INTRODUCTION

The period since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 has witnessed the implementation of aggressive counter-terrorism measures around much of the Western world. This trend is exemplified by the United States and the United Kingdom, the two jurisdictions with which this

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Article is concerned. Many of these counterterrorism measures raise questions about the appropriate boundaries of state power and have serious implications for individual liberty. As affected individuals brought litigation, the United States Supreme Court and the United Kingdom’s House of Lords, the highest courts in their respective jurisdictions,\(^1\) were forced to grapple with these difficult issues.

This Article is an attempt to situate the major decisions of the Supreme Court and the House of Lords concerning aspects of the War on Terror in the historical context of judicial behavior in times of war or crisis. The conventional account of judicial behavior during such times posits that courts are ineffective guarantors of individual liberty because they inevitably defer to executive claims of national security. Only after the period of war has passed do the courts reassert themselves, resulting in a cyclical pattern of contraction and expansion of liberty.\(^2\)

How do the relevant post–9/11 decisions of the Supreme Court and House of Lords fit within this pattern, if at all? This Article considers five possible ways of understanding the relevant decisions in light of the conventional account of judicial behavior described above. First, the decisions of the Supreme Court and House of Lords since 9/11 may represent a break in the historical pattern of judicial deference. Second, the conventional account may simply be incorrect or incomplete. Three further explanations are largely consistent with the conventional account. First, these cases may be sufficiently remote in time from the relevant events such that courts feel confident in reasserting their authority. Second, the courts may view the War on Terror as being in some way qualitatively different from traditional war. The final explanation is that the relevant post–9/11 decisions, while appearing to be different, continue to exhibit deference in a manner consistent with the conventional account.

Part I of this Article sets out the conventional account in greater detail, together with supporting decisions from each jurisdiction. Part II outlines the recent decisions of the Supreme Court and House of Lords that have concerned aspects of the War on Terror. Part III provides an extended discussion of the five possible ways of reconciling the conventional account with the recent decisions. Part IV draws some conclusions as to the most pertinent explanations.

### I. The Conventional Account and Its Basis

During times of emergency, those charged with protecting national security and public safety have exhibited a historical tendency to overreact.

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1. In October 2009, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom replaced the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords.
2. This idea is encapsulated in the Latin maxim that appears in the title (“In the midst of war, the law falls silent”).
As Laurence Lustgarten and Ian Leigh state, “official responses to emergencies which were overwhelmingly viewed at the time as not merely justifiable but compelling, have consistently turned out to be excessive, unnecessary, and often shameful.” Allied with this phenomenon, according to the conventional account of judicial behavior in times of war and crisis, is the ineffectiveness of the courts in checking the excesses of the executive because they tend to defer to executive claims of national security.

According to Lord Steyn, deference “refers to the idea of a court, exceptionally, out of respect for other branches of government and in recognition of their democratic decision-making role, declining to make its own independent judgment on a particular issue.” Similarly, Aileen Kavanagh states that deference is where “judges assign varying degrees of weight to the judgment of the elected branches, out of respect for their superior competence, expertise and/or democratic legitimacy.”

There are two main reasons why the courts are reluctant to get involved in cases involving national security, and thus have a tendency to defer in such matters. The first concern is that it is not constitutionally appropriate for the judiciary to deal with such issues, and that proper recourse in such a policy-driven area lies with the political branches. The second concern is practical. Courts may lack the information needed to determine the case and

4. See Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 Yale L.J. 1011, 1034 (2003) (“Notwithstanding statements about the courts’ role in safeguarding human rights and civil liberties precisely when those rights and liberties are most at risk, when faced with national crises, the judiciary tends to ‘go[ ] to war.’”); Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Law in the Control of Terrorism and Insurrection: The British Laboratory Experience, 42 Law & Contemp. Probs. 140, 187 (1978) (“[I]t is more instructive to look at what the courts do than at what they say; in England, as in the United States, they have not been disposed straitly to confine the powers granted the executive by statute in what they perceive as a real emergency.”); Conor Gearty, Civil Liberties 188 (2007) (“[A]ny answer to these points must take into account . . . the historically very bad record of the entire judiciary in protecting civil liberties in the face of executive and parliamentary action. The lesson of the past is that it is delusional to rely on judges to lead on in the hard work of civil libertarian protection.”) [hereinafter Gearty, Civil Liberties]; David Dyzenhaus, The Constitution of Law 17 (2006) (“[T]he judicial record in enforcing the rule of law in [emergency] situations is at worst dismal, at best ambiguous.”). See also Eyal Benvenisti, National Courts and the “War on Terrorism,” in Enforcing International Law Norms Against Terrorism 307, 309–17 (Andrea Bianchi ed., 2004); David Cole, Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual Rights in Times of Crisis, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 2565, 2568–71 (2003) [hereinafter Cole, Judging the Next Emergency].
7. Lustgarten & Leigh, supra note 3, at 329.
face difficulties with maintaining the secrecy of sensitive information given the adversarial process. Whatever the precise reasons behind this judicial reticence with regard to national security, there is certainly a corpus of judicial decisions in each jurisdiction that forms the basis of the conventional account. These cases are discussed further below.

A. The United States

In 1798, in the context of a looming war with France and bitter political and ideological division between the Federalists and Republicans, the Federalist–controlled Congress enacted the Alien and Sedition Acts. The Alien Acts authorized the President to detain and expel any alien he considered a threat to the United States as well as any enemy alien during a declared war. The Sedition Act criminalized “false, scandalous and malicious writing” critical of the government, Congress or the President. This Act became a weapon to silence political dissent from the Francophile Republicans.

The judges who heard cases involving the Sedition Act, including three Supreme Court Justices on circuit, upheld it. However, the Act turned public sentiments against the Federalists, and the Republicans swept into power in the 1800 elections. The newly elected President Jefferson pardoned those convicted under the Act; Congress later repaid the fines imposed under the Act with interest. The Supreme Court itself later stated that “the attack upon [the Act’s] validity has carried the day in the court of history.”

During the Civil War, President Lincoln authorized significant restrictions on civil liberties. Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus, for

8. Id. See also KAVANAGH, supra note 6, at 211–13.
15. STONE, supra note 10, at 71.
16. Id. at 73.
which he later obtained legislative sanction, resulted in the military
detention of some 20,000 persons suspected of being sympathetic to the
South. In a rare judicial decision that
attempted to restrain the executive in a time of war, Chief Justice Taney,
sitting as a circuit judge, ruled Lincoln’s suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus unconstitutional on the basis that only Congress had the power to
suspend the writ. Despite this, Lincoln paid little heed to Taney’s
decision.

The most famous Supreme Court decision to come out of the Civil War
was *Ex parte Milligan*, where the Court ruled that civilians in Indiana
could not be tried by military tribunal. Milligan was accused of being part of the
Sons of Liberty, a rebel group that had undermined the Union war effort. He
was arrested by the military, tried and convicted before a military tribunal,
and then sentenced to death. The Court ruled unanimously that the military
tribunal lacked the jurisdiction to try a civilian such as Milligan. However,
the Court divided on the reason for this outcome. Five Justices were of the
view that due process dictated the result. The remaining four were of the
view that the problem was a lack of proper Congressional authorization.

The period around World War I witnessed the prosecution of many anti-
war agitators and socialists for adopting positions opposing the war effort.
In a series of cases, the Supreme Court upheld the convictions of these
radicals under the Espionage Act of 1917. In 1919, the Court decided
*Schenck v. United States*. The defendants in *Schenck* had been convicted
of conspiring to violate the Espionage Act by distributing leaflets that urged
draftees to resist the draft. The leaflets in question argued that the draft was
illegal, immoral and only benefited capitalists. Justice Holmes, writing for
a unanimous Court, enunciated the notable “clear and present danger” test,
but upheld the defendants’ convictions. Justice Holmes stated that free
speech protection was necessarily different during a time of war, and

18. Frederic Block, *Civil Liberties During National Emergencies: The Interactions
Between the Three Branches of Government in Coping with Past and Current Threats to the
20. *Ex parte* Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 149 (1861).
21. See William H. Rehnquist, *All the Laws but One: Civil Liberties in
22. 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
23. *Id.* at 122.
24. *Id.* at 120–21.
25. *Id.* at 137 (Chase, C.J., dissenting).
124, 126* (Mark Tushnet ed., 2005) [hereinafter Tushnet, *Defending Korematsu?*].
29. *Id.* at 50–51.
rejected the argument that the leaflets were protected by the First Amendment:

When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right.\(^\text{30}\)

The Court continued to uphold convictions under the Espionage Act for similar speech-based acts in decisions such as *Debs v. United States*,\(^\text{31}\) and *Abrams v. United States*,\(^\text{32}\) which considered the Act after its amendment by the Sedition Act of 1918.\(^\text{33}\) Justice Holmes wrote for a unanimous Court in *Debs*, but penned a famous dissent in *Abrams*.\(^\text{34}\) He was joined in dissent by Justice Brandeis, but their view of the First Amendment remained a minority one into the 1920s,\(^\text{35}\) and only became the mainstream view many decades later.\(^\text{36}\)

World War II provided further instances of judicial acquiescence towards draconian executive measures. The case of *Ex parte Quirin* arose out of a group of eight Nazi saboteurs who landed on the east coast of the United States in June 1942.\(^\text{37}\) They arrived wearing German military uniforms, which they buried at the beach before continuing on in civilian clothing. All were quickly captured by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, partly because one of the saboteurs turned himself in.\(^\text{38}\) President Roosevelt directed that the saboteurs be tried by military commission and denied access to civilian courts.\(^\text{39}\) The saboteurs petitioned the Supreme Court, arguing that they were entitled to be tried in civilian court. The Court, after convening a special term, heard the case in July 1942.\(^\text{40}\) It rejected all the saboteurs’ claims, but did not issue a full opinion until October. By this time all of the saboteurs had been tried and found guilty by the military commission; six of them had already been executed.\(^\text{41}\) Given this *fait accompli*, the Court’s full decision unsurprisingly upheld the trial of the saboteurs by military commission. Writing some sixty years later, Justice

\(^{30}\) Id. at 52.

\(^{31}\) 249 U.S. 211 (1919).

\(^{32}\) 250 U.S. 616 (1919).

\(^{33}\) Ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553 (repealed 1921).

\(^{34}\) Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630–31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).

\(^{35}\) See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); see, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).


\(^{37}\) 317 U.S. 1, 21 (1942).


\(^{39}\) Belknap, supra note 38, at 65.

\(^{40}\) Id. at 69.

\(^{41}\) Id. at 77.
Scalia observed that *Quirin* “was not [the Supreme Court’s] finest hour.” Others have offered even harsher critique.

The most notorious instance of an abridgment of civil liberties from World War II, however, was the Japanese internment. President Roosevelt’s Executive Order 9066, together with supporting legislation subsequently enacted by Congress, formed the legal basis for the forced evacuation and eventual internment of more than 110,000 people of Japanese heritage, most of them American citizens. The majority were detained in ten internment camps behind barbed wire and guard towers for three years, despite the absence of any documented instance of sabotage or disloyalty on the part of a Japanese person living in the United States.

Aspects of the internment were challenged in a series of cases. In *Hirabayashi v. United States*, the Court considered the legality of a dusk–to–dawn curfew imposed on “all alien Japanese, all alien Germans, all alien Italians, and all persons of Japanese ancestry” residing in a defined area. Hirabayashi launched a test case by deliberately violating the curfew. He was prosecuted and convicted for knowingly disregarding restrictions of a military commander in a military area. The Court unanimously upheld his conviction. Although a number of the Justices were troubled by the case, the Court ultimately deferred to the executive on a matter relating to war:

Since the Constitution commits to the Executive and to Congress the exercise of the war power in all the vicissitudes and conditions of warfare, it has necessarily given them wide scope for the exercise of judgment and discretion in determining the nature and extent of the threatened injury or danger and in the selection of the means for resisting it. . . . Where, as they did here, the conditions call for the exercise of judgment and discretion and for the choice of means by those branches of the Government on which the Constitution has placed the responsibility of warmaking, it is not for any court to sit in review of the wisdom of their action or substitute its judgment for theirs.

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43. See Belknap, supra note 38, at 95 (accusing the Court of falling “into step with the drums of war.”).
44. 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942).
47. Stone, supra note 10, at 287.
49. Id. at 88.
50. Id. at 83.
51. Id. at 93.
The Court was again confronted with the internment in *Korematsu v. United States*. Korematsu defied the military’s order to leave his California home; he was subsequently arrested and convicted of remaining in a military area contrary to a military order that required the exclusion of “all persons of Japanese ancestry.” The Supreme Court upheld his conviction by six to three. Justice Black, writing for the majority, accepted the Executive’s claims of military necessity underlying the exclusion of Japanese on the American West Coast without question:

Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to him or his race. He was excluded because we are at war with the Japanese Empire, because the properly constituted military authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast and felt constrained to take proper security measures, because they decided that the military urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the West Coast temporarily, and, finally, because Congress, reposing its confidence in this time of war in our military leaders—as inevitably it must—determined that they should have the power to do just this. There was evidence of disloyalty on the part of some, the military authorities considered that the need for action was great, and time was short. We cannot—by availing ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight—now say that, at that time, these actions were unjustified.

The end of World War II was followed by the onset of the Cold War, and the focus shifted to the threat of communism. The fear of what was perceived as a worldwide communist movement dedicated to overthrowing the United States government, together with an unstable and uncertain international environment, left the American people with what Geoffrey Stone describes as a “pervasive sense of fear.” It was in this broader context that the Supreme Court decided a number of decisions implicating the First Amendment. Among these was the Court’s 1951 decision of *Dennis v. United States*, which considered the appeals of leaders in the

52. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). The other Supreme Court cases were Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943) and *Ex parte Endo*, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
53. He did so for personal reasons: he wanted to remain with his Italian–American girlfriend. See *Stone*, supra note 10, at 299.
55. *Id.* at 223–24. The claim of military necessity was actually very weak. Even before President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, top military officers had testified before a House committee that the probability of attack on the West Coast was virtually zero. They also testified that there was no known instance of Japanese residents in Hawaii or the West Coast spying for Japan. See *Stone*, supra note 10, at 295. See also Eric L. Muller, *Hirabayashi: The Biggest Lie of the Greatest Generation*, UNIV. N.C. LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1233682.
57. *Id.* at 395–423.
Communist Party against their convictions for conspiring to advocate the overthrow of the United States, an offence under the Smith Act. A majority of six Justices upheld the convictions. As Stone observes, Dennis "involved the direct criminal prosecution of the leaders of Communist Party at the height of the nation’s anxiety over Communist subversion." So the outcome is perhaps unsurprising. Indeed it was only from 1957—after the Korean War, after the death of Stalin, and as McCarthyism waned—that the Court’s endorsement of aggressive anti-Communist measures ended.

