the law is essential.138 Lastly, is the means sufficiently related to the purpose?139 The analysis under this question depends upon the level of scrutiny that is triggered: The

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130. See Chemerinsky, supra note 92, at 935.
131. See id. at 936. (“Litigation and judicial decision making in cases about individual rights can be understood as addressing one or more of four questions.”).
132. See id. at 936. A major aspect of the constitutional interpretation debate stems from how the Supreme Court should decide what a fundamental right is and whether non-textual rights should be deemed fundamental. See id.
133. See id. (“If a right is deemed fundamental, the government usually will be able to prevail only if it meets strict scrutiny.”).
134. See id. Courts generally defer to the lawmakers, but deference is not accorded where “there is discrimination against a ‘discrete and insular’ minority” or where a fundamental right is infringed. Id.
135. See id. at 937-38. A telltale sign of constitutional right infringement is if the right is prohibited. See id. at 938.
136. See id. at 938. Interestingly, the Supreme Court has given little direction about what constitutes a direct and substantial infringement. See id.; see also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978) (“When a statutory classification significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests.”).
137. See Chemerinsky, supra note 92, at 938. Like the direct and substantial requirement in question two, the Supreme Court has provided little to no direction about what constitutes a compelling purpose. See id.
138. See id. There is no clear directive for what constitutes a compelling interest. See id. However, an example of the stringency of the compelling interest requirement was articulated in Korematsu v. United States, where the government’s harsh actions against Japanese Americans was justified by national security and wartime necessity. 323 U.S. 214, 218 (1944).
139. See Chemerinsky, supra note 92, at 938. The fourth question requires a government showing that the challenged law is absolutely necessary to achieve the law’s ultimate objective. See id.
government must make a stringent showing that the law is necessary pursuant to strict scrutiny, whereas it only has to prove that the law is reasonable under rational basis review.140

Both Equal Protection and Due Process are imperative in safeguarding vital constitutional liberties.141 Both clauses not only hold the government accountable when it infringes upon fundamental rights, but also have granted and will continue to safeguard some of the most vital individual liberties enjoyed by people within the United States.142 While the evolution of homosexual rights owes much of its current state to both of these clauses, there are certain aspects of same-sex couples’ lives that have yet to be discussed and litigated—such as the inability to obtain biological parenthood due to structural infertility—which seemingly fits into the existing family and reproductive autonomy protections.143

3. Relevant Decisions Pertaining to Family and Reproductive Autonomy

The Supreme Court recognizes the intrinsic importance of family and reproductive autonomy, which is evidenced by its continuous protection of the categorically related liberties and interests.144 Additionally, while sexual orientation has yet to be expressly held as a protected class, the Supreme Court has implicitly foreshadowed the potential of its inclusion.145 Furthermore, the

140. See id. at 938-39:
This requires that the government prove that it could not attain the goal through any means less restrictive of the right. In comparison, under rational basis review, the means only has to be a reasonable way to achieve the goal and the government is not required to use the least restrictive alternative.

Id.


142. See, e.g., id. at 2597, 2603 (discussing how the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses have protected individual liberties and how both clauses are an integral part in safeguarding the ever-evolving societal liberties).

143. See infra Subsection I.C.3.

144. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, at 939-61, 967-1000 (discussing the protections within the family autonomy and reproductive autonomy categories).

145. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567-70 (2003) (focusing on homosexual autonomy in making particular choices about the intimate conduct the individual participates in); see also Barbara B. Hill, The Hunkiest Little Whorehouse in Town Is Looking for a Few Good Men, but Only to Work: The Constitutional Implications of Heidi Fleiss’s Female Brothel, 14 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 77, 95
Supreme Court has stated that laws may not discriminate against an unpopular group of people based on such things as immutability, political powerlessness, and history of discrimination. That tenet served as the basis for the Supreme Court’s decision in Romer v. Evans, which invalidated a law that singled out homosexual persons and impermissibly discriminated against them because they were an unpopular group. However, the Supreme Court has explicitly deemed four aspects of family autonomy as fundamental rights, including the right to marry, the right to custody of one’s children, the right to keep one’s family together, and the right of parents to control the upbringing of their children. Collectively, the family autonomy cases stand for the principle that parents receive the

(2007) (stating that Lawrence may be interpreted as establishing homosexuals as a protected class); Charles R. Calleros, Advocacy for Marriage Equality: The Power of a Broad Historical Narrative During a Transitional Period in Civil Rights, 2015 MICH. ST. L. Rev. 1249, 1278 (“In some courts, classifications based on sexual orientation appear to have triggered a level of scrutiny in equal protection analysis that lies somewhere between rational basis review and intermediate scrutiny.”). The analysis in the Lawrence decision focused on homosexual intimacy and stated that “[w]hen sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice.” 539 U.S. at 567. The reasoning was that “intimate, personal choices, like those related to sexual intimacy, are central to an individual’s dignity, autonomy, and liberty.” Hill, supra note 145, at 95. Additionally, the Supreme Court highlighted that relationship autonomy lies at the core of an individual’s freedom of choice, which shall exist absent fear of being punished for it. See id. at 95-96.

146. See Chemerinsky, supra note 92, at 714 (“[T]he Court has emphasized that immutable characteristics . . . warrant heightened scrutiny [because] [t]he notion is that it is unfair to penalize a person for characteristics that the person did not choose and that the individual cannot change.”).

147. See 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (invalidating a Colorado state statute that discriminated against homosexual persons and prevented laws or policies from granting them any preferential treatment or from asserting claims of discrimination).


149. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (finding that the denial of a parent’s custody rights offends Equal Protection); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59 (1982) (stating that a “natural parent’s ‘desire for and right to ‘the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children’” is an interest far more precious than any property right”) (quoting Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981)).

150. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505-06 (1977) (establishing that the choice of relatives to live together, notwithstanding the degree of kinship, is a fundamental right pursuant to due process).

151. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (finding that parents retain the liberty to make decisions regarding the upbringing of their own children).
utmost reverence when it comes to all aspects of their children’s lives and that the Constitution would be offended if parents’ associated rights to their children were infringed without substantial reason.\footnote{152}

Additionally, the Supreme Court has designated three aspects of reproductive autonomy—the right to purchase and use contraceptives,\footnote{153} the right for a woman to choose abortion,\footnote{154} and the right to procreate\footnote{155}—as fundamental rights.\footnote{156} Particularly, the eminence of the right to procreate was recognized in the early 1940s in \textit{Skinner v. Oklahoma}.\footnote{157} In \textit{Skinner}, the Supreme Court utilized equal protection framework to invalidate an Oklahoma sterilization law and arrive at the holding that procreation is a fundamental right.\footnote{158} The Supreme Court stated that the Oklahoma law prevented

\footnote{152. See \textsc{Chemerinsky}, \textit{supra} note 92, at 946; see also Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977)): We have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended ‘[i]f a state were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the parents and their children, without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children’s best interest. Id. See also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (“Like choices concerning contraception, family relationships, procreation, and childrearing, all of which are protected by the Constitution, decisions concerning marriage are among the most intimate that an individual can make.”).}

\footnote{153. See \textsc{Griswold v. Connecticut}, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (finding that the implicit right to privacy safeguards the right to use contraceptives); see also \textsc{Eisenstadt v. Baird}, 405 U.S. 438, 446 (1972) (extending the right to purchase and use contraceptives to all persons, both married and unmarried).}

\footnote{154. See \textsc{Roe v. Wade}, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973) (holding that women have the fundamental right to choose abortion); see also \textsc{Planned Parenthood v. Casey}, 505 U.S. 833, 878-79 (1992) (reaffirming the essential holding of \textsc{Roe} that women have the right to choose abortion, but overruling the trimester framework and narrowing the pertinent aspects of an abortion decision).}

\footnote{155. See \textsc{Skinner v. Oklahoma}, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (finding that procreation is fundamental to the subsistence of mankind). \textit{But see} \textsc{Buck v. Bell}, 274 U.S. 200, 207-08 (1927) (ruling that the sterilization of certain mentally handicapped individuals who may produce defective offspring is allowed, as it safeguards the general welfare of society). While \textit{Buck} has never explicitly been overruled, \textsc{Skinner} can be said to implicitly do so. See \textsc{Chemerinsky}, \textit{supra} note 92, at 969.}

\footnote{156. See \textsc{Chemerinsky}, \textit{supra} note 92, at 967. However, for the purpose of this Comment, the reproductive autonomy focus shall be the right to procreate.}

\footnote{157. See 316 U.S. at 541 (holding that the right to procreate is a fundamental right). Consequently, \textsc{Skinner} also requires that involuntary, government mandated sterilizations receive a strict scrutiny analysis. See \textit{id.} at 541.}

\footnote{158. See \textit{id.} at 538.}
the continuation of the human race by restricting who could and
could not produce offspring. According to the Supreme Court, the
Oklahoma law had the effect of unequally punishing some criminals
over others with a nuanced loophole in the law, which runs afoul of
both human decency and the Equal Protection Clause. Therefore,
the Court further highlighted that not only marriage, but also
procreation, are fundamental rights because of their intrinsic
importance to the maintenance of mankind.