B. The United Kingdom

During World War I, the Defence of the Realm Acts 1914-1915 delegated broad powers to the executive branch, allowing it to make regulations to secure public safety or the defense of the realm. In June 1915, in order to deal with a perceived threat from those who were not technically enemy aliens, the government promulgated Regulation 14B under the authority of the Defence of the Realm (Consolidation) Act 1914. Regulation 14B permitted the internment of any person of hostile origin or association, where the Secretary of State for the Home Department (Home Secretary) considered it expedient for securing public safety or defense. In addition to some 30,000 enemy aliens interned under the exercise of the prerogative, approximately 160 people were interned under Regulation 14B’s authority.

Regulation 14B was challenged in the case of R v. Halliday, ex parte Zadig. In Halliday, a majority of the House of Lords ruled that the general words of the empowering statute were sufficient to impliedly authorize

60. Dennis, 341 U.S. 494–95.
61. Stone, supra note 10, at 402.
62. Id. at 413.
65. 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 29, § 1 (Eng.).
67. Lustgarten & Leigh, supra note 3, at 173; see also Vorspan, supra note 64, at 277.
Regulation 14B, hence justifying the detention of Zadig, a naturalized British citizen of German descent.\(^7^0\) Lord Shaw, in dissent, argued that if Parliament had intended to delegate such sweeping power to the executive, it would surely have done so more overtly. In Lord Shaw’s view, clear and express words in the empowering statute were required.\(^7^1\) To not require clear, specific statutory authorization was to casually “imply the repeal of laws and liberties fundamental to British citizenship.”\(^7^2\)

Immediately prior to the outbreak of hostilities in World War II, Parliament enacted the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act 1939.\(^7^3\) Like its World War I predecessors, this Act delegated power to the executive to make regulations that appeared necessary for a number of purposes including public safety, the defense of the realm, and the efficient prosecution of the war; once again, the delegation of power essentially gave the executive *carte blanche*. However, unlike its predecessors, the Act expressly provided for the power to establish internment by regulation.\(^7^4\)

As Nazi Germany gained military ascendancy in 1940, fears of a fifth column arose and the pressure to intern in the name of national security increased.\(^7^5\) Some 28,000 enemy aliens were detained under the prerogative.\(^7^6\) Additionally, the government promulgated Regulation 18B of the Defence (General) Regulations, which authorized the internment of British subjects considered security risks. Approximately 2,000 persons were so detained.\(^7^7\)

A number of internment cases reached the courts. The most (in)famous was *Liversidge v. Anderson*, where the House of Lords rejected a challenge to Regulation 18B.\(^7^8\) On its face, Regulation 18B permitted the Home Secretary to order a person detained “if he had reasonable cause to believe” the person was of hostile origin or associations, or that they had recent involvement in acts prejudicial to public safety or the defense of the realm.\(^7^9\) A majority held that the regulation only required the Home Secretary subjectively believe the detainee had hostile origins or associations; the Home Secretary’s order was not to be second–guessed with an inquiry into the grounds for his belief.\(^8^0\) The majority reached this conclusion despite the

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72. *Id.* at 299.
73. 2 & 3 Geo. 6, c. 62 (Eng.).
74. *Simpson, supra* note 68, at 46; Bishop, *supra* note 4, at 144.
76. *Simpson, supra* note 68, at 258.
77. *Id.* at 1. *See also Bonner, supra* note 66, at 64.
80. *Id.* at 224 (Viscount Maugham), 254 & 258 (Lord MacMillan), 261 (Lord Wright), 282 (Lord Romer). There was a patina of due process in the form of an administrative appeal before an advisory committee, which was supposed to inform detainees
fact that the Regulation’s original wording, which required that the Home Secretary merely be “satisfied,” had been changed to “reasonable cause to believe” because of parliamentary pressure. Although the majority left open a theoretical avenue of review in the form of an exception for bad faith, the upshot of the decision was to make the Home Secretary’s decision effectively unreviewable.

Lord Shaw’s earlier dissenting role was reprised here by Lord Atkin. Lord Atkin argued that, given the Regulation’s wording, the courts were entitled to do more than simply accept the government’s word on trust. His dissent pulled no punches when it came to his judicial colleagues:

I view with apprehension the attitude of judges who on a mere question of construction when face to face with claims involving the liberty of the subject show themselves more executive minded than the executive. . . . In this country, amid the clash of arms, the laws are not silent. They may be changed, but they speak the same language in war as in peace. . . . In this case I have listened to arguments which might have been addressed acceptably to the Court of King’s Bench in the time of Charles I.

Subsequent court decisions during the Cold War continued the pattern of the wartime decisions, deferring to executive claims of national security even where the civil liberties of those concerned were severely affected. In Ex parte Hosenball, the journalist Mark Hosenball sought to challenge the Home Secretary’s decision to have him deported using a discretionary power to order deportation where it was “conducive to the public good.” Where national security concerns formed the basis of a deportation, there was no right of appeal. Instead there was an informal review process involving an advisory panel. At a hearing before the panel, the person

of the grounds for their detention, and having heard from detainees, render non-binding advice to the Home Secretary. In practice, the advisory committee was itself not often privy to the grounds underlying the detention of detainees. See Simpson, supra note 68, at 88–89; A.W.B. Simpson, Rhetoric, Reality, and Regulation 18B, Denning L.J. 123, 133 (1988).

82. Liversidge, [1942] A.C. at 224 (Viscount Maugham), 258 (Lord MacMillan), 261 (Lord Wright) 278 (Lord Romer); see also Simpson, supra note 68, at 362.
83. See Bonner, supra note 66, at 67.
85. Id. at 244. Lord Atkin was subsequently ostracized by his judicial colleagues, quite possibly because of the strong tone of his dissent. See R.F.V. Heuston, Liversidge v. Anderson in Retrospect, 86 L.Q.R. 33, 48 (1970).
86. Gearty, Civil Liberties, supra note 4, at 36.
could make representations and call witnesses, but could not hear or challenge the case brought against him. There was also no right to legal representation. After the hearing, the Home Secretary would reconsider the decision to deport in light of the panel’s confidential advice.91

Hosenball was only notified that he had obtained information harmful to the national security of the United Kingdom, including information harmful to servants of the Crown.92 He claimed that the deportation procedure was contrary to the principles of natural justice, because he had not been provided adequate notice of the allegations against him. This argument failed in the Court of Appeal.93 Lord Denning cited with approval the majority judgments in Liversidge and Halliday, and stated that this too, was a case about national security. In such a case, even the principles of natural justice had to be relaxed.94

In 1983, the Minister of Civil Service, Margaret Thatcher, decided that union membership was to be banned at Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ),95 and issued an instruction to that effect. Those affected, the public servants who worked at GCHQ, sought judicial review, claiming that the principles of natural justice required prior consultation before changes were made to their employment conditions.96 In the ensuing House of Lords decision, the majority ruled that the exercise of the prerogative, which was relied on as the source of power for Thatcher’s actions, was in principle amenable to judicial review,97 and that the established practice of consultation with the unions at GCHQ gave rise to a legitimate expectation that the practice would continue. This would ordinarily have been sufficient to hold the order banning union membership unlawful for breach of the principles of natural justice, but for the imperatives of national security.98 Ultimately, the government prevailed because the Law Lords accepted that the decision to ban union membership was announced without prior consultation due to national security; any advance notice of the intention to abolish union membership might itself

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91. Hosenball, [1977] 1 W.L.R. at 780. See also Lustgarten & Leigh, supra note 3, at 185.
95. GCHQ collects signals intelligence. It is the British counterpart of the National Security Agency.
97. Id. at 399–400 (Lord Fraser), 407 (Lord Scarman) & 410 (Lord Diplock).
98. Id. at 401 (Lord Fraser), 412 (Lord Diplock).
have resulted in industrial action, the very thing that the decision was meant to prevent.99

Once national security was invoked, the judges quickly fell into line. Lord Diplock, for example, emphasized that national security was an area where the courts deferred: “It is par excellence a non-justiciable question.”100 Notably, the “ample evidence,”101 as Lord Diplock put it, of the national security interest at stake consisted of a Cabinet Secretary’s sworn assertion that the non–consultation with the unions had been motivated by the government’s fears of provoking industrial action that would in turn threaten national security.102 The House of Lords proved generously credulous, as this ultimately decisive national security argument appeared only after the government had lost at first instance.103

The case of R v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs ex parte Cheblak again concerned the power to deport for reasons of national security.104 Cheblak, a Lebanese resident of the United Kingdom since 1975, was detained pending deportation upon the start of hostilities in the first Gulf War.105 Like Hosenball, because national security concerns were the basis of his deportation, his only recourse was to appeal to the advisory panel. Cheblak subsequently challenged his treatment in court.

The legality of Cheblak’s detention, and by extension those in the same situation as him,106 turned on the contents of the notice provided. Cheblak’s

99. Id. at 403 (Lord Fraser), 412 (Lord Diplock). There had been seven industrial disputes at GCHQ between 1979 and 1981. See Gavin Drewry, The GCHQ Case—A Failure of Government Communications, 38 PARL. AFFAIRS 371, 376 (1985).
100. GCHQ case, [1985] A.C. at 412 (Lord Diplock).
101. Id.
102. See Lustgarten & Leigh, supra note 3, at 331. Lustgarten and Leigh are particularly critical of this aspect of the decision. See id. at 351.
103. Id. at 332. Lustgarten and Leigh emphasize that the judgments should be understood in the context of the Cold War:

They arise from the fear-ridden atmosphere of the days when the Cold War divisions calcified into rival military blocks, and reflect unspoken political assumptions so long dominant and hence lying so deep that the Law Lords may not have been aware of how powerfully those assumptions had shaped their approach to the legal issues.

Id. at 329.
105. Immigration Act, 1971, ch. 77, § 5(5), sch. 3 (U.K.); Lustgarten & Leigh, supra note 3, at 187. People with links to the Palestine Liberation Organization and Iraqi nationals with military links in particular were targeted on the basis that they might engage in terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom. See Bonner, supra note 66, at 126.
106. Cheblak himself was eventually not deported, but the case established an important precedent, particularly in relation to the 171 foreign nationals from the Middle East region served with deportation notices and detained. See Ian Leigh, The Gulf War Deportations and the Courts P.L. 331, 333 (1991). These detentions, too, proved to be an overreaction. See Lustgarten & Leigh, supra note 3, at 190. See also Nick Cohen, Return of the H-Block THE OBSERVER, Nov. 18, 2001 at 31; Home Affairs Committee, The Anti-
notice only stated that he was to be deported for reasons of national security, although in the course of proceedings, counsel for the government revealed that he was alleged to have unspecified connections to terrorism, making him a security risk. The Court of Appeal rejected the argument that Cheblak had not been provided with sufficient reasons for his deportation. Lord Donaldson ruled that the court, in the absence of bad faith, was not in a position to second-guess a Home Office affidavit that stated further notice could not be given because further disclosure might threaten national security.

The Court was plainly of the view that the first recourse should be the non-statutory advisory panel. The Court claimed to be willing to review the fairness of the panel’s procedures, but the fact that it was dealing with matters of national security also had to be taken into account. As for the Home Secretary’s decision, this was also theoretically subject to judicial review. However, given that the Home Secretary could not be compelled to produce any further information about what motivated his decision, the decision was for all intents and purposes unreviewable.

C. Buyer’s Remorse

The history of judicial deference during times of war or crisis (real or perceived) seems quite clear. After the war or crisis has passed, there is often a change of attitude. As David Dyzenhaus observes, after the fact the majority judgments tend to be regarded as “badges of shame,” and it is the dissenting judgments that are seen as charting the correct course for the future. This ex post regret is exemplified by Korematsu and Liversidge.

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108. Id. at 903, 905. For a critical view, see Leigh, supra note 106, at 334.
110. Id. at 902.
111. Id. at 905. The Court’s retreat behind the accountability mechanisms of the advisory panel and the Home Secretary’s accountability to Parliament is problematic. See id. at 902. The hearings before advisory panel did not match the rosy picture that the Court drew: the average hearing was over in 45 to 60 minutes. The Home Secretary’s accountability to Parliament in practice amounted to little; there was no accountability for failure to follow the advisory panel’s advice because the panel’s recommendations were secret. See LUSTGARTEN & LEIGH, supra note 3, at 188–89.
112. David Dyzenhaus, Cycles of Legality in Emergency Times, 18 P.L. REV. 165, 165 (2007) [hereinafter Dyzenhaus, Cycles of Legality]. See also Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?, supra note 26, at 127 (“[T]he pattern commonly attributed to the civil liberties implications of government policies in wartime: The government acts, the courts endorse or acquiesce, and—sooner or later—society reaches a judgment that the action was unjustified and the courts mistaken.”); BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK 60–61 (2006) (discussing the pattern of crisis, re-examination after the fact, followed by the “casting [of]
the two World War II-era cases that in many ways have come to represent the wartime phenomenon of executive overreaction coupled with judicial deference.

The failure of the Supreme Court to hold the government's evacuation and internment of Japanese in the United States unconstitutional in the face of claims of military necessity is well known. Over time, many participants, including government officials and Supreme Court Justices, came to regret their roles in the affair. The Korematsu decision itself became a legal pariah. More than forty years later, the United States government would apologize for the internment. Similarly, the hands-off approach taken by the House of Lords in cases such as Liversidge has also met with criticism. The case is most well remembered for Lord Atkin's celebrated dissent, and in the court of history, Lord Atkin's view has seemingly prevailed.

But despite the acknowledgement of past errors, the cycle seems to repeat as judges again revert to a deferential approach whenever national security is invoked by the executive, even when the case occurs in a context other than an actual war. The result is a cyclical pattern of contraction and expansion of liberty as war and crises come and go.

_Stone, supra_ note 10, at 544, 547 (observing a recurring pattern of excessive civil liberties restrictions in times of war and a judicial propensity to defer during crisis periods).

113. _Stone, supra_ note 10, at 304–05.


116. _Simpson, supra_ note 68, at 418–19 (concluding that “the courts did virtually nothing” for those detained under Regulation 18B). See also _Lustgarten & Leigh, supra_ note 3, at 178.

117. _Simpson, supra_ note 68, at 363 (providing criticism of the reasons behind Lord Atkin's dissent). Bonner implies that there is a little too much celebration of the dissent. See _Bonner, supra_ note 66, at 67. Turpin and Tomkins argue that Lord Shaw's earlier dissent in _Halliday_ is actually more praiseworthy. See _Colin Turpin & Adam Tomkins, British Government and the Constitution_ 757 (6th ed. 2007).

118. _See R v. Home Secretary ex parte Khawaja [1984] 1 A.C. 74, 110 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (“The classic dissent of Lord Atkin in Liversidge v. Anderson is now accepted as correct not only on the point of construction of [R]egulation 18 (b) of the then emergency Regulations but in its declaration of English legal principle.” (citations omitted)); R v. I.R.C. ex parte Rossminter, [1980] 1 A.C. 952 (H.L.) 1011 (appeal taken from Eng.) (“I think the time has come to acknowledge openly that the majority of this House in _Liversidge v. Anderson_ were expeditiously and, at that time, perhaps, excusably, wrong and the dissenting speech of Lord Atkin was right.”); _Ali v. Jayaratne_, [1951] A.C. 66 (H.L.) 76 (appeal taken from Ceylon) (“[I]t would be a very unfortunate thing if the decision of _Liversidge’s_ case came to be regarded as laying down any general rule as to the construction of such phrases when they appear in statutory enactments.”). See also Alec Samuels, _The Quietus of Liversidge v. Anderson?_, 14 _Statute L. Rev._ 140 (1993); _Heuston, supra_ note 85, at 53–68.


120. Discussing the _Quirin_ decision, Fisher writes, “Judicial rulings during World War II provided disturbing evidence of a Court in the midst of war forfeiting its role as the
II. THE RECENT WAR ON TERROR DECISIONS

Having discussed the cases that underlie the conventional account of judicial behavior in times of war and crisis, this part of the Article briefly outlines the recent War on Terror decisions. These are the decisions of the Supreme Court and House of Lords that, broadly speaking, deal with aspects of the War on Terror and were decided between September 11, 2001 and October 2009.  

A. The Supreme Court

In June 2004, the Supreme Court decided a trilogy of cases concerning the detention of terrorist suspects. Two cases, *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld* and *Rumsfeld v. Padilla*, concerned the predicament of American citizens detained indefinitely as enemy combatants. The third, *Rasul v. Bush*, addressed the position of foreign detainees held at the Guantánamo Naval Base in Cuba.

Yaser Hamdi was captured in November 2001 in Afghanistan by Northern Alliance forces who subsequently turned him over to American forces. Initially detained at Guantánamo, Hamdi was later held as an enemy combatant at naval brigs in Virginia and South Carolina. His father filed a writ of habeas corpus on his behalf, effectively beginning the litigation. By the time Hamdi’s case reached the Supreme Court, there were two issues to be resolved: first, whether there was legal authority to detain persons such as Hamdi, and second, to what extent, if any, persons in his position could contest their detention.

The Supreme Court ruled five to four that the military could detain Hamdi as an enemy combatant because Congress had impliedly authorized such detention through the Authorization for the Use of Military Force
(AUMF) enacted shortly after 9/11. However, a different majority concluded that the government’s evidence was an inadequate factual basis for Hamdi’s detention, meaning that further process in the form of a hearing was necessary. Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion outlined a basic framework for conducting such a hearing. Significantly, Justice O’Connor suggested that it would not offend due process to permit the use of hearsay evidence, a presumption in favor of government evidence, and the use of military tribunals.

The second decision concerned Jose Padilla, who had been arrested by FBI agents at Chicago’s O’Hare Airport in May 2002. Although initially detained as a material witness, Padilla was subsequently designated an enemy combatant, transferred into military custody, and detained indefinitely. The allegation at the time was that Padilla was plotting a radiological “dirty bomb” attack on unknown targets within the United States. Padilla’s lawyer, who had been appointed to represent him in the earlier court proceedings, filed a writ of habeas corpus on his behalf in New York. The Supreme Court disposed of Padilla’s case on procedural grounds without addressing its merits. In a five to four decision, the Court ruled that Padilla’s petition should have been brought in South Carolina, the state where Padilla was physically being held.

The third decision, Rasul v. Bush, concerned fourteen detainees who had been captured in Afghanistan and detained at Guantánamo. They subsequently sought writs of habeas corpus. In the lower courts, the Bush Administration, relying on the World War II–era precedent of Johnson v. Eisentrager, had successfully argued that the courts had no jurisdiction to hear claims from Guantánamo detainees, who were non-citizens detained outside American territory. However, the Supreme Court held six-to-three that the Guantánamo detainees were entitled to petition American courts under the habeas corpus statute. Justice Stevens’ majority opinion distinguished Eisentrager in several ways: these detainees came from countries that were not at war with the United States, the detainees all denied engaging in hostile acts against the United States, none of the

128. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509 (“[D]ue process demands that a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral decisionmaker.”).
129. Id. at 533–34.
130. Elsea, supra note 46, at 2–3.
132. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 471–73.
detainees had ever been tried or convicted of any wrongdoing, and all of them had been detained for more than two years on territory over which the United States had exclusive jurisdiction and control.\textsuperscript{136}

However, these factual distinctions were not the basis of \textit{Rasul}’s holding. Rather, Justice Stevens stated that \textit{Eisentrager} was concerned with the constitutional rather than statutory right to habeas corpus. The habeas corpus statute had been reinterpreted since \textit{Eisentrager} to allow petitions from detainees of the United States held overseas.\textsuperscript{137} Additionally, the presumption against the extraterritorial application of statutes was inapplicable because Guantánamo Bay was indefinitely within the “complete jurisdiction and control” of the United States.\textsuperscript{138} Ultimately, there was no dispute that the District Court had jurisdiction over the detainees’ custodians, and thus it also had jurisdiction to hear statutory habeas petitions from Guantánamo detainees.\textsuperscript{139}

The next case to reach the Supreme Court concerned the Bush Administration’s plans to try certain Guantánamo detainees before military commissions that had been established by Presidential Order in November 2001.\textsuperscript{140} In July 2003, the first detainees were designated for trial before these military commissions.\textsuperscript{141} Among them was Salim Hamdan, who was alleged to be Osama Bin Laden’s bodyguard and driver. Hamdan was later charged with conspiracy to commit various war crimes.\textsuperscript{142} However, the system of military commissions that had been established to try him on these charges, with its irregular procedures and relaxed evidential standards, was itself challenged.\textsuperscript{143}

In November 2005, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.\textsuperscript{144} In December, Congress enacted the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA).\textsuperscript{145} which purported to strip the courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus applications from Guantánamo detainees, substituting instead a system that provided for limited review.\textsuperscript{146} Nevertheless, in June 2006, the Supreme Court ruled five to three in favor of Hamdan.\textsuperscript{147} The majority first rejected

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{136} \textit{Rasul}, 542 U.S. at 476.
\item \textsuperscript{137} \textit{Id.} at 478–79.
\item \textsuperscript{138} \textit{Id.} at 480–81.
\item \textsuperscript{139} \textit{Id.} at 483–84.
\item \textsuperscript{140} \textit{Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism}, 66 Fed. Reg. 57, 833, 57, 834–35 (Nov. 13, 2001).
\item \textsuperscript{141} \textit{Hamdan v. Rumsfeld}, 548 U.S. 557, 569 (2006).
\item \textsuperscript{142} \textit{See} Jonathan Mahler, \textit{The Bush Administration vs. Salim Hamdan}, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Jan. 8, 2006, at 44.
\item \textsuperscript{143} \textit{Hamdan}, 548 U.S. at 613.
\item \textsuperscript{144} \textit{Id.} at 572.
\item \textsuperscript{146} \textit{Detainee Treatment Act of 2005}, § 1005(e)(1)–(3).
\item \textsuperscript{147} \textit{Hamdan}, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
\end{itemize}
the contention that the DTA left the Court without jurisdiction to review habeas corpus cases pending at the time of the DTA’s enactment. On the merits of the case, Justice Stevens ruled that Hamdan’s military commission could not proceed because it violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the 1949 Geneva Conventions. First, Hamdan’s military commission violated the UCMJ’s uniformity principle, which required that the procedures for military commissions and courts–martial be the same insofar as practicable. Second, the military commission violated Common Article 3 (CA3) of the Geneva Conventions, applicable by way of Article 21 of the UCMJ’s reference to the law of war, because it did not satisfy CA3’s requirement of trial before a regularly–constituted court.

The Hamdan decision led to the hasty enactment of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA). The MCA effectively undid the Hamdan decision; it explicitly authorized the use of military commissions, albeit while making some procedural improvements. Additionally, the MCA unequivocally removed the statutory right of all non-citizen detainees to seek habeas corpus. This aspect of the MCA became the focus of the next case that came before the Supreme Court, Boumediene v. Bush. The petitioners in Boumediene were a number of non–citizen detainees held at Guantánamo who sought habeas corpus. With the statutory avenue to habeas corpus closed by the MCA, Boumediene squarely addressed the entitlement of these detainees to the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus.

The Court’s decision turned on two issues: first, whether the petitioners, being non–citizens held outside the United States, could invoke the protection of the Suspension Clause; and second, whether the review process set up by the DTA was an adequate substitute for habeas corpus. Writing for a majority of five, Justice Kennedy ruled that the petitioners were entitled to seek the constitutional writ of habeas corpus, which could only be denied in accordance with the Suspension Clause.
the majority ruled that the substitute review process on which the
government relied—military–run Combatant Status Review Tribunals
(CSRTs) based on Justice O’Connor’s suggestions in *Hamdi*, combined
with review in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals per the DTA—was an
inadequate substitute for habeas corpus. The majority therefore held that
Congress, in passing the MCA, had unconstitutionally suspended the writ of
habeas corpus in violation of the Suspension Clause.

Decided on the same day as *Boumediene* was *Munaf v. Geren*. This
case concerned two American citizens, Munaf and Omar, who had
voluntarily travelled to Iraq, and subsequently been detained by
Multinational Force Iraq (MNF–I) after allegedly committing crimes there.
Petitions for habeas corpus were filed on behalf of both men by family
members. In the lower courts, Omar had obtained a preliminary injunction
barring his transfer to Iraqi custody. Munaf’s petition had been dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court unanimously concluded that United States courts
had jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions filed on behalf of citizens such
as Munaf and Omar, who were held by American forces operating as part of
a multinational force. Both were in the immediate physical custody of
American forces answering only to the American chain of command. This
was enough to determine the issue of jurisdiction under the habeas corpus
statute.

Rather than remanding the case, the Supreme Court exceptionally
reached the merits of the petitions, noting that these cases “involve habeas
petitions that implicate sensitive foreign policy issues in the context of
ongoing military operations.” According to Chief Justice Roberts, Munaf
and Omar were effectively asking for court orders requiring the United
States to prevent their transfer to a sovereign government seeking to try
them for alleged crimes committed in its territory. Given that Iraq clearly
had the sovereign right to prosecute them for their alleged crimes, it was
inappropriate for United States courts to interfere. The fact that the
relevant criminal process might not comport with all American
constitutional guarantees, or that transfer to Iraqi custody might
hypothetically result in their torture, did not alter this position.

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157. *Id.* at 2273.
158. *Id.*
159. 553 U.S. 674 (2008).
160. *Id.* at 686–88.
161. *Id.* at 692.
162. *Id.* at 694–95.
163. *Id.* at 695.
164. See *id.* at 703 (noting that the Court, despite Munaf and Omar’s worry over
potential torture in Iraqi custody, refused to address the issue due to the issue’s absence in
The final Supreme Court decision discussed here, *Iqbal*, concerned a point of civil procedure. But its facts arose out of the early days after 9/11. The plaintiff, Javaid Iqbal, was a Pakistani national arrested on criminal charges and detained in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Subsequently, Iqbal filed suit against federal corrections officers and officials, including former Attorney General John Ashcroft, and FBI Director Robert Mueller.\textsuperscript{166}

More specifically, Iqbal’s claim alleged that he had been subjected to various forms of mistreatment during his time in custody in the Administrative Maximum Special Housing Unit (ADMAX SHU).\textsuperscript{167} In relation to Ashcroft and Mueller, Iqbal alleged that they had illegally classified him as being a person of high interest on account of his religion or national origin, and, in so doing, had violated the First and Fifth Amendments. Iqbal further alleged that his mistreatment at the ADMAX SHU was the result of a policy put in place and implemented by Ashcroft and Mueller.\textsuperscript{168}

Writing for a majority of five, Justice Kennedy stated that in order to succeed, Iqbal had to plead sufficient factual matter to show that Ashcroft and Mueller had adopted the detention policies in question for the purpose of discriminating on the basis of race, religion, or national origin.\textsuperscript{169} Justice Kennedy found that Iqbal’s complaint fell short of this standard. Several of Iqbal’s allegations were too conclusory and thus not entitled to be assumed true. Moreover, the factual allegations against Ashcroft and Mueller did not suggest an entitlement to relief because they did not plausibly show purposeful discrimination.\textsuperscript{170}

B. The House of Lords

*Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Rehman* was decided by the House of Lords right around the time of the 9/11 attacks. *Rehman* concerned a decision by the Home Secretary to deport a Pakistani national on national security grounds because of his association with an organization involved in terrorist activities on the Indian subcontinent.\textsuperscript{171}

\begin{thebibliography}{17}

\bibitem{165} Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
\bibitem{166} Id. at 1944.
\bibitem{167} Id. (“For instance, the complaint alleges that [Iqbal’s] jailors ‘kicked him in the stomach, punched him in the face, and dragged him across’ his cell without justification … subjected him to serial strip and body-cavity searches when he posed no safety risk to himself or others … and refused to let him and other Muslims pray because there would be ‘[n]o prayers for terrorists’.”).
\bibitem{168} Id.
\bibitem{169} Id. at 1948–49.
\bibitem{170} Id. at 1951–52.
\bibitem{171} Rehman, [2001] UKHL 47, [2003] 1 A.C. 153 (appeal taken from Eng.).
\end{thebibliography}
appealed to a specialist tribunal known as the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC).\(^{172}\) SIAC ruled that “national security” had to involve a threat targeted at the United Kingdom and that Rehman was not a threat to national security so defined.\(^{173}\) The House of Lords, however, disagreed with the narrow view of “national security” taken by SIAC, and emphasized that this was an area where the judiciary should defer to the views of the executive.\(^{174}\) This attitude was strikingly expressed by Lord Hoffmann:

I wrote this speech some three months before the recent events in New York and Washington. They are a reminder that in matters of national security, the cost of failure can be high. This seems to me to underline the need for the judicial arm of government to respect the decisions of ministers of the Crown on the question of whether support for terrorist activities in a foreign country constitutes a threat to national security. It is not only that the executive has access to special information and expertise in these matters. It is also that such decisions, with serious potential results for the community, require a legitimacy which can be conferred only by entrusting them to persons responsible to the community through the democratic process.\(^{175}\)

The first major legislative response to the 9/11 attacks was the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA), which contained a battery of new counter-terrorism powers. The most severe was the authorization of a system of indefinite detention for terrorist suspects.\(^{176}\) Prior to its eventual repeal, Part 4 of the ATCSA empowered the Home Secretary to certify a person a “suspected international terrorist” for the purposes of the ATCSA if the Home Secretary reasonably believed that the person’s presence in the United Kingdom was a risk to national security and


\(^{173}\) See Rehman, [2003] 1 A.C. at [4]–[6].