Summarily, the journey that the homosexual community had to
endure to achieve equal rights to marriage provides erudition into the
unjust imbalance of rights accorded to individuals based on sexual
orientation. However, the interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses has and
will continue to correct marital and societal inequities. The
Fourteenth Amendment is already credited with the declaration of
marriage, procreation, and childbearing as fundamental rights. Yet,
procreation and childbearing are not as easily attainable for the
homosexual community as they are for the heterosexual
community. Luckily, with the assistance of ART treatments, family formation is still plausible; thus, examination of the available

159. See id. at 536. The Oklahoma act in question was titled the Oklahoma’s Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act, which essentially allowed the state to sterilize individuals who met the state’s definition of habitual criminal. See id. That is, any person who was convicted of two or more felonies concerning “moral turpitude.” Id.
160. See id. at 541 (“But the instant legislation runs afoul of the equal protection clause.”).
161. See generally Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that marriage is a fundamental right pursuant to Due Process).
162. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536 (discussing the importance of procreation in maintaining the human race).
164. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597, 2603 (detailing the uses of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses); Sandefur, supra note 89, at 148-56 (explaining the uses of substantive due process generally); Smolin, supra note 91, at 993-94 (discussing the corresponding uses of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses); Equal Protection, supra note 90 (explaining Equal Protection protections and the general applicability of the Clause).
165. See supra notes 148, 157-158 and accompanying text.
166. This is attributable to structural infertility and the associated economic barriers created by ART. See sources cited supra note 10.
167. See Jacoby, supra note 10, at 149 (explaining ART and how it can be used in the homosexual community).
ART treatments and their associated costs—which may or may not be covered by insurance—is imperative to understanding how same-sex couples can overcome their structural infertility barrier.\(^\text{168}\)

**II. INFERTILITY AND INSURANCE OPTIONS**

ART provides alternatives to procreation through scientific technology, and its usage and demand are nearly immeasurable.\(^\text{169}\) Same-sex couples, both gay and lesbian, have a variety of infertility treatment options available to them, but the necessary expenditures associated with the treatments place a substantial encumbrance upon those options.\(^\text{170}\) Yet, despite the available ART options, structural infertility combined with the high cost of the procedures exposes the degree of difficulty same-sex couples face in obtaining biological parenthood.\(^\text{171}\) However, that difficulty is further exacerbated by the lack of insurance options available to same-sex couples, which supplements the existing economic and social reasons why same-sex couples currently face unconquerable barriers to biological parenthood.\(^\text{172}\)

**A. Structural Infertility, ART, and Associated Statistical Data**

The term structural infertility denotes an operative barrier to biological procreation due to the scientific incompatibility of reproductive organs.\(^\text{173}\) This term is used to define the immutable infertility that same-sex couples experience.\(^\text{174}\) Because there is

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\(^{169}\) See generally Jacoby, *supra* note 10 (explaining what ART is and how it is necessary to assist the parenthood market).


\(^{171}\) See Jacoby, *supra* note 10, at 140-50. Even with these barriers, though, couples frequently exhaust all options to achieve “what to them is irreplaceable.” *Id.*

\(^{172}\) See Aloni & Daar, *supra* note 11, at 23-24 (“The hope that marriage equality will adjust existing inequalities in family formation through the use of ART is dashed by a spate of existing laws that structurally preempt inclusion of same-sex couples.”).

\(^{173}\) See Jacoby, *supra* note 10, at 149 (explaining that structural infertility affects those who do not participate in heterosexual intercourse).

\(^{174}\) See *supra* notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
currently no way around structural infertility, same-sex couples are conscripted into employing ART procedures to accomplish biological parenthood.\textsuperscript{175}

ART was developed in the latter portion of the twentieth century and, since 1978, has facilitated pregnancies for individuals who struggle with infertility.\textsuperscript{176} ART is a term that encompasses a multitude of alternative measures, separate and apart from sexual intercourse, that result in conception.\textsuperscript{177} By its very definition, ART serves as a substitute for conventional procreation, acting as a proxy for “reproductive systems that are either broken . . . or absent.”\textsuperscript{178} Therefore, ART allows for the creation of families that otherwise may not exist and affords medically and structurally infertile individuals and families the prospect of parenthood.\textsuperscript{179} Same-sex couples face infertility based upon their unassailable and immutable
characteristics; thus, same-sex couples must employ ART to facilitate biological parenthood and familial life.\footnote{See id. ("[S]ame-sex couples can look to ART to enable them to become parents, often fulfilling a dream of biological parenthood that was simply unavailable a generation ago.").}

ART is in high demand as of late. In 1996, the Center for Disease Control (CDC) began accumulating infertility treatment data from all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.\footnote{See Saswati Sunderam, Assisted Reproductive Technology Surveillance, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (CDC), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss6411a1.htm [https://perma.cc/6E59-6NV2] (last visited Oct. 9, 2017).} In a 2008 study, 38,496 of the 2.7 million infants born in the United States were conceived via some form of ART.\footnote{See ABA Approves Model Act for Assisted Reproduction Agencies, INT’L FERTILITY L. GROUP (IFLG), https://www.iflg.net/aba-art-agencies-model-act [https://perma.cc/72MG-VLSU] (last visited Oct. 9, 2017); see also Richard B. Vaughn, Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology, A.B.A., https://apps.americanbar.org/family/committees/artmodelact.pdf [https://perma.cc/WP6S-9GGD] (last visited Oct. 9, 2017).} In 2013, the CDC confirmed that 190,773 ART procedures were performed in that year and that 1.6% of all children born in the United States during 2013 were conceived using some form of ART.\footnote{See generally Sunderam, supra note 181.} In 2014, the CDC confirmed that 208,604 ART procedures were performed, which yielded 57,323 live births.\footnote{See National Data 2014, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (CDC), https://nccd.cdc.gov/rdh_art/rdPage.aspx?rdReport=DRH_ARTClinicInfo&ClinicId=9999&ShowNational=1 [https://perma.cc/3SS7-JY64] (last visited Oct. 9, 2017).} The following year, an additional 17,857 ART procedures were performed, generating another 1.6% of children born in the United States in 2014.\footnote{See id.} However, there is a notable incongruity between the supply and demand for ART services—as the usage of ART is still a rarity in comparison to its need.\footnote{See id.; see also Jacoby, supra note 10, at 149. If states utilized their regulatory powers to mandate infertility insurance coverage, or if the federal government did so on its own, there would be a significant increase in individuals who employ ART and, therefore, achieve their dream of biological parenthood. See id. at 151-53.}

According to census data collected in 2010, there were 646,464 same-sex couples in the United States, of which 131,729 were
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married and 514,735 were unmarried. As of 2013, the number of married same-sex couples nearly doubled—totaling 251,695. And as of 2015, there are an estimated nine million lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) individuals in the United States alone. Additionally, increasing numbers of same-sex couples are employing ART to fulfill their desire to have a family. Therefore, infertility insurance coverage for all ART treatments is increasingly important for same-sex couples.

B. Available ART Options

There are a multitude of ART treatment options available to facilitate biological parenthood. One of the most prevalent treatment options is In-vitro Fertilization (IVF), which encompasses four stages to complete the procedure. The first step requires a female to be administered ovulation-stimulating hormones, which cause egg-containing follicles to mature, allowing for an abundance of eggs to be collected for the purpose of one IVF cycle. Next, prior to ovulation, the harvested eggs are surgically removed using a minimally invasive procedure. Then, the sperm and the egg are

187. See DAAR, supra note 177, at 474. Lesbian same-sex couples account for 51% of the homosexual couple total, while male same-sex couples make up the remaining 49%. See id.
188. See Amy Roberts & Caitlin Stark, By the Numbers: Same-Sex Marriage (June 12, 2015, 7:13 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/11/politics/btn-same-sex-marriage [https://perma.cc/PZ6Q-BUDB].
189. Id.
190. See Ikemoto, supra note 10, at 1055, & n.170 (“[L]esbians and gay men do use procreative technologies to become parents.”).
191. See id. at 1055-56. Male and female same-sex couples both procreate through ART. See id. Thus, “mandated, or otherwise-expanded, insurance coverage resolves financial-access questions.” Jacoby, supra note 10, at 155.
192. See generally Baron & Bazzell, supra note 177, at 58 (discussing the various forms of ART treatment options).
193. See Cohen & Chen, supra note 170, at 490. IVF had its first success in 1978 in Oldham, England. See id.; see also Baron & Bazzell, supra note 177, at 58 (“IVF is the dominant form of ART.”).
194. See Cohen & Chen, supra note 170, at 490-91 (“First, the woman who will provide eggs is administered ovulation-stimulating hormones, which cause multiple egg-containing follicles to mature so that up to several dozen eggs can be harvested in a single treatment cycle.”).
195. See id. at 491 (“Second, just prior to ovulation the eggs are removed by a minor surgical procedure; today this is usually done by an ultrasound-guided needle inserted through the vaginal wall into a developed ovarian follicle through which, by suction, the egg is harvested.”).
combined in a culture dish, which is examined throughout the next twenty-four hours to determine if fertilization ensued. 196 Lastly, if the fertilization was successful, physicians attempt implantation of four or eight embryos after a two to three day waiting period. 197 The woman is then requested to administer a pregnancy test within ten to fourteen days to see if the procedure was successful. 198

Another infertility treatment option available is Gamete Intrafallopian Transfer (GIFT), which is a variant of IVF. 199 GIFT involves direct placement of an unfertilized egg and viable sperm into the fallopian tubes instead of into the uterus, resulting in the fertilization inside of the woman’s body. 200 Conversely, Zygote Intrafallopian Transfer (ZIFT) involves the direct placement of a pre-fertilized egg into the fallopian tubes instead of the uterus; thus, fertilization is already complete prior to implantation. 201

Alternatively, Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection (ICSI) involves a minor procedure where a physician utilizes a micro-needle to inoculate a solitary sperm into the middle of the unfertilized egg. 202 The now-fertilized egg is then left to develop in a laboratory for a period of one to five days before it is ultimately implanted into a woman’s uterus. 203 Another option is Artificial Insemination (AI) or Intrauterine Insemination (IUI), which encompasses any method of manual sperm insertion into the uterus to facilitate fertilization. 204

196. See id. (“Third, sperm is introduced into individual culture dishes, each of which contains a culture medium and one egg with the culture dish monitored after the first day to determine if fertilization occurs.”).

197. See id. (“Finally, if fertilization occurs, the preembryos are allowed to mature in the medium, usually for two to three days after egg retrieval, until the preembryos reach the four or eight cell stage when some or all of them are transferred into the woman’s uterus to attempt implantation.”).

198. See id. (“Ten to fourteen days after transfer, the woman will undergo a pregnancy test to determine if the transfer was successful.”). Frozen eggs can be used in IVF as well. See id.

199. See Baron & Bazzell, supra note 177, at 58-59.

200. See id. (“In GIFT, unfertilized eggs and sperm are placed in the fallopian tube and fertilization occurs inside of the body.”).

201. See id. (“ZIFT, on the other hand, involves placement of a pre-fertilized egg in the fallopian tubes.”).

202. See id. (“In ICSI, a doctor uses a small needle to inject a single sperm into the center of an egg.”).

203. See id. (“[T]he fertilized egg grows in a laboratory for one to five days before being placed in the woman’s uterus.”).

204. See id. AI is a broad term that denotes the general method of manual insertion of sperm into a woman. See id.; see also Infertility FAQs,Ctr. for Disease Control & Prevention (CDC), http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/infertility/ [https://perma.cc/KN8Y-9TS7] (last visited Oct. 9, 2017).
Yet another infertility treatment option is surrogacy. There are two methods of surrogacy—traditional and gestational. Traditional surrogacy involves a female who serves as the egg donor and carrier and undergoes insemination with the intended father’s sperm. Conversely, gestational surrogacy involves a female who serves as the carrier for a third-party and uses the third-party’s egg instead of her own. Therefore, the main difference hinges upon whether there is a genetic tie between the carrier and the embryo.