\(^{174}\) Id. at [26] (Lord Slynn) (“The Home Secretary] is undoubtedly in the best position to judge what national security requires even if his decision is open to review. The assessment of what is needed in the light of changing circumstances is primarily for him.”), at [28] (Lord Steyn) (“Even democracies are entitled to protect themselves, and the executive is the best judge of the need for international co-operation to combat terrorism and counter-terrorist strategies.”). See also Laurence Lustgarten, National Security, Terrorism and Constitutional Balance, 75 Pol. Q. 4, 11 (2004).

\(^{175}\) Rehman, [2003] 1 A.C. at [62].

suspected that the person was a “terrorist.”

In instances where legal or practical considerations barred the United Kingdom from removing a non–citizen certified as a suspected international terrorist, Section 23 of the ATCSA authorized indefinite detention. The Home Secretary’s certification decision could only be scrutinized in proceedings before SIAC, which could cancel a certification if it concluded that there were no reasonable grounds for suspecting the person to be a terrorist as defined in Section 21(1).

Part 4 of the ATCSA was controversial, not in the least because its indefinite detention regime plainly infringed Article 5 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms which protects the right to liberty and security of the person. Part 4 therefore required the British government to lodge a formal derogation from Article 5 in accordance with Article 15 of the ECHR.

Despite a number of different bodies recommending otherwise, the Blair Government persisted with indefinite detention under the ATCSA.

Sixteen persons suspected of various terrorism–related activities were certified by the Home Secretary and detained at Belmarsh Prison in London. Several detainees challenged the lawfulness of their detention.

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177. Anti–Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001 §§ 21(1), (2), (5). The term “terrorist” was itself broadly defined to include those involved in the commission of terrorist acts, members of international terrorist groups, and those with links with terrorist groups. See id. §§ 21(2), (4).

178. Typically, these cases arose where criminal prosecution was difficult, and where deportation was not feasible because of concerns that the certified person might be mistreated upon returning to his home country. See Chahal v. United Kingdom, 12 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. 413, 455 (1996) (holding that it violates Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights to deport or extradite a person where “substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person in question, if expelled, would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 in the receiving country.”).


December 2004, a majority of the House of Lords ruled that the ATCSA detention regime was incompatible with the ECHR in A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (also known as the Belmarsh case).\textsuperscript{186} Although there was a public emergency sufficient to warrant derogation under Article 15 of the ECHR, indefinite detention under Section 23 of the ATCSA was not strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, resulting in a breach of Article 5 of the ECHR.\textsuperscript{187} Additionally, the singling out of non–citizen terrorist suspects (but not citizen terrorist suspects) for detention amounted to discrimination in violation of Article 14.\textsuperscript{188} Accordingly, the House of Lords quashed the derogation order and declared Section 23 of the ATCSA incompatible with Articles 5 and 14 of the ECHR.\textsuperscript{189}

The House of Lords’ decision forced the Blair Government to alter its detention policy; part of this involved repealing Part 4 of the ATCSA, and replacing it with the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (PTA).\textsuperscript{190} The PTA created a new legislative framework for detention by empowering the Home Secretary to impose control orders upon both citizen and non-citizen terrorist suspects who have “involvement in terrorism-related activity.”\textsuperscript{191} A control order imposes certain restrictions on the liberty of its target, the controlee, in order to restrict or prevent involvement in terrorism-related activity. It is an offense to breach an obligation in a control order without reasonable excuse.\textsuperscript{192}

The PTA creates two types of control orders.\textsuperscript{193} “Derogating” control orders impose sufficiently onerous infringements on an individual’s liberty as to require derogation from Article 5 of the ECHR, and can only be

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{186} [2005] 2 A.C. 68.
\item \textsuperscript{187} Id. at [43] (Lord Bingham), [81] (Lord Nicholls), [132]–[133] (Lord Hope), [156] (Lord Scott), [189] (Lord Rodger), [231] (Baroness Hale).
\item \textsuperscript{188} Id. at [68] (Lord Bingham), [138] (Lord Hope), [159] (Lord Scott), [189] (Lord Rodger), [232] (Baroness Hale).
\item \textsuperscript{189} Id. at [73] (Lord Bingham), [85] (Lord Nicholls), [139] (Lord Hope), [160] (Lord Scott), [239] (Baroness Hale), [240] (Lord Carswell). See generally Adam Tomkins, Readings of A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, P.L. 259, 259–60 (2005); Conor Gearty, 11 September 2001, Counter-terrorism, and the Human Rights Act, 32 J.L.S. 18 (2005).
\item \textsuperscript{190} By March 2005, nine of the Belmarsh detainees had been released on strict bail conductions, leaving no one physically detained under Part 4 of the ATCSA. They were later made subject to control orders. See Clive Walker, Keeping Control of Terrorists Without Losing Control of Constitutionalism, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 1395, 1410 (2007) [hereinafter Walker, Keeping Control].
\item \textsuperscript{191} Prevention of Terrorism Act c. 2, § 1 (U.K.). Section 1(9) defines “terrorism-related activity”. Written ministerial statement on control orders: 11 June 2010 – 10 September 2010, http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/parliamentary-business/written-ministerial-statement/control-orders-sep2010-wms/(last visited Oct. 28, 2010) (“As of September 2010, there were nine control orders in force, all of which were in respect of British citizens.”).
\item \textsuperscript{192} Prevention of Terrorism Act § 9.
\item \textsuperscript{193} See generally Walker, Keeping Control, supra note 191 (discussing the control order regime comprehensively).
\end{itemize}
imposed by the High Court upon application by the Home Secretary.\textsuperscript{194} “Non-derogating” control orders impose specific combinations of restrictions upon individuals such as curfew, electronic tagging, searches of residences and other premises, restrictions on association, and restrictions on the use of telephones and the Internet.\textsuperscript{195} The Home Secretary may impose non-derogating control orders, although absent emergency, the High Court’s permission is required.\textsuperscript{196} The Home Secretary’s decision is then reviewed in a full hearing before the High Court.\textsuperscript{197}

Some of those who were made subject to non-derogating control orders (the controlees) brought litigation. There were two main grounds of challenge. The first was that the restrictions imposed by these non-derogating control orders were in fact so onerous as to amount to a deprivation of liberty in breach of Article 5 of the ECHR. In October 2007, a majority of the House of Lords held in \textit{Secretary of State for the Home Department v. JJ} that non-derogating control orders that included an eighteen hour curfew as part of their restrictions amounted to a deprivation of liberty, and were thus invalid as they could not be imposed by the Home Secretary under the terms of the PTA.\textsuperscript{198}

The second ground of challenge was based on the right to a fair hearing protected by Article 6 of the ECHR. This issue arose because the controlee was not entitled to see all of the factual material that underlay his or her particular control order. The PTA specifically authorizes procedural measures such as the non-disclosure of certain evidence, closed proceedings from which controlees and their lawyers are excluded,\textsuperscript{199} as well as the appointment of special advocates to represent controlees in the closed proceedings.\textsuperscript{200}

In \textit{Secretary of State for the Home Department v. MB}, a majority of the House of Lords gave a qualified endorsement to this scheme.\textsuperscript{201} The Lords emphasized that it was the fairness of the overall process that was important. The majority recognized the potential contribution of special advocates to fairness, but accepted that in certain cases the provision of a special advocate might not be sufficient to ensure compliance with Article

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{194} Prevention of Terrorism Act § 4.
\item \textsuperscript{195} Prevention of Terroristm Act § 1, [4].
\item \textsuperscript{196} \textit{Id.} at § 3, [1](a), (b). In cases where the Home Secretary does not have permission, the order must be immediately referred to court under § 3(3).
\item \textsuperscript{197} \textit{Id.} at § 3, [2](c), [6](b), [6](c).
\item \textsuperscript{198} \textit{Secretary of State for the Home Department v. JJ}, [2007] UKHL 45, [2007] 3 W.L.R. 642, [23]-[24] (appeal taken from Eng.).
\item \textsuperscript{199} Prevention of Terroristm Act sch, [4](2), [7]. \textit{See also} Civil Procedure (Amendment No 2) Rules 2005, 2005 S.I. 2005/656, rules 76.22–25, 76.28, 76.29.
\item \textsuperscript{200} \textit{See generally} John Ip, \textit{The Rise and Spread of the Special Advocate}, P.L. 717 (2008).
\item \textsuperscript{201} \textit{Secretary of State for the Home Department v. MB} [2007] UKHL 46, [2007] 3 W.L.R. 681 (appeal taken from Eng.).
\end{itemize}
6. In cases where a special advocate was not enough to ensure fairness, the majority held that Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 should be invoked to read down the relevant provisions of the PTA and its associated procedural regulations so that they only took effect where this was consistent with fairness. In a subsequent decision, Secretary of State for the Home Department v. AF, the House of Lords clarified that Article 6 required the disclosure of the core of the case against the controlee so that the controlee could adequately brief the special advocate.

The other part of the Blair Government’s post-Belmarsh detention strategy—a renewed effort at deportation by securing diplomatic assurances from foreign governments not to mistreat deported terrorist suspects—came under scrutiny in RB(Algeria) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department. The Home Secretary sought to deport three men—one Jordanian (Othman) and two Algerians (RB and U)—on national security grounds. All three contended that the Home Secretary could not take this action because this would result in their exposure to a real risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment in violation of Article 3 of the ECHR.

The British government had received specific diplomatic assurances from the respective governments that the returned men would not be subject to torture or other ill treatment. At first instance, SIAC held that the assurances from the respective foreign governments were sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article 3. The House of Lords unanimously upheld this decision on appeal. In effect, the House of Lords held that the assurances provided by the foreign governments in these cases meant that there were no substantial grounds for believing that the three men, if deported, would face a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3.

The House of Lords’ two other post-9/11 War on Terror decisions dealt with issues other than detention and deportation. One concerned whether SIAC could take into account evidence procured through torture perpetrated by foreign agents when hearing appeals against certification under the

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202. Id. at [35], [66], [85], [90].
203. Id. at [44], [72], [84], [92].
204. See Secretary of State for the Home Department v. AF, [2009] UKHL 28 (appeal taken from Eng.).
206. [2009] UKHL 10 (appeal taken from Eng.).
207. Id. at [1]. See generally Chahal, supra note 180.
208. RB(Algeria), supra note 207, at [106]–[108].
209. Id. at [25]–[35], [45]–[52].
210. Id. at [125]–[126] (Lord Phillips), [192]–[196] (Lord Hoffmann), [241] (Lord Hope), [254] (Lord Brown), [265] (Lord Mance).
211. Othman also argued that there were substantial grounds for believing his deportation would lead to him facing a real risk of flagrant violations of Articles 5 and 6 of the ECHR. SIAC rejected these claims as well. These conclusions were also upheld on appeal. Id. at [130]–[154] (Lord Phillips).
ATCSA detention regime.\footnote{212} SIAC, being a special tribunal, was not bound by the law of evidence.\footnote{213} By the time these proceedings reached the House of Lords, Part 4 of the ATCSA had already been repealed. However, the appeals were allowed to continue.\footnote{214} While conceding that evidence obtained through torture with the involvement or complicity of British officials would be inadmissible and an abuse of process,\footnote{215} the Home Secretary’s position was that the same did not apply to evidence obtained through torture by foreign agents. In \textit{A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (No. 2)} (the \textit{Torture} case), the House of Lords ruled unanimously that no British court (including SIAC) could rely on evidence that might have been procured through torture, regardless of the nationality of the torturer.\footnote{216} However, the Lords disagreed on the standard of proof to be met before this prophylactic rule applied. A majority of four ruled that it had to be established to the balance of probabilities that the evidence was obtained via torture.\footnote{217}

The other decision, \textit{R(Gillan) v. Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis},\footnote{218} concerned the power of a senior police officer under the Terrorism Act 2000 to authorize blanket, suspicion-less stops and searches in a given geographical area.\footnote{219} Such authorizations, when confirmed by the Home Secretary, could run for renewable periods of up to 28 days.\footnote{220} Once an authorization was in place, a police officer was permitted to stop and search any vehicle or pedestrian for items that could be used in connection with terrorism without any requirement of individualized suspicion of involvement in terrorist activity.\footnote{221} The two appellants in \textit{Gillan}, having been stopped and searched under these provisions, challenged their use. The House of Lords dismissed their appeals. The Law Lords held that the executive actors by the terms of the provisions had considerable latitude in employing this power. The House of Lords was untroubled by the repeated authorizations and their wide geographical scope, and found that the authorization and confirmation in question had been lawful.\footnote{222} The Law Lords also ruled that the exercise of the stop and search power did not

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\item \footnote{212} \textit{A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (No. 2)}, [2005] UKHL 71, 2006 2 A.C. 221 [8]–[9] (Lord Bingham) (appeal taken from Eng.) [hereinafter \textit{A v. Secretary of State (No. 2)}].
\item \footnote{213} Special Immigration Appeals Commission (Procedure) Rules 2003, S.I. 2003/1034, rule 44(3) (U.K.) [hereinafter Immigration Appeals Commission Rules].
\item \footnote{214} Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005 c. 2, § 16, [4] (U.K.).
\item \footnote{215} \textit{A v. Secretary of State (No. 2)}, [2006] 2 A.C. [66] (Lord Nicholls).
\item \footnote{216} \textit{A v. Secretary of State (No. 2)}, [2006] 2 A.C. 221.
\item \footnote{217} \textit{Id.} at [117]–[127] (Lord Hope), [145] (Lord Rodger), [156]–[158] (Lord Carswell), [172]–[173] (Lord Brown).
\item \footnote{218} [2006] UKHL 12, 2 A.C. 307 (appeal taken from Eng.) [hereinafter \textit{Gillan}].
\item \footnote{219} Terrorism Act, 2000 c. 11, §§ 44–47 (U.K.).
\item \footnote{220} \textit{Id.} at § 46(2)–46(4).
\item \footnote{221} \textit{Id.} at § 45.
\item \footnote{222} \textit{Gillan}, [2006] UKHL 12, 2 A.C. at [16]–[19] (Lord Bingham).
\end{itemize}
breach the relevant ECHR rights, including Article 5 as well as Article 8, which affirms the right to respect for private life.223

III. RECONCILING THE RECENT DECISIONS WITH THE CONVENTIONAL ACCOUNT

As discussed in Part I, the executive’s use of extraordinary powers during times of war or crisis has generally met with little judicial resistance in the United States and the United Kingdom. Since 9/11, despite familiar claims about the need for deference to the executive in matters of national security being made,224 this pattern does not appear to have repeated itself, at least not to the same extent, in the cases discussed in Part II. How can this phenomenon be reconciled with the conventional account of judicial behavior in times of war? Five possible explanations are discussed below.

A. A Break in the Historical Pattern of Judicial Deference

The first and most optimistic explanation from a civil libertarian standpoint is that there has been a break in the cycle of judicial acquiescence followed by post–fact regret and the resulting pattern of contraction and expansion of liberty. So has the post–9/11 period seen the emergence of judges willing to stand firm in the face of executive claims of national security, or in David Dyzenhaus’ terms, a “judicial ‘coalition of the willing’”?225

Discussing developments in several jurisdictions, including the two under consideration, Eyal Benvenisti discerns a clear contrast between the recent crop of judicial decisions and historical judicial behavior.226 Benvenisti argues that it is possible to now speak of a new era, where “executive unilateralism is being challenged by national courts in what could perhaps be a globally coordinated move.”227 Similarly, a number of

223. Id. at [21]–[29].

224. See, e.g., A v. Secretary of State (No. 1), [2005] 2 A.C. [37] (Lord Bingham) (“[The Attorney General] submitted as it was for Parliament and the executive to assess the threat facing the nation, so it was for those bodies and not the courts to judge the response necessary to protect the security of the public. . . . [M]atters of the kind in issue here fall within the discretionary area of judgment properly belonging to the democratic organs of the state. It was not for the courts to usurp authority properly belonging elsewhere.”). See also infra text accompanying notes 234–236; Eyal Benvenisti, Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses of Foreign and International Law by National Courts, 102 Am. J. Int’l L. 241, 253 (2008) [hereinafter Benvenisti, Reclaiming Democracy].


226. Benvenisti, Reclaiming Democracy, supra note 224, at 256. See also DAVID COLE & JULIUS LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE 264 (2007).

227. Eyal Benvenisti, United We Stand: National Courts Reviewing Counterterrorism Measures, in COUNTERTERRORISM: DEMOCRACY’S CHALLENGE 251, 254 (Andrea Bianchi & Alexis Keller eds., 2008) [hereinafter Benvenisti, United We Stand].
British commentators have highlighted the contrast between the robust review of the House of Lords in the Belmarsh case and the earlier case law exemplified by Liversidge.\textsuperscript{228}

The Supreme Court and the House of Lords have seemingly rebuffed a host of executive measures implemented in the name of national security since 9/11, so there appears to be some validity to this view. This section looks more closely at the support for the view that there has been a break in the cycle of judicial deference, and proposes several possible reasons why it might have occurred.

1. The United States

The conventional account of judicial behavior described above would suggest that the Supreme Court would subject the executive branch’s post-9/11 national security policies to minimal scrutiny. Yet the Court did not behave consistently with this prediction, and consistently rejected many of the arguments advanced by the government.

The Supreme Court’s 2004 decisions, for example, created a number of obstacles for the Bush Administration. This is probably least true of the Padilla decision, which as noted earlier, was decided on purely procedural grounds.\textsuperscript{229} This decision, together with a few other procedural machinations, ultimately allowed the Bush Administration to avoid a potentially adverse Supreme Court decision.\textsuperscript{230} The other two 2004 decisions posed more immediate problems for the Administration. Despite government claims that permitting judicial review would endanger national security,\textsuperscript{231} the majority in Rasul stymied the Bush Administration’s attempt

\textsuperscript{228} See Brice Dickson, Safe in Their Hands? Britain’s Law Lords and Human Rights, 26 L. STUD. 329, 339 (2006); Mary Arden, Human Rights in the Age of Terrorism, 121 L.Q.R. 604, 616-17 (2005); KAVANAGH, supra note 6, at 219.

\textsuperscript{229} See Padilla, 542 U.S. 426.

\textsuperscript{230} Padilla duly filed his case in South Carolina, where the District Court ordered him released. The Fourth Circuit overruled. In November 2005, shortly before a response to Padilla’s petition for a second Supreme Court hearing was due, the Bush Administration transferred Padilla into the civilian court system where he was later convicted at trial. Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the "War on Terror", 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1013, 1036–37 (2008).

\textsuperscript{231} In its Supreme Court brief, the Bush Administration claimed that:

[a]ny judicial review of the military’s operations at Guantanamo would directly intrude on those important intelligence-gathering operations. Moreover, any judicial demand that the Guantanamo detainees be granted access to counsel to maintain a habeas action would in all likelihood put an end to those operations—a result that not only would be very damaging to the military’s ability to win the war, but no doubt be “highly comforting to enemies of the United States.”

to insulate Guantánamo from judicial scrutiny. In the *Hamdi* litigation, the Administration again made bold claims of executive exclusivity in the national security arena. Although Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion did not go as far as some of the other opinions, it rejected these claims in the *Hamdi* decision’s most quotable sound–bite. But the rejection was not merely rhetorical. In holding that Hamdi must have some ability to challenge his designation as an enemy combatant, Justice O’Connor rejected the government’s claims that no further fact-finding into the circumstances of Hamdi’s capture was necessary, and that proper respect for the separation of powers deprived the individual of any individual process.

In the *Hamdan* litigation, the government made further claims of executive exclusivity. Indeed, in a brief to the D.C. Circuit, the government asserted that the mere fact litigation was possible was a potential danger to national security. Such claims fell on deaf judicial ears in the Supreme Court. *Hamdan* was another rebuke to the Bush Administration, and delayed (temporarily, as it turned out) the Administration’s plans for trying terrorist suspects by military commission.

Two aspects of the decision were particularly significant. First, the holding that CA3 of the Geneva Conventions applied to the conflict with al

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233. In the Supreme Court, the government contended that Hamdi’s status as an enemy combatant justified “holding him in the United States indefinitely—without formal charges or proceedings—unless and until it makes the determination that access to counsel or further process is warranted.” *Hamdi*, 542 U.S. at 510–11 (2004). The government also argued that “as long as a prisoner could challenge his enemy combatant designation when responding to interrogation during incommunicado detention he was accorded sufficient process to support his designation as an enemy combatant.” *Id.* at 540–41.

234. Justices Scalia and Stevens dissented and held that the detention of an American citizen could only be legal after a conviction for a criminal charge or where the writ of *habeas corpus* had been suspended. *Id.* at 554–79. Justices Souter and Ginsburg joined the plurality opinion so as to vacate the lower court opinion. However, they disagreed with Justice O’Connor’s conclusion that the AUMF impliedly authorized detention, and her suggestions about what might satisfy her due process framework for enemy combatants. *Id.* at 540–54. Only Justice Thomas accepted the government’s legal position in its entirety. *Id.* at 579–99.

235. *Hamdi*, 542 U.S. at 536 (“[A] state of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens.”).

236. *Id.* at 526.

237. *Id.* at 527.

238. See Brief for Appellants at 12, *Hamdan v. Rumsfeld*, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005), available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/nkk/documents/hamdan-opening-brief2.pdf (“By permitting captured enemies to continue their fight in our courts, the district court’s holding threatens to undermine the President’s power to subdue those enemies.”).

 Qaeda had significant ramifications for the interrogation and treatment of detainees because of CA3’s prohibition on the mistreatment of detainees.\textsuperscript{240} Second, \textit{Hamdan} had wider significance because it repudiated the idea that the President had constitutional \textit{carte blanche} in prosecuting the War on Terror, even in the face of constraining legislation.\textsuperscript{241} The decision thus reaffirmed the principle that even the President, the Commander–in–Chief in wartime, was constrained by law.\textsuperscript{242}

The reaction of the political branches to \textit{Hamdan}, namely the MCA, set the stage for a further confrontation in \textit{Boumediene}, where the Court ruled that Guantánamo detainees had the constitutional right to seek habeas corpus and that the MCA was an unconstitutional suspension of that right.\textsuperscript{243}

As David Cole observes, the Court defied the predictions of the conventional account once more:

For the first time in its history, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a law enacted by Congress and signed by the president on an issue of military policy in a time of armed conflict. While the Court has on rare occasions found that presidents exceeded their powers where they acted \textit{contrary} to congressional will during wartime . . . this decision went much further, upending the joint decision of the political branches acting together on a military matter during a time of military conflict.\textsuperscript{244}

\textbf{2. The United Kingdom}

The contrast between the conventional account and the apparently robust post–9/11 stance of the House of Lords has been widely noted by academic commentators.\textsuperscript{245} The centerpiece of this new approach is the \textit{Belmarsh}...
decision, in which a majority of eight Law Lords ruled against the government. 246 Lord Hoffmann, in an apparent turnaround from his earlier paean to deference in Rehman, held that the situation faced by the United Kingdom was not a public emergency threatening the life of the nation, meaning that derogation under Article 15 of the ECHR was unjustified:

Terrorist violence, serious as it is, does not threaten our institutions of government or our existence as a civil community. . . . The real threat to the life of the nation, in the sense of a people living in accordance with its traditional laws and political values, comes not from terrorism but from laws such as these. That is the true measure of what terrorism may achieve. 247

The other seven Law Lords in the majority decided the case on the basis that even though derogation was justified under Article 15, the measures taken were not strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. 248 In so ruling, these Law Lords proved willing to scrutinize decisions taken for the purposes of national security. 249

The exceptionality of the Belmarsh decision has been widely noted. It was, as Adam Tomkins described, “an extremely rare example of a British court overturning the government’s view of what was necessary in the interests of national security.” 250 Conor Gearty expressed a similar view: “[t]he speeches of these eight senior judges amount collectively to what is


247. A v. Secretary of State (No. 1), [2005] 2 A.C. [96]–[97].

248. See supra text accompanying notes 187–189.

249. See, e.g., A v. Secretary of State (No. 1), [2005] 2 A.C. [164] (Lord Rodger), [226] (Baroness Hale). See also Shah, Skirmish, supra note 185, at 416–17.

250. Adam Tomkins, Readings of A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, P.L. 259, 259 (2005); see also David Feldman, Proportionality and Discrimination in Anti-Terrorism Legislation, 64 C.L.J. 271, 272 (2005) (describing the decision as unprecedented in that it examined “the legitimacy of measures adopted in good faith on national security grounds.”). Even the ultimately skeptical Keith Ewing stated that “[t]he decision is perhaps the most important decision since Entick v. Carrington (1765), not only for the fact that the House of Lords stood up so convincingly to the Executive but also for their manner of doing so.” Keith Ewing, The Futility of the Human Rights Act – A Long Footnote, 37 BRACTON L.J. 41, 42 (2005).
the finest assertion of civil liberties that has emerged from a British court since at least *Entick v Carrington.*\(^{251}\)

In addition to the Belmarsh case, the House of Lords proved willing to scrutinize the executive on matters of national security in its decisions concerning control orders\(^{252}\) and the use of evidence obtained through torture.\(^{253}\) The outcomes of these recent War on Terror cases has led David Bonner to conclude that there has been a change: the historical judicial approach of deference in matters of national security, and being “at times more executive-minded than the executive,” has been consigned to the past.\(^{254}\)

### 3. Causes

David Dyzenhaus offers two explanations for the historical record of judicial deference during times of emergency. The first is that judges defer because of a lack of courage; the second is that judges defer out of prudence.\(^{255}\) If Dyzenhaus is right about this, then what has happened to this lack of judicial courage or excess of prudence? The next section outlines three related causes for this change in judicial approach.

#### a. Social Learning

Mark Tushnet argues that a political community can learn from the mistakes of the past through a process he terms social learning. A draconian policy implemented by the executive in the name of national security may be accepted at the time, even by the courts. However, once an emergency is over, the reflection that takes place after the fact comes to the conclusion that the policy was unjustified, and that the judicial acceptance of it was wrong.\(^{256}\) The outcome of this process is that society, and particularly its

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251. Conor Gearty, *Human Rights in an Age of Counter-Terrorism: Injurious, Irrelevant or Indispensable?*, 58 C.L.P. 25, 37 (2005) [hereinafter Gearty, *Human Rights*]. *See also* Feldman, *supra* note 251, at 273 (“For all these reasons . . . the decision, perhaps the most powerful judicial defence of liberty since *Leach v. Money* (1765) 3 Burr. 1692 and *Somersett v. Stewart* (1772) 20 St. Tr. 1, will long remain a benchmark in public law.”); Mary Arden, *Meeting the Challenge of Terrorism: The Experience of English and Other Courts*, 80 A.L.J. 818, 824 (2006). (“It must be one of the first times that the courts of the United Kingdom have dealt such a body blow to legislation enacted by Parliament to confer powers on the Executive to meet a threat to national security.”).