The cost associated with ART varies depending on the elected procedures. Infertile individuals are faced with a vast array of out-of-pocket expenses that cause some to sink into debt. Illustratively, a single round of IVF ranges from $12,000 to $12,400. GIFT and ZIFT procedures range from $15,000 to $20,000, while ICSI is an additional $1,500 to the cost of IVF, thus totaling $13,500 to

205. See Baron & Bazzell, supra note 177, at 58.
206. See id. at 59.
207. See id. Traditional surrogacy, which is commonly known as donor egg or embryo IVF, involves a female egg donor who is inseminated with sperm from the intended father, and if fertilization ensues, that female egg donor carries the pregnancy to term. See id.
208. See id. (“In gestational surrogacy, the gestational mother carries a donated, fertilized egg, sometimes from a donor different from the gestational mother and sometimes from the woman who intends to raise the child.”); see also Anne R. Dana, The State of Surrogacy Laws: Determining Legal Parentage for Gay Fathers, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 353, 360 (2011) (“Surrogacy is a method of childbearing that can be used to circumvent . . . structural infertility for gay . . . men.”).
209. See Baron & Bazzell, supra note 177, at 59 (“The distinction between the two types of surrogacy is that in traditional surrogacy, the woman carrying the fertilized embryo uses her own egg and also carries the baby. A gestational surrogate has no genetic link to the child.”).
210. See infra notes 211-216 and accompanying text.
212. See Cohen & Chen, supra note 170, at 486. However, the average total cost projection for In-vitro fertilization is estimated to be $66,667 to $114,286, as producing a live birth through the IVF treatment requires multiple cycles. See id.; see also Fertility Treatment: Getting Started, BABYCENTER, http://www.babycenter.com/0_fertility-treatment-getting-started_4089.bc [https://perma.cc/S93C-KR7W] (last visited Oct. 9, 2017).
$13,900.214 The least expensive procedure is AI where a partner’s sperm versus donor sperm is used.215 The estimated range for gestational and traditional surrogacy is between $50,000 and $100,000, but the costs associated with surrogacy vary significantly depending on corresponding legal fees, contract fees, medical fees, monthly surrogate stipends, and other miscellaneous variables.216 Additionally, donor eggs can cost an additional $15,000 to $20,000, so that additional cost must be factored in to procedures where a third-party egg is necessary.217 Therefore, since all ART procedures carry an associated cost, many who seek ART treatments also seek alternative financing, like insurance.218

C. Applicable Infertility Insurance Legislation and Statutes

The federal government and various states have recognized the financial impact that infertility treatments have on individuals and families.219 In response, some enacted mandates for insurance companies to provide for or offer infertility insurance coverage.220


217. See Pratt, supra note 216, at 1136. Adoption is an alternative to natural procreation that allows individuals to achieve parenthood. See Cohen & Chen, supra note 170, at 493. However, adoption is not a form of ART and is therefore beyond the scope of this Comment.

218. See Jacoby, supra note 10, at 152-53. However, the majority of people do not have access to infertility insurance. See id. at 152.

219. See id. And if more states provided coverage, more couples could be parents. See id.

220. See generally State Laws Related to Insurance Coverage for Infertility Treatment, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (NCSL), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/insurance-coverage-for-infertility-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/64UW-282G] (last visited Oct. 9, 2017) (summarizing the state statutes that mention any degree of infertility insurance coverage). Also, the federal government enacted the ACA,
However, not all states have removed the heteronormative language within their statutes to broaden the range of qualified recipients.\textsuperscript{221}

The inclusion of infertility insurance coverage in a private health insurance plan hinges upon whether governing state law requires insurers to provide some form of infertility coverage.\textsuperscript{222} Fifteen of fifty states currently require insurance coverage, or at least the offering of coverage for infertility services, generally.\textsuperscript{223} However, only two of those fifteen states—California and Maryland—have amended their statutes to include language allowing same-sex couples the ability to obtain coverage as well.\textsuperscript{224} The remaining states denote either heterosexual exclusivity or create an ambiguous statutory construction that neither mentions nor excludes homosexuals or heterosexuals.\textsuperscript{225}

1. The Homosexually Inclusive State Statutes: California and Maryland

California and Maryland explicitly provide for infertility insurance in their state statutes; thus, they are the only two homosexually inclusive states out of the fifteen that provide for infertility insurance.\textsuperscript{226} Particularly, in 1990, California passed a bill to amend its current insurance statute to include a mandate that all

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which mandates that insurance coverage and available medical treatments that are offered to heterosexual couples must also be offered to same-sex couples. \textit{Health Care Coverage Options for Same-Sex Couples}, supra note 18. The ACA is commonly referred to as “Obamacare.” \textit{See id.; see also} Leonard, supra note 211 (stating that infertility treatment was contemplated in the original drafting of the ACA but was eventually eliminated in the final draft).

\textsuperscript{221} See generally NCSL, supra note 220. This is notwithstanding the ACAs directive. \textit{See id.}

\textsuperscript{222} See generally Jacoby, supra note 10, at 152. However, many are critical about insurance mandates. \textit{See id.} at 152-53. It is difficult to get people on board with mandated infertility insurance coverage because of associated costs, but also because couples may employ ART where they otherwise would not. \textit{See id.} at 153. Yet, many people who support providing infertility insurance consider it an aspect of the reproductive autonomy safeguarded by the Constitution. \textit{See id.}

\textsuperscript{223} For a detailed synopsis of various state infertility statutes—Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, Texas, and West Virginia—see Blake, supra note 11, at 663-64, 664 n.67.

\textsuperscript{224} See generally NCSL, supra note 220 (providing summaries of all state insurance statutes that mention infertility coverage).

\textsuperscript{225} See id.

\textsuperscript{226} See id.
insurance providers must offer infertility insurance coverage. As the law currently stands, all insurers must offer infertility treatment coverage, but IVF is exempt from the mandate. In 2013, the California legislature passed an amendment stating that individuals who elect to purchase the option of infertility insurance coverage shall be provided the insurance and the care without discrimination based on, among other characteristics, domestic partner status or sexual orientation. The inclusion of this subsection specifically disallows the exclusion of same-sex couples. Furthermore, California’s insurance code provides for criminal consequences for anyone who willfully violates the insurance code; thus, denying coverage or care based upon domestic partner status or sexual orientation can constitute a crime under California law.

The definition of infertility denoted in the California statute, however, still reads like the common definition, as it requires a physician-verified condition as a cause of infertility or unsuccessful conception or live birth after at least one year of regular, unprotected sexual intercourse. While this language is the familiar,

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228. See Ins. Code § 10119.6(a) (“On and after January 1, 1990, every insurer issuing, renewing, or amending a policy of disability insurance that covers hospital, medical, or surgical expenses on a group basis shall offer coverage of infertility treatment, except in vitro fertilization.”).

229. See Ins. Code § 10119.6(g). Consistent with Section 10140, coverage for the treatment of infertility shall be offered and, if purchased, provided without discrimination on the basis of age, ancestry, color, disability, domestic partner status, gender, gender expression, gender identity, genetic information, marital status, national origin, race, religion, sex, or sexual orientation. Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed to interfere with the clinical judgment of a physician and surgeon.

Id.

230. See id.

231. See id. (stating that a willful violation of the insurance code is a crime); see also Health & Safety Code § 1374.55. However, California’s insurance code exempts IVF coverage. See id. Importantly, states that offer, instead of mandate, infertility insurance coverage could provide loopholes in employer-provided healthcare plans for the employer to select less-expensive plans that do not include infertility coverage. See generally Leonard, supra note 211.

232. See Ins. Code § 10119.6(b).

For purposes of this section, “infertility” means either (1) the presence of a demonstrated condition recognized by a licensed physician and surgeon as a cause of infertility, or (2) the inability to conceive a pregnancy or to carry a pregnancy to a live birth after a year or more of regular sexual
heteronormative language found in the majority of state insurance codes, the addition of the language in the 2013 amendment seemingly prevents same-sex discrimination, as it forbids discrimination based on sexual orientation or domestic partner status. While the definition of infertility included in the statute does not carve out an exception for same-sex couples or define homosexual intercourse, at least the elective coverage shall be offered for purchase and cannot be denied to individuals based upon their domestic partner status or sexual orientation. That being said, the infertility definition does require “regular sexual relations,” which offers two potential interpretations, since “regular” could mean consistent, or “regular” could mean conventional, heterosexual intercourse. However, upon examination of the legislative history, a committee report reveals that an example of infertility discrimination would be a denial of coverage grounded in an individual or a couple not having an opposite sex partner with whom they have regular sexual intercourse.

Similarly, in 2015, Maryland amended its insurance code to forbid discrimination against same-sex couples in infertility insurance statutes. The amendment prohibits entities from

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relations without contraception. “Treatment for infertility” means procedures consistent with established medical practices in the treatment of infertility by licensed physicians and surgeons, including, but not limited to, diagnosis, diagnostic tests, medication, surgery, and gamete intrafallopian transfer. “In vitro fertilization” means the laboratory medical procedures involving the actual in vitro fertilization process.

Id. 233. See id.; see also Ins. Code § 10119.6(b), (g).
234. See Ins. Code § 10119.6(g).

The author argues that an example of how the current nondiscrimination laws are not being adhered to is when an individual or couple are unable to conceive and attempt to access their infertility coverage and are denied based on not having an opposite sex married partner with whom to have one year of regular sexual relations without conception. The author concludes that there are many insurers who currently cover all their insured with infertility coverage in their plan and this bill does not affect insurers who are in compliance with existing nondiscrimination laws.