256. Tushnet, *Defending Korematsu?*, *supra* note 26, at 125.
courts, become more circumspect over time when faced with similar claims.257

Knowing that government officials in the past have exaggerated threats to national security or have taken actions that were ineffective with respect to the threats that there actually were, we have become increasingly skeptical about contemporary claims regarding those threats, with the effect that the scope of proposed government responses to threats has decreased.258

This dynamic can be seen clearly in relation to Korematsu.259 Rather than lying around like a “loaded weapon” as Justice Jackson feared,260 Korematsu instead lies around as a salutary warning to society and as a kind of anti–precedent for the courts.261 Several members of the current Supreme Court have disapproved of it.262 The Court itself has never approved its result again.263 The words of Judge Marilyn Patel, who granted Korematsu’s writ of coram nobis and vacated his wartime conviction some forty years later, sum up the historical verdict on the decision:

Korematsu remains on the pages of our legal and political history. As a legal precedent it is now recognized as having very limited application. As historical precedent it stands as a constant caution that in times of war or declared military necessity our institutions must be vigilant in protecting constitutional guarantees. It stands as a caution that in times of distress the shield of military necessity and national security must not be used to protect governmental actions from close scrutiny and accountability. It stands as a caution that in times of international hostility and antagonisms our institutions, legislative, executive and judicial, must be prepared to exercise their authority to protect all citizens from the petty fears and prejudices that are so easily aroused.264

257. Id. See also Thomas Poole, Harnessing the Power of the Past? Lord Hoffmann and the Belmarsh Detainees Case, 32 J.L.S. 534, 543 (2005). See Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?, supra note 25, at 132 (pointing out that the process of social learning may be imperfect).
259. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
260. Id. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
261. Cole, Judging the Next Emergency, supra note 4, at 2575 (“In short, Korematsu has not proved to be the ‘loaded weapon’ that Justice Jackson feared. To the contrary, it has served as an object lesson in what the Court and the government ought not do in future crisis.”) (emphasis omitted); Shira A. Scheindlin & Matthew L. Schwartz, With All Due D eference: Judicial Responsibility in a Time of Crisis, 32 Hofstra L. Rev. 795, 841 (2004) (“[T]he decisions made in wartime have not withstood the test of time. Every law student knows, Korematsu is a major embarrassment.”).
Explicit (and perhaps oblique) references to *Korematsu* appear in some of the post–9/11 decisions discussed in this Article, indicating at least an awareness of the mistakes of history. Justice O’Connor’s *Hamdi* opinion seems to allude to *Korematsu* when it discusses the dangers of an “unchecked system of detention” in light of “history and common sense.” Later in the opinion, when arguing that military needs coexist with judicial scrutiny, Justice O’Connor specifically cites Justice Murphy’s dissent in *Korematsu*. Similarly, Justice Souter’s opinion references *Korematsu* and the “cautionary example of the internments in World War II” in the course of discussing whether there was legal authority to detain Hamdi. That *Korematsu* should be cited in *Hamdi* is not entirely surprising given the broad historical parallels in the subject matter. Additionally, in a powerful symbolic move, Fred Korematsu himself filed an amicus brief in the *Hamdi* and *Rasul* cases.

Perhaps more surprisingly, Judge Patel’s retrospective verdict on *Korematsu* appears in a part of Lord Bingham’s *Belmarsh* judgment that discusses the importance of maintaining judicial supervision even in times of crisis, suggesting that its anti–precedential quality may not be limited to the United States. In addition, Lord Hoffmann’s *Belmarsh* judgment draws on similar historical lessons from closer to home:

There have been times of great national emergency in which habeas corpus has been suspended and powers to detain on suspicion conferred on the government. It happened during the Napoleonic Wars and during both World Wars in the twentieth century. These powers were conferred with great misgiving and, in the sober light of retrospect after the emergency had passed, were often found to have been cruelly and unnecessarily exercised.


266. *Id.* at 535 (“While we accord the greatest respect and consideration to the judgments of military authorities in matters relating to the actual prosecution of a war, and recognize that the scope of that discretion necessarily is wide, it does not infringe on the core role of the military for the courts to exercise their own time-honored and constitutionally mandated roles of reviewing and resolving claims like those presented here. Cf. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 233-34 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting).”).


269. *A v. Secretary of State (No. 1)*, [2005] 2 A.C. [41].

270. *Id.* at [89].
In sum, the social learning thesis suggests that the more skeptical and non–deferential approach evident in the Supreme Court and the House of Lords since 9/11 is the result of the courts paying heed to the lessons of the past, and being conscious of the need to avoid repeating their judicial predecessors’ acquiescence in executive measures that later proved excessive.

b. The Rise of Civil Society

David Cole and Jules Lobel advance an explanation based on the existence of an increasingly strong civil society, including human rights groups, civil liberties groups, the domestic and foreign media, and foreign governments. Cole and Lobel argue that the actions of these entities in scrutinizing and criticizing aspects of American counter-terrorism policy have “given the courts a stronger backbone than they have ever shown in confronting the executive in a time of crisis on national security matters.”

Many of these groups brought their views directly to the Supreme Court’s attention by filing amicus briefs in support of the detainees in the major detention cases. Similarly, in the United Kingdom, the human rights organizations Liberty and Justice have been prominent both in the public arena and as intervening parties in most of the major cases before the House of Lords.

An interesting transnational manifestation of this phenomenon is the criticism of detention at Guantánamo Bay by British judges both inside and outside the courtroom. In R(on the application of Abbasi and another) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and another, the English Court of Appeal considered the situation of Abbasi, a British citizen detained by the United States at Guantánamo Bay. Abbasi’s lawyers sought to compel the British Foreign Office to take action on his behalf. They were unsuccessful, but the decision is notable for the message the Court appeared to send to its judicial brethren in the United States:

272. COLE & LOBEL, supra note 226, at 264.
275. With the exception of Rehman and Gillan, at least one of Liberty, Justice, or in some cases Amnesty International, intervened in the House of Lords cases discussed in this article.
The position of detainees at Guantanamo Bay is to be considered further by the appellate courts in the United States. It may be that the anxiety that we have expressed will be drawn to their attention. We wish to make it clear that we are only expressing an anxiety that we believe was felt by the [District Court] in Rasul. As is clear from our judgment, we believe that the United States courts have the same respect for human rights as our own.277

Likewise, Lord Steyn, speaking extra–judicially at a lecture at Lincoln’s Inn, made a sustained critique of the detention of terrorist suspects at Guantánamo Bay and the plans to try certain detainees before military commissions. He called for the United States to live up to its professed values, and made none–too–subtle reminders that the eyes of the international community were watching.278 It was, as Dyzenhaus observes, a suggestion that the Supreme Court “put [its] rule–of–law house in order.”279

The reaction of civil society since 9/11 certainly provides a marked contrast to the reaction to, for example, the Japanese internment in World War II.280 In the end, it is obviously difficult to ascertain the extent to which the activities of these various facets of civil society affected the judges concerned. But wider public awareness and scrutiny surely cannot have hurt the cause of litigants seeking redress from the courts.

c. Changes in the Law

A third cause relates to the great changes to the law that have occurred since World War II, particularly the development of international human rights and the law of armed conflict. The impact of legal change is especially apparent in relation to the Bush Administration’s attempts to try terrorist suspects by military commission. These military commissions, as noted earlier, were established by the Presidential Order of November 13, 2001.281 This Order was modelled on Roosevelt’s Order that established the

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277.  Id. at [107] (emphasis added).
279.  Dyzenhaus, supra note 4, at 169. See Steyn, supra note 278, at 1-3 (discussing Lord Steyn’s cautionary examples: the historical record of excessive measures taken by democracies during crises and the record of judicial oversight, both exemplified by the Liversidge and Korematsu decisions). This is consistent with the social learning thesis. See also Poole, supra note 257, at 550.
280.  See Daniels, supra note 267, at 162–64 (describing the general lack of public protest about the internment, and the inactivity of the media and groups traditionally devoted to protecting civil liberties). See also Frank H. Wu, Profiling in the Wake of September 11: The Precedent of the Japanese American Internment, 17 CRIM. JUST. 52, 53 (2002).
commissions unsuccessfully challenged in *Quirin*. However, President Bush’s Order received much more criticism. Bradford Berenson, a lawyer in the White House at the time, later discussed the decision to follow the *Quirin* precedent: “[t]he legal foundation was very strong. F.D.R.’s [O]rder establishing military commissions had been upheld by the Supreme Court. This was almost identical. What we underestimated was the extent to which the culture had shifted beneath us since World War Two.”

Certainly, there have been major cultural changes in the sixty odd years since World War II, including greater skepticism of government and of unconstrained executive power—the consequence of events such as the Vietnam War and Watergate. Additionally, there have been developments in American law since World War II, including significant changes to constitutional criminal procedure, as well as courts–martial and military justice. This alone would have made the reliance upon the 1942 *Quirin* precedent a risky proposition. Moreover, quite apart from changes to American domestic law, the international legal arena also shifted (to say the least) over the same period of time. A large part of this shift was the post-war establishment of the system of international human rights.

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287. See *Fisher*, supra note 38, at 256.

288. Id. at 255.

289. Cole, *Rights over Borders*, supra note 244, at 52 (“These increasingly confident judicial assertions of authority in turn reflect global transformations in international law since the end of World War II, including most significantly international human rights law.”); Bonner, supra note 66, at 347. See also Steyn, supra note 278, at 5–6.


The basic idea of human rights, namely that people have certain entitlements by virtue of their humanity, has an obvious transnational appeal. It therefore provides an obvious normative standpoint from which to critique counterterrorism policy. The constituents of the civil society discussed earlier—(most obviously) human rights groups, the media, foreign governments, as well as both the English Court of Appeal in *Abassi*293 and Lord Steyn294—have all employed the discourse of human rights in this way.

Allied with the establishment and development of human rights law were advancements in the law of armed conflict. The end of World War II saw the adoption of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949,295 which have since gained universal acceptance.296 These were followed in 1977 by the first and second Additional Protocols,297 although they have not been ratified by the United States.298 These developments in the law, which included the creation of Common Article 3 and its requirement of trial before a regularly constituted court, proved especially important in *Hamdan*.299

As far as the United Kingdom is concerned, the most important legal development has been the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights into the United Kingdom’s domestic law via the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA).300 In the United Kingdom, legal rights were traditionally sourced in the common law rather than in a formal bill of


294. See generally Steyn, *supra* note 278.


299. *Hamdan*, 548 U.S. at 630–34. See also *id.* at 633 (where a plurality of the Court found Article 75 of Additional Protocol I to be declaratory of many of the “trial protections that have been recognized by customary international law.”).

This changed somewhat with the entry into force of the ECHR in 1953, and the acceptance of the individual right to petition the European Court of Human Rights in 1966. However, it was not until October 2000, with the coming into force of the HRA, that ECHR rights became domestically enforceable in the United Kingdom.

The HRA is essentially a statutory bill of rights that provides for a soft form of judicial review of legislation: Section 3 of the Act requires that all legislation must be given effect to in a way that is consistent with the ECHR, “so far as it is possible to do so.” While the HRA was undoubtedly a significant constitutional development, the extent to which it has made a difference to human rights protection in the United Kingdom remains contested. The position taken here is that the HRA has made a difference in cases concerning national security and human rights in two ways.

First, the HRA led to the establishment of a new parliamentary committee, the Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR), which is tasked with reporting on human rights in the United Kingdom. Among its activities is the checking of legislation for compliance with ECHR rights. Consequently, since 9/11, the JCHR has issued many highly detailed reports on different aspects of counterterrorism law and policy. Its reports are relied on by other human rights groups, members of Parliament as well as the courts. Significantly, in the Belmarsh case, Lord Bingham drew upon the

301. Bonner, supra note 66, at 347.
302. Id.
303. Fenwick, supra note 300, at 141.
304. McGoldrick, supra note 245, at 115. The right to petition the European Court of Human Rights remains available upon the exhaustion of domestic remedies. This has proved significant in several War on Terror cases. The Court’s decision of A v. United Kingdom, (2009) 49 ECHR 625 (Grand Chamber) was the Strasbourg sequel to the Belmarsh case. This decision directly influenced the decision of House of Lords in AF. See, e.g., Secretary of State for the Home Department v. AF [2009] UKHL 28, at [64]–[65] (Lord Phillips), [70]–[74] (Lord Hoffmann), [98] (Lord Rodger). See also Gillan & Quinton v. United Kingdom, (2010) ECHR 45 (ruling that the stop and search power under Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 breached Article 8 of the ECHR, which ensures respect for private life). This decision of the ECtHR resulted in the suspension of the use of Section 44. See Home Office Media Centre, Changes to Police Search Powers, July 8, 2010, available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/media-centre/news/changes-use-stop-search.
305. Human Rights Act § 3.
309. Id. at 119.
work of the JCHR, as well as the Newton Committee, a body which had been set up especially to review the ATCSA. The support provided by the work of these bodies may be part of the explanation for the apparent change from the traditional deferential scrutiny applied in cases concerning national security.

Second, the HRA has made a difference by elevating the judiciary as an institution, and giving it a firm mandate to act in cases involving human rights. This is evident in Lord Bingham’s response in the Belmarsh case to the Attorney General’s claim that it was for the political branches to assess both the gravity of the threat facing the nation, and what measures might be appropriate in response; such issues, in the Attorney General’s submission, fell within the purview of the democratically elected branches of the state. Lord Bingham stated that he did not accept the full extent of the Attorney General’s claim:

I do not in particular accept the distinction which he drew between democratic institutions and the courts. It is of course true that the judges in this country are not elected and are not answerable to Parliament. It is also of course true . . . that Parliament, the executive and the courts have different functions. But the function of independent judges charged to interpret and apply the law is universally recognised as a cardinal feature of the modern democratic state, a cornerstone of the rule of law itself. The Attorney General is fully entitled to insist on the proper limits of judicial authority, but he is wrong to stigmatise judicial decision-making as in some way undemocratic. It is particularly inappropriate in a case such as the present in which Parliament has expressly legislated in section 6 of the 1998 Act to render unlawful any act of a public authority, including a court, incompatible with a Convention right, has required courts (in section 2) to take account of relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence, has (in section 3) required courts, so far as possible, to give effect to Convention rights and has conferred a right of appeal on derogation issues. . . . The 1998 Act gives the courts a very specific, wholly democratic, mandate.

This suggests that the HRA has been important at the institutional level: by giving the courts a much stronger sense of constitutional mandate on

310. A v. Secretary of State (No. 1), [2005] 2 A.C. [23], [64]-[65] (Lord Bingham).
312. Discussing the recent decisions of the House of Lords as well as the Israeli High Court, Benvenisti argues that “the ‘human rights revolution’ did ultimately matter. Its real impact was, however, institutional rather than substantive: although the pull of the rights rhetoric elevated also societal interests to the status of individual rights and therefore essentially levelled the playing field between the competing rights, it also reallocated the authority to weigh these interests by transferring them from the political branches to the courts.” See Benvenisti, United We Stand, supra note 227, at 268.
313. A v. Secretary of State (No. 1), [2005] 2 A.C. [37].
314. Id. at [42].
which to act, the HRA has likely contributed to the overcoming of the traditional judicial reluctance to act in cases concerning national security.  

d. Executive Excesses

Brian Simpson has described the traditional judicial attitude towards executive power in wartime as being subject to the “Reading Presumption of Executive Innocence.”  

Named for Lord Reading, this is the presumption that the executive “will act honestly and that its powers will be reasonably exercised.” The final cause then, is executive action that is sufficiently egregious to overcome this presumption. In the years after 2001, certain actions on the part of both the Bush Administration and the Blair Government may have been sufficiently egregious to make the judges reluctant to completely trust the good faith of the executive.

The Bush Administration took extreme positions in habeas corpus litigation in an attempt to exclude the possibility of judicial scrutiny over the detention of terrorist suspects. However, the Administration’s claims of exclusive and unreviewable authority over detention may have been undermined by its own overbroad detention policy, particularly as more and more accounts of erroneous detention emerged. The Administration did not help itself by setting up the cursory Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) review process in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 2004 decisions. Between July 30, 2004 and January 12, 2005, CSRTs confirmed the enemy combatant status of 520 out of 558 detainees. In practice, the combination of non-disclosure of evidence, the presumption in favor of the government’s evidence, and the acceptance of hearsay evidence

315. See Bonner, supra note 66, at 29; Kavanagh, supra note 246, at 299–300.
317. Id. at 29.
318. See Devins, supra note 271, at 498–99 (noting examples from Supreme Court litigation that indicate “the [Bush] [A]dministration sought to negate any judicial role in policing presidential war making”).
321. CSRTs consisted of panels of military officers that decided whether “a preponderance of evidence” supported the detention of a detainee as an enemy combatant. A CSRT could consider hearsay evidence. There is also a presumption that the government’s evidence was “genuine and accurate.” Detainees had no access to any classified material. See Memorandum from Gordon England, Secretary of the Navy, on Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, for distribution (July 29, 2004), http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040730comb.pdf.
put the detainees at a great disadvantage, and reduced the CSRT process to a *pro forma* affair.\(^{323}\) Indeed, there is speculation that it was a highly critical affidavit from intelligence officer Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Abraham, based on his experience of the CSRT process, which led the Supreme Court to reverse its initial decision to refuse certiorari in *Boumediene*.\(^{324}\)

The Bush Administration’s treatment of those it detained also likely undermined its position before the Supreme Court. The first photographs from Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq became public on the evening after the Supreme Court had heard the cases of *Hamdi* and *Padilla*, and one week after *Rasul* had been heard.\(^{325}\) In the oral argument for *Padilla*, Justice Ginsburg had even questioned then–Deputy Solicitor General Clement about whether anything would prevent the President from authorizing torture. Clement replied that this was unthinkable because the executive branch of the United States did not do such things.\(^{326}\) It is hard to suppose that the pictures from Abu Ghraib could have been far from the Justices’ minds when they were considering the Bush Administration’s claims of exclusive executive competence in national security matters. While there is no express mention of Abu Ghraib in any of the 2004 decisions, portions of those decisions, as Jenny Martinez observes, seem to be driven by concerns about the coercive interrogation and mistreatment of detainees.\(^{327}\) Justice O’Connor’s *Hamdi* opinion, for example, contains a reference to the AUMF definitely not authorizing “indefinite detention for the purpose of interrogation.”\(^{328}\) Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion in *Padilla* is also unequivocal in rejecting detention for the purpose of interrogation.\(^{329}\) However, Martinez contends that it was the *Rasul* decision that was the

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\(^{325}\) Martinez, supra note 230, at 1050.


\(^{327}\) Martinez, supra note 230, at 1051.

\(^{328}\) *Hamdi*, 542 U.S. at 521.

\(^{329}\) *Padilla*, 542 U.S. at 465 (Stevens, J., dissenting)(“Executive detention of subversive citizens, like detention of enemy soldiers to keep them off the battlefield, may sometimes be justified to prevent persons from launching or becoming missiles of destruction. It may not, however, be justified by the naked interest in using unlawful procedures to extract information. Incommunicado detention for months on end is such a procedure. Whether the information so procured is more or less reliable than that acquired by more extreme forms of torture is of no consequence. For if this Nation is to remain true to the ideals symbolized by its flag, it must not wield the tools of tyrants even to resist an assault by the forces of tyranny.”).
most affected by Abu Ghraib: the majority’s facially expansive approach to jurisdiction was “a signal to the executive branch about the possibility of judicial review of interrogation practices in far-flung places.”

By the time Hamdan was argued in the Supreme Court in 2006, more damaging material was in the public domain. The notorious Bybee/Yoo memorandum had been leaked in June 2004. This proved to be just one of many memoranda documenting and justifying the use of coercive interrogation. By 2005, reports of secret CIA prisons and extraordinary rendition emerged. In December 2005, there was the revelation that President Bush had authorized the National Security Agency to eavesdrop on Americans outside the parameters prescribed by statute. Many of these policies rested upon the same expansive theory of Presidential power advanced in litigation by the Bush Administration. That the Supreme Court rejected this theory in Hamdan was thus significant, but at the same time, perhaps unsurprising.

The Blair Government’s example of excess centered around the dossier of pre-war intelligence on Iraq that was allegedly given a “sexing up.” Then–Prime Minister Tony Blair presented the information in the dossier to Parliament in September 2002. Among his claims were that Saddam Hussein had the capability to launch weapons of mass destruction in forty–five minutes. This claim became central to Blair’s case for supporting the American-led Iraq war. The forty–five minute claim was later disavowed, eventually leading to a public inquiry into the intelligence on Iraq that was critical of the intelligence services. Both David Bonner and Conor Gearty suggest that the scandal over the intelligence on Iraq and weapons of mass destruction may have led to greater skepticism about the Government’s national security claims. This “fiasco” receives an explicit mention in Lord Hoffmann’s Belmarsh judgment. Lord Scott, who had some

330. Martinez, supra note 230, at 1051.
331. See Johnson, supra note 232, at 456–62.
333. See Bybee, supra note 241.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Bonner, supra note 66, at 30; Gearty, Human Rights, supra note 251, at 39 (referring to the “corrosive effect on confidence of the spurious WMD intelligence in Iraq.”).
familiarity with the world of intelligence, makes the point even more clearly:

It is certainly true that the judiciary must in general defer to the executive’s assessment of what constitutes a threat to national security or to “the life of the nation”. But judicial memories are no shorter than those of the public and the public have not forgotten the faulty intelligence assessments on the basis of which United Kingdom forces were sent to take part, and are still taking part, in the hostilities in Iraq.

B. The Conventional Account is Incorrect or Incomplete

Some commentators have argued that, although there is a wealth of historical evidence that supports the conventional account, civil liberties are not invariably infringed during wartime, and that there have been historical instances of courts protecting civil liberties during times of emergency or perceived emergency. If this alternative account is correct, then there is less difficulty in accommodating the non–deferential decisions of the Supreme Court and the House of Lords since 9/11.

However, some of the Supreme Court decisions that are said to support the alternative account are, for varying reasons, problematic. Some decisions were actually made after the war or crisis was over. A small number were decided in media res. For instance, in 1943, the Supreme Court took a firm stance against mandatory displays of allegiance toward the flag in *West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.* In doing so, the Court overruled *Minersville v. Gobitis,* its own decision from just three years prior in which it had upheld the expulsion of Jehovah’s Witness children for refusing to salute the flag. At the time of the decision, World War II was certainly ongoing, but as Michal Belknap notes, the case hardly presented “even an apparent threat to the war effort.”

Then there is the canonical Korean War–era *Youngstown* decision, in which the Court ruled that President Truman’s Executive Order directing seizure of steel mills when confronted with the prospect of a steelworkers’
strike was unconstitutional.\textsuperscript{348} Truman’s order was framed in military terms, and warned that a strike would hinder the war effort and thereby impair national security.\textsuperscript{349} That said, \textit{Youngstown} did not directly concern national security policy as such. Alternatively, \textit{Youngstown} may be an example of an exception to the rule, the result of a perfect storm of political and legal circumstances.\textsuperscript{350}

The \textit{Pentagon Papers} decision, in which the Court ruled against the government in its attempt to enjoin the publication of a secret study on the involvement of the United States in Vietnam, is another possible exception.\textsuperscript{351} As Geoffrey Stone argues, “[i]n the \textit{Pentagon Papers} decision, the Supreme Court, for the first time in American history, stood tall—in wartime—for the First Amendment.”\textsuperscript{352} At the same time, however, Stone acknowledges that the study was probably more an embarrassment than a threat to national security: it was at that time already three years old, concerned a prior administration’s actions, and disclosed no military plans.\textsuperscript{353} So once again, this decision did not represent a direct challenge to the executive branch’s national security policies.

The most that could be said, as far as the United States is concerned, is that there is perhaps the odd anomalous decision. At most this requires a slight qualification of the conventional account: in wartime and during crises, the courts defer to the executive in the great majority of cases concerning national security.\textsuperscript{354} Still, the number of post–9/11 decisions that seem to qualify as anomalies is considerably greater than the number of earlier decisions that might qualify. This would suggest that other factors are at work.

In the case of the United Kingdom, the pattern of historical judicial deference in wartime and crisis is even stronger; one struggles to find any historical examples of judicial resistance in national security cases,\textsuperscript{355} which

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{348} Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Block, supra note 18, at 487–88.
\item \textsuperscript{349} Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, \textit{The Steel Seizure Case: One of a Kind?}, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 63, 65 (2002).
\item \textsuperscript{350} \textit{Id.} at 71–75.
\item \textsuperscript{351} \textit{See} N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
\item \textsuperscript{352} Stone, supra note 10, at 519.
\item \textsuperscript{353} \textit{Id.} at 518.
\item \textsuperscript{354} \textit{See}, e.g., Cole, \textit{Judging the Next Emergency}, supra note 4, at 2594 (“[T]he historical record does not demonstrate that courts will inevitably fold under the pressure of emergencies, but only that they will often do so.”) (emphasis omitted).
\item \textsuperscript{355} \textit{See} \textsc{Lustgarten} & \textsc{Leigh}, supra note 3, at 320 (“[A]nyone taking even a tally-sheet approach to judicial decisionmaking must be struck by the consistency of results in the cases . . . in virtually all of them the executive emerged victorious. Statistical randomness cannot explain so striking a pattern, and it is highly unlikely that all the unsuccessful litigants were asserting fanciful claims or suffered from poor representation.”); \textsc{Turpin} & \textsc{Tompkins}, supra note 117, at 756 (“Courts in the United Kingdom have traditionally been notoriously weak in upholding civil liberties in the face of government claims to national security. This is
makes many of the decisions of the House of Lords since 9/11, such as the Belmarsh decision, seem even more anomalous.

C. The Passage of Time

As alluded to in the previous section, there are instances of the courts behaving in a non–deferential manner on matters of national security either right at the end of or after a war or crisis. This indicates that the point in time when a case reaches the court may be important: a challenge is most likely to succeed when the war or crisis is over, and normality has returned. For example, the Supreme Court’s Milligan decision is sometimes thought of as a landmark civil liberties decision, but it was decided after the Civil War had concluded, and after President Lincoln’s death.

The same pattern is discernible in Duncan v. Kahanamoku. Martial law had persisted in Hawaii for three years until President Roosevelt revoked it in 1944. Martial law had included the trial of civilians before military tribunals. The Court observed that although the Hawaiian Organic Act, on which the government relied, permitted the Governor to invoke martial law, there was no explicit legislative authorization to close the civilian courts and supplant them with military tribunals for an extended period. Accordingly, a majority of the Court ruled that the trials complained of were illegal, and the imprisoned civilians were entitled to be released. But the case was only argued at the end of 1945; the Court’s decision was only made after martial law had already been ended and after the war was over. The answer might have been different had the case come before the Court during the war.

By contrast, Quirin was argued in July 1942. This was during the Battle of the Atlantic, when German U–boats were attacking American sailors and merchantmen in American waters. Similarly, the internments in the United Kingdom under Regulation 18B occurred in the middle of 1940, a period when France was falling to the Nazis and Britain was being bombed on a nightly basis. Liversidge v. Anderson was heard in September of
1941, and decided two months later. At that time, Europe was in the hands of Nazi Germany, which had recently invaded Russia. The United States had yet to join the war.

However, the passage of time is not always a guarantee of success. The Court’s decisions concerning allegedly subversive speech in World War I were decided after the war’s conclusion. Similarly, Korematsu was argued in October 1944 and decided two months later. Although World War II had not yet concluded—even putting aside evidence that indicates the military had long known that there was no real threat to the West Coast of the United States—by late 1944, Japanese forces had certainly long lost the initiative in the Pacific Theatre.