Id. 237. See Michelle Andrews, Maryland Revamps Its In Vitro Coverage Mandate to Accommodate Same-Sex Couples, Kaiser Health News (July 10, 2015), http://khn.org/news/maryland-revamps-its-in-vitro-coverage-mandate-to-accommodate-same-sex-couples [https://perma.cc/Y3TY-WQLM] (“What we were interested in was parity and equality. If married opposite-sex couples were entitled
requiring same-sex patients to establish a pattern of unsuccessful conception through heterosexual sexual intercourse in order to qualify for infertility treatments.\textsuperscript{238} Maryland carriers\textsuperscript{239} are now prohibited from discriminating against same-sex couples for infertility insurance coverage for treatments other than IVF.\textsuperscript{240} Additionally, carriers may no longer impose conditions upon same-sex couples that essentially serve as a prerequisite for insurance coverage.\textsuperscript{241} Prior to this amendment, carriers used the statutory ambiguities to continue to deny infertility services to same-sex couples.\textsuperscript{242} However, the statute includes a caveat: Same-sex couples must attempt six rounds of unsuccessful AI\textsuperscript{243} for a period of not less than two years in order to qualify.\textsuperscript{244} Therefore, same-sex couples must expend at least some economic resources before qualifying for infertility insurance coverage in Maryland.\textsuperscript{245}

California and Maryland have modified their infertility insurance statutes to align with the needs of their citizens.\textsuperscript{246} However, the other thirteen state statutes that provide for or at least
discuss infertility insurance coverage have not modified statutory
language to account for homosexuals. Thus, some statutes
implicitly exclude homosexuals from insurance coverage because of
their infertility definition language.

2. The State Statutes Embodying Heterosexual Exclusivity

In analyzing the pertinent state statutes that provide for
infertility insurance coverage, no statute expressly excludes
homosexual individuals. Rather, the states effectively do through
statutory definitions that seem to require either heterosexual
intercourse for a number of years, or the fertilization of a patient’s
egg with her spouse’s sperm. For example, Connecticut’s statute
provides for infertility insurance coverage, and it expressly mentions,
but does not limit, coverage to eight treatments—including IVF,
GIFT, ZIFT, and IUI. Connecticut defines infertility as a
“condition of a presumably healthy individual who is unable to
conceive or produce conception or sustain a successful pregnancy
during a one-year period.” While this is not the common
heteronormative language that mentions heterosexual intercourse, it
has the effect of discriminating against same-sex couples because the
one-year period is superfluous.

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247. See generally NCSL, supra note 220. However, states individually
handle ACA enforcement, so it is up to the state to require insurers to comport with
the federal directive. See Katie Keith & Kevin Lucia, New Guidance: Federal
Regulators Allow “Collaborative Arrangements” for ACA Enforcement,
COMMONWEALTH FUND BLOG (Apr. 5, 2013), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/
publications/blog/2013/apr/federal-regulators-allow-collaborative-arrangements
[https://perma.cc/ZFJ4-4ZD9].

248. See NCSL, supra note 220.

249. See Aloni & Daar, supra note 11, at 22-23. No state law expressly
excludes same-sex coverage in its statutory language. See id.

250. See id. at 23. (“To the extent infertility is defined . . . as a failure to
conceive after some period of unprotected heterosexual inter-course, this definition
excludes those whose partnering does not include this activity.”).


252. Id. Coverage is implicitly limited to heterosexual couples only when
language like Connecticut’s is included in the statute. See Aloni & Daar, supra note
11, at 23.

253. See Aloni & Daar, supra note 11, at 23. By requiring a period of years
of unsuccessful, unprotected sexual intercourse, same-sex couples are exempt
because their sexual relations are non-procreative. See id.
The Massachusetts statute defines infertility similarly to Connecticut and imposes a minimum one-year requirement, but it only requires generalized insurance policies to include coverage for the “medically necessary expenses of diagnosis and treatment of infertility.” Similarly, Hawaii’s statute provides for a one-time benefit for outpatient expenses related to a single IVF procedure, so long as, among other requirements, the egg is fertilized with the male spouse’s sperm, there is a history of infertility, or there is a medically diagnosed infertility condition. While the statute’s use of “spouse” now encompasses same-sex couples because the only requirement is that the couple be legally married, the requirements have the effect of discriminating against same-sex couples. Meanwhile, the Illinois state statute restricts group policy renewals or issuances unless the policy provides for, among other treatments, IVF, GIFT, ZIFT, or AI. Furthermore, the Illinois statute requires insurance coverage for IVF, GIFT, and ZIFT only if pregnancy has been unsuccessful or unattainable, but, like other statutes, defines infertility heteronormatively.

Alternatively, New Jersey mandates that group insurance policies include coverage for, among other services, IVF, AI, GIFT, 

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254. See Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 175, §47H (West 2015). The statute does not apply if the female is over thirty-five years of age. See id.

255. Id.


257. See id. This is because the statutory language has the same superfluous requirements as the Connecticut statute. See id.; see also supra note 253 and accompanying text.

258. See 215 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 5/356m(a) (West 2016). No group policy of accident and health insurance providing coverage for more than 25 employees that provides pregnancy related benefits may be issued, amended, delivered, or renewed in this State after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 99th General Assembly unless the policy contains coverage for the diagnosis and treatment of infertility including, but not limited to, in vitro fertilization, uterine embryo lavage, embryo transfer, artificial insemination, gamete intrafallopian tube transfer, zygote intrafallopian tube transfer, and low tubal ovum transfer.

Id.

259. See id. at § 5/356m(c). For purpose of this Section, ‘infertiltiy’ means the inability to conceive after one year of unprotected sexual intercourse, the inability to conceive after one year of attempts to produce conception, the inability to conceive after an individual is diagnosed with a condition affecting fertility, or the inability to sustain a successful pregnancy.

Id.
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ZIFT, and egg retrievals.260 Yet New Jersey also defines infertility in a heteronormative fashion, thus leaving no room for a same-sex couple loophole.261 New York is proactively trying to increase infertility treatment access, passing a bill in 2002 that implemented funding for a grant program to make more services available to its citizens.262 However, the state’s insurance statute simply prohibits the denial of coverage for treatments or conditions resulting in infertility,263 and does not require coverage for, among other treatments, IVF, GIFT, or ZIFT.264 Moreover, the statute defines infertility in accordance with the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM), which uses the common definition of failure to achieve pregnancy after unprotected sexual intercourse for a specified period of time.265

Meanwhile, Texas requires health insurance companies who provide pregnancy-related benefits to offer or at least provide an option for obtaining coverage for outpatient expenditures resulting from an IVF procedure.266 However, a further reading of the code

260. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:48-6x(a) (West 2017). However, egg retrievals are limited to four per lifetime. See id.

261. See id. (defining infertility as a “disease or condition that results in the abnormal function of the reproductive system” such that a person is not able to: impregnate another person; conceive after one year of unprotected intercourse if the female partner is under 35 years of age and her partner is male, or six months of unprotected intercourse if the female partner is 35 years of age or older and her partner is male; conceive due to involuntary medical sterilization; or carry a pregnancy to live birth). For a summary of the statute, see NCSL, supra note 220.


263. See INS. § 3216(i)(13)(A)-(B).

264. See § 3221(k)(6)(C)(v).


266. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1366.003(a) (West 2005). Subject to this subchapter, an issuer of a group health benefit plan that provides pregnancy-related benefits for individuals covered under the plan shall offer and make available to each holder or sponsor of the plan coverage for services and benefits on an expense incurred, service, or prepaid basis for outpatient expenses that arise from in vitro fertilization procedures.

Id.
reveals that the coverage is conditioned upon the fertilization of the patient’s eggs with her spouse’s sperm and that the couple has a continuous five-year history of infertility due to specified medical conditions. Yet other state statutes do not mention or implicitly distinguish amongst heterosexual or homosexual individuals, thus leaving their state statutes open to interpretation.

3. The Vague and Indeterminate State Statutes

Some state statutes present ambiguity, as they do not explicitly or implicitly address the question of coverage for same-sex couples. Some state statutes are unclear about the general offering of infertility insurance or create conditions upon the offering of coverage that pose the question on who the insurance may be offered to and to what extent it may be offered. Illustratively, Arkansas’s statute provides a one-sentence mandate for insurance providers to cover IVF only and does not include a definition of infertility. Montana simply requires Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), but not other insurers, to provide coverage for “basic health services,” which by Montana’s definition include infertility services. However, like the Arkansas statute, a definition of infertility or an elaboration of infertility services is not provided. Likewise, West Virginia’s statute requires HMOs to cover “basic

267. See § 1366.005(2)-(3)(A)-(D).
(2) the fertilization or attempted fertilization of the patient’s oocytes is made only with the sperm of the patient’s spouse; (3) the patient and the patient’s spouse have a history of infertility of at least five continuous years’ duration or the infertility is associated with: (A) endometriosis; (B) exposure in utero to diethylstilbestrol (DES); (C) blockage of or surgical removal of one or both fallopian tubes; or (D) oligospermia.

Id.

268. See NCSL, supra note 220.

269. See id.

270. See Blake, supra note 11, at 663-65 & n.67 (describing state statutes that discuss infertility coverage generally).

271. See Ark. Code Ann. § 23-86-118(a) (West 2001) (“All accident and health insurance companies doing business in this state shall include, as a covered expense, in vitro fertilization.”).


273. See id. Since there are no parameters provided, a reasonable statutory interpretation or broad reading of the statute could create an inference that infertility treatment coverage for same-sex couples is included, especially since the ACA requires coverage to be equal for both heterosexual and homosexual persons. See id.
health care services,” which include infertility services, but does not provide further explanation.274

Similarly, Ohio requires health insurance corporations to provide “basic health care services,” which include preventative health care services that encompass infertility services.275 However, the mandate adds the caveat that the coverage shall only be provided when medically necessary, which leaves the statute open for interpretation in regard to its applicability to same-sex couples.276 Likewise, Rhode Island requires coverage for infertility-related coverage, but only when medically necessary.277 However, the statute defines infertility as the condition of a married individual who is otherwise healthy but who cannot conceive or sustain a pregnancy for at least one year.278 Rhode Island also caps off the mandatory coverage at $100,000.279

Lastly, three states do not necessarily fit into any identifiable statutory category, but do discuss infertility or ART in their insurance statutes, while not necessarily mandating coverage or the offering of coverage.280 Louisiana’s statute explicitly prevents insurers from excluding coverage for the treatment and diagnosis of an otherwise insurable medical condition solely because the condition was the result of infertility.281 However, the statute further specifies that it cannot be read to require coverage for certain infertility treatments.282 Additionally, Minnesota explicitly excludes coverage for fertility drugs if the drugs are for the purpose of enhancing fertility.283 Moreover, Utah’s statute is unique, as it requires insurance providers to offer coverage for maternity benefits

276.  See id.
278.  See § 18-30-(b).
279.  See § 18-30-(g).
280.  See NCSL, supra note 220.
281.  See LA. STAT. ANN. § 22:1036(A)(1) (2001) (“Any health insurance policy, contract, or plan specified in Subsection B of this Section which is issued for delivery, delivered, renewed, or otherwise contracted for in this state on or after January 1, 2002. shall not exclude coverage for diagnosis and treatment of a correctable medical condition otherwise covered by the policy, contract, or plan solely because the condition results in infertility.”).
282.  See § 22:1036(A)(2)(a)-(e) (“This Section shall not be construed to require coverage of the following: (a) Fertility drugs. (b) In vitro fertilization or any other assisted reproductive technique. (c) Reversal of a tubal ligation, a vasectomy, or any other method of sterilization.”).
and for an adoption subsidy of $4,000 if a child is placed for adoption within ninety days of its birth. However, the statute also provides the option to apply that $4,000 subsidy to the cost of infertility treatments instead of reimbursement for adoption expenditures, if the insured so chooses.

Of the fifteen state statutes examined, only California and Maryland neutralize their statutory language to eliminate infertility insurance discrimination. However, while the California and Maryland state statutes are similarly applicable to homosexuals, there is a nuanced difference—California’s statute requires the offering of infertility treatment insurance coverage, while Maryland obligates carriers to provide coverage. However, the other thirteen states whose insurance statutes provide for variations of infertility insurance coverage have yet to amend their language to account for a substantial number of ART utilizers—homosexual persons—or have a definitional aspect that exempts homosexuals from obtaining the coverage.

Conclusively, infertility treatments are exceptionally costly, inaccessible to some, and yet in high demand by many. The


285. See NCSL, supra note 220 (“The law was amended to allow an enrollee to obtain infertility treatments rather than seek reimbursement for an adoption.”).

286. See generally id. (summarizing Maryland and California’s statutory language).

287. See id. See generally Health Insurance 101, RESOLVE, http://resolve.org/what-are-my-options/insurance-coverage/health-insurance-101/ [https://perma.cc/8D4Z-JRNG] (last visited Oct. 9, 2017) (“Mandate to Cover: is a law requiring that health insurance companies provide coverage of infertility treatment as a benefit included in every policy (policy premium includes cost of infertility treatment coverage). Mandate to Offer: is a law requiring that health insurance companies make available for purchase a policy which offers coverage of infertility treatment (but the law does not require employers to pay for the infertility treatment coverage.”).

288. See Blake, supra note 11, at 665 (“For the most part, state insurance mandates based on external factors apply equally to all individuals. . . . [However], it is those laws that use internal factors to determine insurance coverage that are most significant with respect to the rights of gay . . . persons.”).

289. See id. at 658-61. “[T]here is a strong current of structurally infertile groups making use of ART.” Id. at 658. However, given the costly barriers for ART treatments, the system is “inherently inequitable” because “only a fortunate few can afford to spend [thousands] in order to have a chance at a baby [so] [m]any couples are forced out of the baby business from the outset.” Id. at 661. Yet, the high demand for ART persists. See id.
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statutory definitions of infertility in the overwhelming majority of states that define it exclude same-sex couples from insurance coverage. While the majority of states do not provide for infertility insurance coverage, the states that do should not discriminate against same-sex couples. Therefore, a redefinition of infertility is not only imperative in achieving procreative equality, but is also necessitated pursuant to Obergefell and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.

III. THE NECESSITY OF REDEFINITION

The Constitution forbids sheer discrimination, especially when there is not a legitimate government interest justifying the inequality. Therefore, laws that hinder same-sex couples from acquiring infertility insurance to reduce the costliness of ART procedures should be deemed unconstitutional, as the laws effectively discriminate against same-sex couples without justification. Same-sex couples have the same compelling desire to have children; thus, without a valid, legal foundation for such discrimination—notwithstanding the untenable societal condemnation—laws that limit ART coverage to heterosexual couples are unconstitutional pursuant to the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. However, instead of requiring affected same-

290. See Aloni & Daar, supra note 11, at 24 (discussing the implicit definitional exclusions in state insurance statutes).

291. See Blake, supra note 11, at 662. Proposals for mandated insurance coverage to reduce the discriminatory impact of insurance statutes that exclude unpopular groups have been introduced, as the need for intervention is obvious and recognized. See id. at 661.

292. See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Aloni & Daar, supra note 11. For a similar perspective regarding same-sex couples and biological parenthood, see generally Douglas NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, 126 Yale L.J. 2260 (2017). However, Professor NeJaime states that equal protection and due process claims may not come to fruition for quite some time. Id. at 2270. (“[R]eform will likely require constitutional oversight. While scholars have addressed constitutional limitations on government regulation of family formation through ART, the issues of parental recognition uncovered in this Article gesture toward a set of constitutional questions in both equal protection and due process that will take years to fully emerge and develop.”).

293. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996); see also supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.

294. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 634-35 (declaring laws that target the unpopular homosexual community are unconstitutional).

295. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597, 2604. The Supreme Court stated that both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses will continue to remedy
sex couples to bring a lawsuit to address the infertility insurance discrimination, states that offer infertility insurance coverage should amend their prejudicial statutory language to ensure compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment and with the underlying principle in Obergefell: that same-sex couples must be on equal footing with heterosexual couples generally, but especially in the institution of marriage.

A. Existing Statutory Structure and Heteronormative Definitions Offend Obergefell

Obergefell dictates the transcendent importance of children within the institution of marriage; thus, statutory construction that exudes heteronormativity and inhibits same-sex couples from achieving biological parenthood runs afoul of the Supreme Court’s directive for sweeping equality regardless of sexual orientation. By narrowly construing infertility as a medical issue, states ignore Obergefell’s principle that fundamental aspects of personhood evolve as society changes. After the Obergefell decision, it is clear that the Supreme Court is moving towards unequivocal equalization of same-sex couples’ rights. Justice Kennedy’s powerful language proves that homosexual discrimination has no place in today’s society. Thus, current infertility definitions that denote heteronormativity are out of touch with twenty-first century norms.

See id. at 2603. It is obvious that the Supreme Court considers childbearing and familial formation integral aspects of the institution of marriage, which is evidenced by their declaration that the constitutional right to marry has many aspects—one of which is childbearing. See id. at 2601.

296. See id. at 2608. The Constitution grants same-sex couples equal dignity in the eyes of the law. See id.

297. See id. at 2595 (stating that same-sex couples seek the privileges associated with the institution of marriage).

298. See id. at 2608 (declaring that family is a paramount paradigm within the institution of marriage); see also supra note 295 and accompanying text.

299. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597, 2603-04 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)) (stating that liberty “extend[s] to personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy” and that “new insights and societal understandings can reveal unjustified inequality within . . . fundamental institutions” like marriage).

300. See id. at 2608 (“They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them that right.”).

301. See, e.g., id. at 2599 (“The four principles and traditions . . . demonstrate that the reasons marriage is fundamental under the Constitution apply
1. The Outdated Heteronormativity of Infertility Definitions

Heteronormative infertility definitions have the effect of excluding same-sex couples. While the definition of infertility may vary trivially across insurance statutes, the definition generally denotes infertility as a disease or medical condition that impacts a man or a woman’s reproductive system and consequently impedes the ability of conception. The majority of states that provide for infertility insurance coverage implicitly or explicitly exempt same-sex couples through their heteronormative definition of infertility. While the language does not blatantly disallow homosexuals from obtaining insurance coverage, by requiring heterosexual intercourse for a period of years, the language can be interpreted to exclude same-sex couples because they will never be able to satisfy the definitional or medical thresholds; thus, such definitions are contrary to contemporary understandings of marriage and family.

The vital role of families and children in the Obergefell decision evidences the Supreme Court’s appreciation for the familial aspect of marriage. Particularly, by stating that childbearing is an
integral part of a marriage, that marriage safeguards families and children, and that the marital union uniquely exemplifies the paradigms of love and family, it follows that any discriminatory barrier to the attainment of parenthood offends Obergefell.\textsuperscript{308}

Namely, the fact that same-sex couples are structurally infertile cannot exempt them from biological parenthood, especially since alternative options—specifically ART—are available.\textsuperscript{309} However, astronomical costs accompany ART procedures.\textsuperscript{310} Thus, same-sex couples who are not wealthy, or are without disposable income, are essentially prevented from employing ART procedures because most states do not afford them the option of obtaining infertility insurance to curb the financial impact.\textsuperscript{311} Hence, heteronormative language precludes most same-sex couples’ procurement of biological parenthood, which is a privilege within the confines of marriage that Obergefell declares same-sex couples should enjoy equally.\textsuperscript{312}

The critics of Obergefell oppose conscripting states into same-sex marriage and disagree with extending the fundamental right to marry to same-sex couples, mostly because they focus on the archaic definition of marriage as a marital union between a man and a woman and on the non-procreative aspect of homosexual sex.\textsuperscript{313} The dissent further implicates that children are better off if sexual

\begin{footnotes}
\item[308] See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015). Marriage involves protections and benefits to children that are so material and immeasurable that barring same-sex couples from capitalizing them is contradictory to children’s best interest. See id.

\item[309] See DAAR, supra note 177, at 474 (“Thus, ART opens up the prospect of parenthood . . . to those whose family structure is something other than a heterosexual couple. [S]ame-sex couples can look to ART to enable them to become parents, often fulfilling a dream of biological parenthood that was . . . unavailable a generation ago.”).

\item[310] See supra notes 211-217 and accompanying text.

\item[311] See Blake, supra note 11, at 659-62 (explaining the costs of certain ART procedures and how other countries improve ART access by financing treatments). Inability to receive ART treatments hinges upon financial access. See id. at 661.

\item[312] See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594. Furthermore, because of the immutability associated with homosexuality, same-sex marriage is the only avenue for same-sex couples to attain the associated benefits that follow from the commitment of marriage. See id.

\item[313] See id. at 2613. (Roberts, J., Scalia, J., & Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Procreation occurs through sexual relations between a man and a woman.”). Interestingly, the dissent cites numerous definitions of marriage as a two-person union between a man and a woman, but most of the sources come from the 1800s or early 1900s. See id. at 2614.
\end{footnotes}
relations only occur between a man and a woman. However, the majority opinion cites psychological research that rebuts arguments that children who grow up with same-sex parents experience harm. Furthermore, by the dissent focusing on the procreative aspect of marital relations, it implies that married couples have a duty to procreate. The majority, however, correctly points out that childbearing is only one aspect of marital autonomy, which is why the option should be afforded to all married couples equally.

Contemporary society no longer defines marriage as a union between a man and a woman, and family structure no longer denotes a heteronormative construction; therefore, infertility can no longer hinge upon heterosexual connotations either. This nation’s highest court found that the marital union, which is now equally accessible to same-sex couples, safeguards childrearing and procreation, which lie at the core of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the structural infertility associated with homosexuality cannot serve as a disqualifier for a same-sex couple to obtain the biological tie to their children that heterosexual couples enjoy.

Therefore, states that offer infertility insurance to heterosexual couples, but do not leave room for the inclusion of same-sex couples, run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment and Obergefell. Hence, redefining infertility and removing the associated medical necessity characteristics from the definition is imperative. Thus, states that

314. See id. at 2613. (“Therefore, for the good of children... sexual relations that can lead to procreation should occur only between a man and a woman committed to a lasting bond.”).

315. See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.

316. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2613 (discussing the importance of procreative sexual relations within the institution of marriage for continuing the human race).

317. See id. at 2600-01 (stating that childbearing is one of the four principles and decisions of marriage).

318. See supra notes 61, 67-73 and accompanying text (detailing the familial reasons for legalizing same-sex marriage).

319. See Aloni & Daar, supra note 11, at 26 (“Now that same-sex marriage rights have been secured, we could think again about how to make family law more pluralistic and accommodating for diverse types of families.”).

320. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600 (stating that the third principle—that marriage safeguards families and children—finds its legal basis in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause).

321. See Daar, supra note 177, at 474; see also note 308 and accompanying text.

322. See generally Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584; Aloni & Daar, supra note 11.

323. See, e.g., Cal. Ins. Code § 10119.6(g) (West 2013); Md. Code Ann., Ins. § 15-810(b) (West 2016) (allowing same-sex infertility insurance coverage).
do not offer infertility coverage should be compelled to do so, like California.  

2. California Almost Got It Right—Follow California...With One Exception

The California infertility insurance statute should be considered the model statute for all states, but especially those that currently provide infertility insurance coverage for heterosexual couples generally. The California statute does not mandate that insurers actually provide the coverage; rather, the statute mandates that insurers offer coverage for purchase as an addition to a preexisting health insurance plan. However, the statute exempts IVF coverage, which is the most successful and sought after ART procedure. Therefore, states should adopt California’s statute without the IVF exemption.

Offering infertility insurance coverage allows same-sex couples, both gay and lesbian, to tailor their health insurance plans appropriately in order to satisfy their structural infertility needs. It is more likely that states will agree to a less intensive statutory proposal than one that conscripts them into providing the coverage. Thus, despite employer-provided plans locating a potential loophole—to select less expensive plans that do not include the infertility insurance coverage—at least individuals and couples will have the option to obtain the coverage within their state. While this may be more expensive for the insured, it will undoubtedly be less expensive than paying for ART out-of-pocket, given the cost and added expenditures associated with each procedure.

325. See id.
326. See generally NCSL, supra note 220 (describing the state infertility statutes).
327. See Ins. Code § 10119.6(a).
328. See id.; see also Cohen & Chen, supra note 170, at 490. IVF is the most prevalent ART procedure. See id. However, individuals usually do multiple rounds of IVF, which compounds the financial burden. See id. at 492.
329. See Leonard, supra note 211 (discussing the massive debt individuals acquire in seeking ART treatments); see also Jacoby, supra note 10, at 152-53 (stating the variety of issues critics have regarding health insurance mandates).
330. See Jacoby, supra note 10, at 153 (discussing how mandating insurance will be costly and a “hard sell”).
331. See generally Leonard, supra note 211.
332. See Jacoby, supra note 10, at 154-64 (outlining the financing options and associated costs with financing ART). Furthermore, insurance companies and
Another positive highlight within the California statute is found in the absence of an insurance coverage ceiling on the amount of infertility insurance coverage that may be paid.\textsuperscript{333} Some statutes limit the amount of coverage to a total of \$100,000, which seems generous,\textsuperscript{334} but when analyzed beside the ART options and their respective costs, that amount only skims the surface of the cost of some ART procedures.\textsuperscript{335} Most ART treatments require multiple attempts before proving successful, which means that the cost of one procedure, which may seem financially attainable when isolated, can easily multiply and ultimately become unaffordable.\textsuperscript{336}

Since ART procedure success is not guaranteed, and a given procedure may take multiple attempts before proving successful—which could easily absorb the allotted amount of coverage without ever obtaining a pregnancy that is carried to live birth—it follows that statutes should not limit insurance coverage to an amount that will not cover some of the most common ART procedures.\textsuperscript{337} At an increased price, insurance providers could tailor insurance plans to fit the insured’s needs.\textsuperscript{338} However, the issue with the California statute is that it exempts IVF coverage,\textsuperscript{339} which is one of the most

\textsuperscript{333} See Cal. Ins. Code § 10119.6(g) (West 2013).
\textsuperscript{334} See, e.g., 27 R.I. Gen. Laws § 18-30-(g) (West 2017); Md. Code Ann., Ins. § 15-810(e) (West 2016).
\textsuperscript{335} See, e.g., Cohen & Chen, supra note 170. This is because of the high cost associated with the more popular and successful procedures of IVF and surrogacy. See Jacoby, supra note 10, at 149-50 ("[O]ne round of IVF or related processes far exceeds what an average household of four spends out of pocket on health care for an entire year. Employing a gestational surrogate costs tens of thousands of dollars.").
\textsuperscript{336} For example, statistics demonstrate that IVF and surrogacy can easily accumulate a total north of \$100,000. See supra notes 212-220 and accompanying text (discussing ART procedures, their success rates, and accompanying costs).
\textsuperscript{337} See Cohen & Chen, supra note 170; Fertility Treatment: Getting Started, supra note 212; Services and Fees, supra note 216; Sunderam, supra note 181.
\textsuperscript{338} See Health Insurance 101, supra note 287; cf. supra notes 186, 218-223 and accompanying text (discussing the downfalls of insurance mandates).
\textsuperscript{339} See Cohen & Chen, supra note 170, at 491 (stating that individuals usually do multiple rounds of IVF, which compounds the financial burden).
successful, yet expensive, ART procedures available. While it is understandable that a statutory mandate to offer IVF coverage could be burdensome, if the purpose of the statute is to provide individuals with the choice to purchase infertility insurance, then all forms of ART should be available at the right price.

B. Financial Implications of State Mandated Insurance Coverage

Providing infertility insurance coverage to both heterosexual and homosexual couples will be costly, which may deter some states from reforming their insurance statutes. Since cost is the main barrier to achieving biological parenthood, aside from the structural infertility component, it logically follows that wealthier same-sex couples that enjoy disposable income may have more accessibility to biological parenthood through ART treatments. However, that leaves less fortunate same-sex couples to either struggle to produce the necessary funds to achieve a biological tie to their children or relinquish the possibility altogether. Furthermore, male same-sex couples face a severer financial impact, as without the necessary female reproductive organs, their ART options are constrained to surrogacy.

340. See id. at 492. The total cost of producing a live birth through IVF procedures ranges from $66,667 to $114,286. See id.
341. See CAL. INS. CODE § 10119.6(g) (West 2013); see supra notes 236-237 and accompanying text (discussing California’s and Maryland’s insurance statutes and their applicability to same-sex couples).
342. See generally Health Insurance 101, supra note 287 (discussing mandates to offer and mandates to cover).
343. See id.
344. See generally Cohen & Chen, supra note 170 (discussing the costliness of certain ART procedures). Since costs are so astronomical, individuals may be forced to employ less effective ART procedures to attempt to achieve biological parenthood. See Pratt, supra note 216, at 1137.
345. See Baron & Bazzell, supra note 177, at 57. While ART does provide same-sex couples with the ability to obtain biological parenthood, the associated monetary aspect is burdensome. See id.
346. See Pratt, supra note 216, at 1129 (“Infertility deprives would-be parents of an ‘experience that is central to . . . identity and meaning in life.’”); see also Dana, supra note 208, at 360 (discussing surrogacy and how it is the only ART option for male same-sex couples to achieve biological parenthood).
1. **Cost Versus Benefit: Does it Matter?**

Same-sex couples experience “direct and indirect barriers to ART.”

The high cost associated with infertility insurance coverage is unquestionable and is why most insurers refuse to provide coverage. However, states recognize the astronomical costs of ART treatments; thus, they should utilize their regulatory powers over insurance companies and mandate the coverage.

Insurance companies cite a few main arguments for their denial of infertility insurance coverage. The underlying reason, however, seems to revolve around the cost. Mandating insurance coverage for ART will be pricey, so insurers may cross-subsidize the additional cost throughout all insured persons to curb their financial burden. However, insurers also deny that infertility is an illness, which justifies their denial of ART insurance coverage, because

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347. See Pratt, supra note 9, at 1337.
348. See Baron & Bazzell, supra note 177, at 77-78. (“Insurers often cite skyrocketing costs as a reason for not providing coverage for infertility treatments.”).
349. See Cohen & Chen, supra note 170, at 486-87 (suggesting that states should use their police powers to impose insurance mandates for ART coverage). However, the government does not recognize positive rights all that often, and to do so requires a showing of history of discrimination, political powerlessness, and immutability. See Chemerinsky, supra note 92, at 714. However, if reproduction or even ART were considered positive rights, “it would reinforce claims that a state mandate excluding groups with structural or medico-structural infertility from mandated insurance is a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process violation.” Blake, supra note 11, at 683.
350. See Baron & Bazzell, supra note 177, at 77-81 (elaborating on insurers main arguments for the denial of insurance coverage).
351. See id. at 77 (discussing the financial burdens of ART).
352. See Cohen & Chen, supra note 170, at 487 (“A number of states have attempted to improve access . . . through their regulatory powers over insurance, making IVF a mandated benefit such that health insurers are required to cover IVF in their plans, thus cross-subsidizing the costs across all insured individuals.”). If infertility insurance coverage was mandated, the estimated cost could increase to approximately $105 to $175 per year. See John C. Goodman & Merrill Matthews, Jr., The Cost of Health Insurance Mandates, NCPA (Aug. 13, 1997), http://www.ncpa.org/pub/ba237 [https://perma.cc/AX6M-MCYV]. But see Cohen & Chen, supra note 170, at 507-08 (stating that IVF mandates may only increase insurance premiums by $3.14 per year).
353. See Baron & Bazzell, supra note 177, at 78. (“One argument insurers make in defense of their denials of coverage is that, while improper function of reproductive organs may be an illness, infertility is not.”).
coverage is typically reserved for treating illnesses exclusively. Moreover, insurers argue that ART procedures are not of medical necessity and are elective, or alternatively that the procedures are experimental, and thus excluded from coverage. However, these arguments make a sweeping generalization about infertility and ignore the immutable structural infertility that same-sex couples experience—which belies that the procedures are unnecessary or elective. Also, structural infertility is not grounded in a medical diagnosis—it lies at the heart of the immutability of sexual orientation, which is why infertility can no longer be viewed strictly as a medical issue under the law. Thus, the remaining justification insurers provide is the associated cost. However, high costs cannot justify an outright denial of infertility coverage, especially where coverage is offered to heterosexual couples but denied to same-sex couples.

State powers encompass regulating for the health of its people, which provides state governments with the power to regulate insurance as they see fit. However, a state’s role in promoting for the health of its people involves ensuring equal access to opportunities that allow them to pursue their life goals of biological

354. See id. (“Therefore, because insurance plans only provide coverage for ‘illnesses,’ procedures used to change an infertile condition are not compensable.”). Insurance companies also deny that artificial insemination is a treatment for correcting infertility. See id.

355. See id. at 79. The argument is grounded in the fact that infertility treatments are not necessary to preserve an insured’s health. See id. Also, insurers believe that “procedures that circumvent a problem area instead of permanently correcting underlying physical problems should not be considered medically necessary.” Id. A court determination that ART procedures are not simply elective is necessary. See id.

356. See Chemerinsky, supra note 92, at 714 (discussing that immutable characteristics warrant heightened scrutiny).

357. See Pratt, supra note 9, at 1286-87 (discussing the definition of infertility under the law); see also Jacoby, supra note 10, at 149 (defining structural infertility as encompassing individuals who do not participate in heterosexual intercourse).

358. See generally Cohen & Chen, supra note 170 (explaining the implications of additional insurance costs and why insurers ground their denial of insurance coverage in increased premiums).

359. See id. at 508 (“Whether an increase in premiums is a good reason not to adopt these insurance mandates might depend on where precisely in that range the cost increase falls.”).

360. See Jacoby, supra note 10, at 152 (discussing how states could use their regulatory powers to mandate insurance coverage).
Infertility is a departure from normal individual functioning because it impedes the basic function of procreation, so state insurance mandates that increased access to ART for same-sex couples to achieve biological parenthood would be a proper use of state regulatory powers. However, male same-sex couples face a heightened barrier to ART, as their biological parenthood hinges upon surrogacy—the costliest procedure.

2. But, What About the Fathers?

Perceptibly, ART options for male same-sex couples are more limited than those of female same-sex couples. An obvious issue with homosexual males and procreation is that their reproductive system does not enable them to carry a child. However, that immutability cannot discharge male same-sex couples’ ability to achieve biological parenthood. While not discounting the tumultuous journey undertaken by female same-sex couples, their ability to obtain sperm to fertilize their eggs and enjoy a biological tie to their children is a more affordable and attainable endeavor than that of male same-sex couples.

Male same-sex couples must resort to surrogacy to achieve biological parenthood, and surrogacy is one of the costliest ART

361. See Cohen & Chen, supra note 170, at 502 (“[A] state’s role in promoting health . . . [is] a matter of political justice, to ensure access to the ‘normal opportunity range’ to pursue the ‘array of life plans reasonable persons are likely to develop for themselves.’”).

362. See id. (“‘[I]nfertility is a departure from normal functioning that reduces an individual’s fair share of the normal opportunity range and gives rise to claims for assistance’ because infertility interferes with ‘basic functions of free and equal citizens, such as reproducing themselves biologically, an aspect of plans of life that reasonable people commonly pursue.’”). Moreover, state action is justified because human welfare warrants it. See id. at 503.

363. See Dana, supra note 208, at 360 (discussing the fact that surrogacy is the only ART option for gay men).

364. See generally id. (discussing male same-sex couples and their experiences with surrogacy).

365. See id.

366. The Krupas’ lawsuit advocated only for the women of New Jersey to obtain motherhood and left out the possibility for the men of New Jersey to obtain fatherhood. See generally Complaint, supra note 1.

367. See Dana, supra note 208. Gay couples have the same desire for biological parenthood and cannot be discriminated against in the context of ART. See id. at 372-73.
procedures.368 However, to add to the existing financial and structural infertility barriers, surrogacy requires male same-sex couples to locate a willing and able third-party female to serve as their surrogate—which is difficult because there are not necessarily an abundance of females lining up to carry someone else’s child.369 Consequently, the male same-sex couple must also economically support that gestational carrier at least throughout the term of her pregnancy, which compounds the already-existing financial burden.370

However, coverage that makes it more difficult for males to obtain biological parenthood versus females violates equal protection.371 While on its face a law may not be discriminatory if it provides for same-sex couples’ ability to obtain infertility insurance, the law’s effect will discriminate against male same-sex couples and infringe upon their ability to obtain biological parenthood more than female same-sex couples.372 Where the government confers benefits, it must do so equally.373 The issue with an equal protection challenge, though, is that the law’s purpose will not be to discriminate against male same sex couples; thus, the laws will probably not violate the Equal Protection Clause.374

368. See supra notes 214-215 and accompanying text (detailing surrogacy costs).

369. See generally Dana, supra note 208. However, some women agree to be surrogates because (1) “they like being pregnant,” (2) “they want the money, and” (3) “they view having a baby for a childless couple as providing an altruistic gift.” Id. at 364.

370. See Pratt, supra note 216, at 1156. The additional costs of using a surrogate include the surrogate’s fee, the surrogate’s medical expenses, and potential attorneys’ fees. See id.

371. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, at 713. Equal Protection forbids discrimination on the basis of gender. See id.

372. See Blake, supra note 11, at 683-84 (“[V]iolations of Equal Protection do not always require that the law classify a group and discriminate on its face.”).

373. See Equal Protection, supra note 90 (explaining that Equal Protection requires states to treat similarly situated persons equally).

374. See Blake, supra note 11, at 684 (explaining that Equal Protection is violated if there is evidence of discriminatory intent). However, since private insurance is in play, insurers have free reign to formulate their policy inclusions as they see fit. See id. at 677-78. While a claim against an insurance company for not conferring benefits equally may pose a gender discrimination issue, it is difficult to argue that increased insurance coverage is necessary to ensure males can attain biological parenthood. See generally id. This is because the coverage amount will also have to be equally accessible to females or that may pose another gender discrimination issue. See generally id. However, since cost alone cannot justify not providing insurance benefits, insurance companies must formulate individual
Since surrogacy could cost a male same-sex couple over $100,000, it is nonsensical that male same-sex couples should not be able to attain their goal of having a family and genetic ties to their children simply because the out-of-pocket expenditures are astronomical. Therefore, infertility insurance plans should offer coverage for surrogacy, or at least increase the coverage cap to allow same-sex couples, especially males, to achieve biological parenthood.

C. Redefinition After Obergefell: Why Equal Protection and Due Process Dictate Redefinition

In Obergefell, Justice Kennedy enumerated four principles and traditions that establish the underlying reasons why marriage is a fundamental right. The third principle—that the fundamental right to marry protects children and families, which draws meaning from the related rights of childrearing and procreation—incorporates the core Equal Protection and Due Process principles relating to the liberties of marriage, the establishment of a home, and the rearing of children. Therefore, the Supreme Court realizes the significance of children and their importance in building a family unit, and same-sex couples and heterosexual couples alike consider children to be an important piece of marriage and family. Marriage equality finally policies to accommodate the varying needs of both male and female same-sex couples. See generally Cohen & Chen, supra note 176. A way to do this is by offering male same-sex couples an option to purchase an insurance policy for surrogacy coverage specifically. See generally Jacoby, supra note 10. While this might require male same-sex couples to pay more for insurance coverage, the cost of their insurance premiums will still be less than it would be to pay for surrogacy out-of-pocket. See supra notes 214-215 and accompanying text. See generally Dana, supra note 208 (discussing surrogacy barriers for male same-sex couples).

375. See supra notes 214-215 and accompanying text. See generally Dana, supra note 208.
376. See supra note 374 and accompanying text.
378. See id. at 2600. Same-sex couples want the privileges that accompany marriage—childbearing is one of them. See id.
379. See id.
380. See, e.g., Ikemoto, supra note 10, at 1055-56; see also Orentlicher, supra note 168, at 653 (“Gay couples have the same strong interest as heterosexual couples in raising children with whom they have biological ties.”).
came after many years of discrimination, oppression, and cruelty. 381 The right to marry, which encompasses familial properties, may no longer be denied to same-sex couples pursuant to the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, 382 so it follows that the associated right to procreate—which is a correlating privilege of marriage—cannot be infringed either.

1. Equal Protection Necessitates Equal Opportunity for Infertility Insurance Coverage

Equal protection prohibits laws from granting a right to some, but not to others, yet it also mandates that the government shall treat similarly situated persons equally. 383 Same-sex couples are no longer discriminated against within the institution of marriage because of Obergefell, which positioned same-sex couples on equal footing with heterosexual couples. 384 In Obergefell, Justice Kennedy explicitly stated that childbearing is an integral aspect of marriage. 385 Furthermore, Skinner established in the 1940s that procreation is a fundamental right. 386 Therefore, it can be inferred that those who are accorded the fundamental right to marry cannot have their ability to obtain biological parenthood disregarded. 387

The argument under Equal Protection would be stronger if the Supreme Court declared sexual orientation a suspect classification. 388 However, utilizing the reasoning from Lawrence, an argument can be formulated that sexual orientation is treated like a protected class under the law, thus equally deserving of the associated constitutional

381. See Abrams et. al., supra note 28, at 89 (detailing the evolution of homosexual rights).
382. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604 (holding that same-sex marriage is legal).
383. See Chemerinsky, supra note 92, at 712, 935 (discussing the requirements of Equal Protection).
384. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608. (“They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them that right.”).
385. See id. at 2600.
387. See id.; Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600-01.
388. See Chemerinsky, supra note 92, at 712-14. This is because heightened scrutiny would be warranted and would make laws that infringed upon sexual orientation, like infertility laws requiring heterosexual intercourse, have to satisfy the most stringent level of scrutiny. See id.
protections and stringent scrutiny requirements.\textsuperscript{389} Conversely, an argument can be made that same-sex couples cannot be excluded from infertility insurance coverage based on sexual orientation as a general classification warranting no extra protection, as unpopular groups cannot be targeted and discriminated against per \textit{Romer}.\textsuperscript{390}

\textbf{a. Utilizing \textit{Lawrence}: Sexual Orientation as a Suspect Classification}

If sexual orientation was a suspect classification, or if the reasoning from \textit{Lawrence} was utilized to argue that it is at least protected under the law, then statutes that explicitly and implicitly discriminate against same-sex couples via heteronormative infertility definitions\textsuperscript{391} could be unconstitutional on their face.\textsuperscript{392} If a facial classification exists, heightened scrutiny automatically applies, and the government has the burden to prove the law is necessary or substantially important.\textsuperscript{393} Arguably, the government cannot withstand a heightened level of scrutiny because a genuine reason to disallow familial formation or the expansion of mankind is inconceivable.\textsuperscript{394} Even so, the potential exists that discriminatory infertility laws would also fail a rational basis analysis.\textsuperscript{395}

\textbf{b. Sexual Orientation as a General Classification}

Sexual orientation is not currently a suspect classification; therefore, the argument pursuant to \textit{Romer} is the sounder argument as the law stands today.\textsuperscript{396} For non-suspect classifications, the default

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{389} See \textit{Lawrence} v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003); see also \textit{Hill}, supra note 145, at 95.
\item \textsuperscript{390} See \textit{Romer} v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996).
\item \textsuperscript{391} See, e.g., \textit{CONN GEN. STAT.} § 38a-536 (West 2015); \textit{HAW. REV. STAT.} § 431: 10A-116.5 (2013); \textit{ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.} § 5/356m(a), (c) (West 2016); \textit{MASS. ANN. LAWS} ch. 175, § 47H (West 2013); \textit{N.J. STAT.} § 17:48-6x (West 2017); \textit{TEX. INS. CODE} §§ 1366.003(a), 1366.005(2)-(3)(A)-(D) (West 2005).
\item \textsuperscript{392} See \textit{CHEMERINSKY}, supra note 92, at 712-13.
\item \textsuperscript{393} See \textit{id.} at 713. Depending on the classification, this would trigger intermediate or strict scrutiny. See \textit{id}.
\item \textsuperscript{394} See \textit{Romer}, 517 U.S. at 634-35 ("[L]aws of the kind now before us raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons affected.").
\item \textsuperscript{395} See \textit{id.} at 635.
\item \textsuperscript{396} See \textit{id}. Romer used rational basis to declare a Colorado law discriminating against persons based on their sexual orientation unconstitutional. See \textit{id}. However, Justice Ginsberg’s oral arguments in \textit{Obergefell} v. \textit{Hodges} hinted that
\end{itemize}
level of scrutiny is rational basis. While extreme deference is given to the government pursuant to rational basis and the burden is on the challenger to prove that the law is not rationally related to a legitimate government interest, laws cannot simply target an unpopular group and discriminate against them. However, upon review of infertility insurance statutes that exempt same-sex couples from satisfying the threshold requirements of being medically infertile and participating in heterosexual intercourse for a period of years, the laws are inherently discriminatory against same-sex couples. Notwithstanding the government’s interest in escaping the associated expenditures that would be required by offering infertility insurance for all married couples, there has to be an additional reason that is not economically grounded in order to deny the coverage. However, there does not appear to be a legitimate interest, aside from financial resources, that could justify denying coverage; thus, there is strong potential for a successful claim under Equal Protection. However, there is also a claim under Due Process, as infringements on the fundamental rights to procreate and marry necessitate due process.

this could also be a gender classification issue, which would require laws to pass intermediate scrutiny. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 85, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14-556). However, this is beyond the scope of this Note.

397. See Chemerinsky, supra note 92, at 714.
398. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 635; see also Chemerinsky, supra note 92, at 714.
399. See generally NCSL, supra note 220 (summarizing the state infertility statutes).
400. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976) (“Financial cost alone is not a controlling weight in determining whether due process requires a particular procedural safeguard prior to some administrative decision. But the Government’s interest, and hence that of the public, in conserving scarce fiscal and administrative resources is a factor that must be weighed.”).
401. See generally Romer, 517 U.S. 620.
402. See Chemerinsky, supra note 92, at 934; see also Blake, supra note 11, at 683 (“As notions of reproductive freedom continue to develop and as technologies like ART continue to become more mainstream, courts may more readily be willing to acknowledged a positive right of reproduction and even ART.”). But see NeJaime, supra note 292, at 2270 (stating that equal protection and due process claims for same-sex parental equality may take years to materialize).
2. Due Process Provides for Coverage Where it is Due

Pursuant to substantive due process, the government must show adequate reason for infringing upon a fundamental right. Procreation has been a recognized fundamental right since the early 1940s, and laws that infringe upon that right are only constitutional if they satisfy a strict scrutiny analysis. Additionally, marriage has been declared a fundamental right since 1976 and was extended to same-sex couples in 2015. Therefore, pursuant to the Due Process Clause, infertility statutes that impede insurance access for same-sex couples infringe upon their fundamental rights to procreate and marry.

Since fundamental rights are infringed, strict scrutiny is triggered. The next question within a due process analysis requires a showing that the fundamental right is infringed. However, the law also requires that the infringement be substantial and direct. When same-sex couples cannot achieve biological parenthood because their access to insurance is restricted, thus preventing relief from the financial burden of ART, their right to procreate is substantially and directly infringed. Similarly, when children are such a fundamental aspect of marriage as denoted by Justice Kennedy, laws that hinder that associated privilege substantially and directly infringe upon the fundamental right to marry. The third question in a due process analysis requires the government to prove that laws granting infertility insurance to heterosexual couples and not to same-sex couples are essential, but it is difficult to conceive

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403. See Chemerinsky, supra note 92, at 935 (explaining procreation as a fundamental right that triggers strict scrutiny when a challenged law infringes on that right).
404. See id. at 933.
406. Contra Blake, supra note 11 (discussing Due Process and ART before the Obergefell decision).
407. See Chemerinsky, supra note 92, at 936.
408. See id. at 938.
409. See id.
410. See Jacoby, supra note 10, at 156-58.
412. See Chemerinsky, supra note 92, at 938.
any potential reasons that are not ludicrous.\textsuperscript{413} Lastly, the government must show that the insurance statute is sufficiently related to the statutory purpose—which is habitually to provide alternative access to parenthood to those who cannot achieve it.\textsuperscript{414} Statutory purpose cannot only accommodate heterosexual couples’ desire for biological parenthood because same-sex couples have the identical desire to achieve biological parenthood.\textsuperscript{415} Therefore, same-sex couples’ fundamental rights to marriage and procreation are severely infringed by laws that disallow ART coverage and establish barriers for their achievement of familial life.\textsuperscript{416}

Not surprisingly, given the symbiotic relationship of children and families, same-sex couples are employing alternatives to natural procreation—ART treatments—at an increasing rate as a means to fulfill their desire to have a family.\textsuperscript{417} However, unjustness ensues when same-sex couples—and not heterosexual couples—are required to expend considerable capital in order to fulfill their desire for biological parenthood, their fundamental right to procreate, and their associated marital privilege to childbearing—which is both intolerable and unconstitutional.\textsuperscript{418} At its core, equal protection forbids similarly situated persons—namely, married couples, both heterosexual and homosexual alike—from being discriminated against.\textsuperscript{419} Thus, the heteronormative nature of state insurance mandates that exclude same-sex couples from receiving insurance coverage for the immutable infertility they face runs afoul of the

\textsuperscript{413}. Cf. Blake, supra note 11, at 683-86. At the time of the writing, the fundamental right to marry was not extended to same-sex couples. Thus, the author’s argument that there is no Due Process violation for laws because “[r]egardless of whether these mandates result in unequal distribution of or costs for ART across differing marital statuses and sexual orientation,” can be refuted using the holding and reasoning in Obergefell. See id. at 681.

\textsuperscript{414}. See supra notes 236-237 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{415}. See Orentlicher, supra note 168, at 653; see also DAAR, supra note 177, at 474 (stating that same-sex couples want to achieve biological parenthood just as much as heterosexual couples and that ART is a way for them to achieve that goal).

\textsuperscript{416}. See generally Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584.

\textsuperscript{417}. See id. (discussing how homosexual persons and same-sex couples have employed ART to start their desired families).

\textsuperscript{418}. See Jacoby, supra note 10, at 150 (explaining that individuals will go into substantial debt to attempt to obtain biological parenthood, including taking out a second mortgage, selling assets, and siphoning savings and retirement accounts).

\textsuperscript{419}. See Blake, supra note 11, at 686-92 (discussing Equal Protection as applied to ART and how the government must confer benefits equally where it confers them).
CONCLUSION

Equalizing same-sex couples’ right to marry in *Obergefell* was a giant step toward awarding same-sex couples the fundamental rights they deserve.\(^4\) However, it was only one of the necessary steps in the process.\(^2\) For many marital couples, one of the most important aspects of marriage is procreation, and the subsequent opportunity to raise their biological children within their own family unit—so important that Justice Kennedy pronounced it as a fundamental aspect and associated privilege of marriage in *Obergefell*.\(^3\) Simply put, same-sex couples should not have to struggle to achieve biological parenthood purely because they are anatomically incapable of naturally conceiving a child.\(^4\) By virtually requiring same-sex couples to bankrupt themselves in order to obtain the family that they want and deserve is, by definition, unjust and unconstitutional.\(^5\) Ceasing the declaration of infertility solely as a medical issue and providing infertility insurance coverage for same-sex couples diminishes the disparate treatment that plagues the homosexual community—which *Obergefell* set out to do in 2015.\(^6\) While labeling same-sex couples infertile because of their homosexual immutability may be more unconventional than what many people are used to, that is of insignificant magnitude—as same-sex couples “ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law [and] the Constitution grants them that right.”\(^7\)

\(^{4}\) See generally id. (discussing the implications of the Fourteenth Amendment with denying ART to homosexual persons, but concluding differently because at the time of the writing same-sex marriage was not utilized).

\(^{5}\) See supra Section I.B (discussing the *Obergefell* decision in depth).

\(^{6}\) See supra Section I.B (discussing the *Obergefell* decision in depth).

\(^{7}\) See supra note 11, at 22-23 (discussing the changes that need to be made post-*Obergefell*).