The recent decisions of the Supreme Court and House of Lords indicate that timing may still be an important factor. By the time that cases worked their way up to the highest courts, more and more time had passed since the initial shock of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. This made the context in which those cases were decided more like Milligan and Duncan, and less like Quirin and Liversidge. Peter Spiro makes this point in relation to the Supreme Court’s Hamdan decision:

The putative boldness of the Court’s action in Hamdan might also be discounted by the context in which it was decided. Query whether the case counts as a wartime decision. The administration’s aggressive characterizations notwithstanding, in the absence of another major terrorist attack (post-9/11), the perception of an acute threat may have subsided.

Thus, in the relative safety and calm of early 2006, the Court could afford to be more confident in asserting itself. The same logic applies to the 2004 decisions, which were decided a little under three years after the 9/11 attacks. Had they reached the Court earlier, and been decided closer to 9/11, their outcomes might well have been different.

The same observation can be made about the House of Lords. The Rehman decision, in which a number of Law Lords expressed the view that

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365. See Heuston, supra note 85, at 40.
366. Brennan, supra note 14, at 15. The end of World War I was, however, immediately followed by the “Red Scare.” See id. at 15–16.
367. 323 U.S. 214.
368. See Muller, supra note 55.
371. Spiro, supra note 369, at 894.
372. Id. See Martinez, supra note 230, at 1071–72 (arguing that the use of procedural mechanisms to delay the final resolution of substantive issues related to the War on Terror may be to ensure a sufficient amount of time has passed such that clear reflection occurs.).
national security was the prerogative of the executive, came out the month after 9/11. One year later, in October 2002, the English Court of Appeal ruled in favor of the government in the Belmarsh case. At the time, there was an expectation of further terrorist attacks. As it turned out, by the time the House of Lords decided the Belmarsh case, some two years later, there had been at that point been no further attacks. Conversely, the terrorist bombings in London of July 2005 would surely have been in the minds of the Law Lords when they were deciding the Torture case later that same year. Indeed, the stricter standard of proof insisted upon by the majority in that decision may reflect a concern not to unnecessarily hamper the executive’s ability to protect national security.

D. Qualitative Differences Between Traditional War and the War on Terror

The fourth explanation why judges may be acting in a less deferential manner is because they perceive the War on Terror to be something other than a war or crisis. The first difference that could be drawn is one about the quality of the threat. Bruce Ackerman, for example, contrasts a physical threat to a population with a threat to a polity. He contends that terrorism, unlike the threats faced during World War II and the Civil War, poses a physical threat to populations, but not to the continued existence of government.

A similar view is evident near the conclusion of Lord Hoffmann’s judgment in the Belmarsh case. Lord Hoffmann was alone in concluding that derogation from the ECHR was unjustified because there was not a public emergency threatening the life of the nation. Lord Hoffmann drew a distinction between the predicament faced by the United Kingdom in the dark days of early World War II and threat it faced from al Qaeda:

This is a nation which has been tested in adversity, which has survived physical destruction and catastrophic loss of life. I do not underestimate the ability of fanatical groups of terrorists to kill and destroy, but they do not threaten the life of the nation. Whether we would survive Hitler hung

in the balance, but there is no doubt that we shall survive Al-Qaeda. The Spanish people have not said that what happened in Madrid, hideous crime as it was, threatened the life of their nation. Their legendary pride would not allow it. Terrorist violence, serious as it is, does not threaten our institutions of government or our existence as a civil community.  

Related to this is the debate about whether the War on Terror can sensibly be conceived of as a war. Some have argued that the War on Terror is a constructed (and bad) idea, but the War on Terror paradigm continues to have purchase. But even if one accepts that the War on Terror is properly considered a real war rather than a metaphorical one, it looks like a different kind of war. In earlier conflicts such as the two World Wars, the nation as a whole felt it was at war. A larger proportion of the population was directly affected in some way, for example by serving in the armed forces, or working in war-related industries. There was conscription, rationing of food, and other forms of domestic sacrifice. By contrast, for the vast majority of the population today, life goes on as before the 9/11 attacks.

The War on Terror also differs from earlier wars in some other significant respects. Unlike past wars, there are for the most part no armies massing on battlefields; instead there are no clear distinctions between the battlefield and non–battlefield. Most significantly, the War on Terror has no obvious end. Historically, courts have been unwilling to rule on when a war has ended for legal purposes, and thus when executive war powers


384. Indeed after 9/11, Americans were urged to consume. See, e.g., Lizette Alvarez, *House Passes a War-Bond Bill, but Bush Is Not Enthusiastic*, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2001, at C7 (“While calling the bill a good patriotic gesture, the Bush [A]dmistration is not going out of its way to promote the [war bonds] legislation, arguing that in today’s economy it is important to encourage consumers to spend.”).

385. The Bush Administration claimed the power to detain captives as enemy combatants regardless of whether they were captured on a traditional battlefield. See *Boumediene*, 128 S. Ct. at 2241 (“Some of these [detainees] were apprehended on the battlefield in Afghanistan, others in places as far away from there as Bosnia and Gambia.”). See also *In re Guantánamo Detainee Cases*, 255 F.Supp. 2d 443, 475 (D.D.C. 2005).
cease to operate.\textsuperscript{386} In the War on Terror, there will probably not even be an event that can be marked as the date the war factually ended.\textsuperscript{387}

Most obviously, these differences may have affected how the Supreme Court viewed the executive’s detention decisions. There is plainly a much lower risk of wrongfully detaining a uniformed German soldier captured on a battlefield in Normandy than a terrorist suspect captured in civilian clothing in Pakistan. The prospect of wrongful detention lasting for potentially a captive’s lifetime adds to the stakes.\textsuperscript{388}

More generally, the prospect of an indefinite war on terror lasting for generations renders the dichotomy between war/crisis and peace/normality inadequate.\textsuperscript{389} Michael Rosenfeld proposes a useful intermediate category between the two poles by drawing a distinction between times of crisis and times of stress.\textsuperscript{390} Times of crisis involve some kind of threat to the existence of the state, and may have multiple causes, including war. Such times are to be contrasted with ordinary times. Somewhere in the middle of the spectrum are times of stress. There is of course overlap between times of crisis and stress, but the less acute and more diffuse and long–term a threat is, the more likely that it will cause a period of stress. If a threat is severe and occurs in a short space of time, it will probably cause a period of crisis.\textsuperscript{391} In terms of Rosenfeld’s tripartite framework, the War on Terror amounts to “conditions of stress” rather than crisis.\textsuperscript{392}

If the Supreme Court and House of Lords considered the post–9/11 period to be a period of stress rather than crisis associated with traditional war, then this makes the generally non-deferential approach more explicable. The clearest indication of this appears in Justice Kennedy’s \textit{Boumediene} opinion:

\begin{quote}
Because our Nation’s past military conflicts have been of limited duration, it has been possible to leave the outer boundaries of war powers undefined. If, as some fear, terrorism continues to pose dangerous threats to us for years to come, the Court might not have this luxury.\textsuperscript{393}
\end{quote}

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{386} See \textit{Ludecke v. Watkins}, 335 U.S. 160 (1948). \textit{See also R v. Bottrill ex parte Kuechenmeister [1947] 1 K.B. 41 (Eng.).}
\item\textsuperscript{387} Michael Rosenfeld, \textit{Judicial Balancing in Times of Stress, in COUNTERTERRORISM: DEMOCRACY’S CHALLENGE} 357, 392 (Andrea Bianchi & Alexis Keller eds., 2008) (“Whereas conventional wars are generally limited in duration, the war on terror must be conceived as a war without end.”).
\item\textsuperscript{388} \textit{Boumediene}, 128 S. Ct. at 2238 (“[T]he consequence of error may be detention of persons for the duration of hostilities that may last a generation or more . . . [the risk of error] is a risk too significant to ignore.”).
\item\textsuperscript{389} See \textit{GROSS & AOLAIN}, \textit{supra} note 357, at 174–80.
\item\textsuperscript{390} Rosenfeld, \textit{supra} note 391, at 359.
\item\textsuperscript{391} \textit{Id.}
\item\textsuperscript{392} \textit{Id.} at 357. \textit{See also} Mark Tushnet, \textit{Emergencies and the Idea of Constitutionalism, in THE CONSTITUTION IN WARTIME} 39, 45 (Mark Tushnet ed., 2005).
\item\textsuperscript{393} \textit{Boumediene}, 128 S. Ct. at 2277.
\end{itemize}
Put simply, the courts have not deferred to the executive in the way that they have in past wars and crises because they perceive the War on Terror as being a prolonged and indefinite period of stress—something other than a war or crisis—thus justifying a different approach.

E. Less than Meets the Eye: Continued Judicial Deference?

The final explanation is the most pessimistic from a civil libertarian standpoint. This is that the break in the historical pattern of deference in wartime or crisis has been at least partially misdiagnosed in two ways. First, the decisions that are said to herald a new dawn of judicial assertiveness almost exclusively concern detention. The picture becomes more ambiguous once decisions concerning other aspects of the War on Terror are considered.394 Second, even some of the lauded decisions of the Supreme Court and House of Lords have had less impact than often claimed, and have aspects that are more accommodating to the needs of the executive than might first appear.

The Supreme Court’s Iqbal decision illustrates the first point.395 In ruling as it did, the Court makes it difficult for persons like Iqbal to seek redress. The decision itself turns on Iqbal’s allegations against Ashcroft and Mueller being implausible. That is, it is implausible to suppose that in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Iqbal’s detention and alleged mistreatment were the result of instructions from above. This is, to say the least, a charitably trusting attitude.396

The Supreme Court’s detention decisions illustrate the second point. These decisions certainly had some effect upon the Executive, and they were typically portrayed as being setbacks for the Bush Administration.397 But the Bush Administration’s claims were often so extreme that the Court even hearing the case was essentially a setback, regardless of how the Court ruled.398

Moreover, not all forms of judicial intervention are created equal. Judicial intervention may involve a court inquiring into whether the

394. See also Judith Resnik, Detention, the War on Terror, and the Federal Courts, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 579, 630 (2010) (arguing that “[a] critical approach argues that a full accounting [of the Supreme Court’s War on Terror decisions] requires looking at more cases, ranging from rulings on relief other than habeas to the claims that the Supreme Court did not reach, either through jurisprudential doctrines or by declining to grant review”) (emphasis added).
395. See supra text accompanying notes 165–170.
397. See, e.g., Editorial, Reaffirming the Rule of Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2009, at A26 (referring to the Supreme Court’s 2004 decisions of Rasul and Hamdi as being a “a stinging rebuke” to the Administration). See also Jonathan Mahler, Why This Court Keeps Rebutting This President, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2008, at WK3.
398. See supra text accompanying notes 231–238.
The executive has the legal authority to act in the way it has, or it may involve a court considering whether the executive has acted in accordance with substantive legal and constitutional principles. Most of the Supreme Court’s decisions, which were based on separation of powers principles, the absence of congressional authorization, or other process–based points, fall into the first category. The Court’s decisions have thus tended to impose certain broad boundaries, but leave the details to be worked out by the lower courts or the executive.

In *Hamdi*, a majority of the Court accepted that there was sufficiently clear legal authorization for detaining Hamdi in the form of the AUMF. A different majority held, however, that Hamdi was entitled to more of an opportunity to challenge his designation as an enemy combatant. But beyond that, there was little guidance that other than Justice O’Connor’s skeletal due process framework that formed the basis for the CSRTs. *Rasul* was also a narrow decision in that it only established that the courts had the statutory jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions from Guantánamo detainees; the courthouse door, in other words, was open, only to be shut again when the habeas statute was subsequently amended.

*Rasul* raised, but did not resolve, other questions, such as whether its holding applied to terrorist suspects held by the United States outside of Guantánamo. The decision also said little about the substantive claims detainees might raise, leaving only a tantalizing hint in the last footnote of the majority opinion.

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399. Benvenisti, *United We Stand*, supra note 227, at 255. For a fuller account of Benvenisti’s ladder of judicial review and how it applies to various post–9/11 judicial decisions, see id. at 255–63.


402. See supra text accompanying notes 127–128.

403. See supra text accompanying note 129. Justice Souter, with Justice Ginsburg joining, agreed with the plurality in ordering the case remanded. However, they did not agree with the plurality’s suggestions as to the applicable procedure. See *Hamdi*, 542 U.S. at 553–54.

404. See supra text accompanying notes 145–146.

405. Justice Scalia’s dissent suggested that, under *Rasul*, habeas jurisdiction would logically extend to parts of Iraq and Afghanistan. See *Rasul*, 542 U.S. at 501 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The majority’s ambiguity on this point may have been deliberate. See supra text accompanying note 330.

406. *Rasul*, 542 U.S. at 483 n. 15 (“‘Petitioners’ allegations—that, although they have engaged neither in combat nor in acts of terrorism against the United States, they have been held in executive detention for more than two years in territory subject to the long-term, exclusive jurisdiction and control of the United States, without access to counsel and without being charged with any wrongdoing—unquestionably describe ‘custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’”). Jenny Martinez interprets this
Similarly, although *Hamdan* invalidated the Bush Administration’s military commissions, and held that CA3 of the Geneva Conventions applied to the conflict with al Qaeda, the decision primarily turns on the lack of proper congressional authorization, a point that comes through particularly clearly in Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion. *(407)* Accordingly, in the wake of *Hamdan*, the Bush Administration quickly made plans to have Congress enact a statutory regime that would authorize revised military commissions and limit the scope of the Court’s ruling on CA3. The result was the MCA, which largely cancelled out the decision.* *(408)*

Even *Boumediene* was ultimately about a question of process: whether detainees at Guantánamo had the constitutional right to seek habeas corpus. *(409)* As with the other decisions, the Court left open questions of substance, such as the class of person legitimately subject to detention, and questions of implementation. *(410)* The consequence has been continuing uncertainty about key issues related to detention at Guantánamo, even after more than eight years and several Supreme Court decisions. *(411)*

*Munaf* follows this pattern of process over substance. The decision affirms the right of two citizens detained without trial to seek habeas corpus. *(412)* Indeed this point does not turn on Munaf and Omar’s citizenship. However, the Court’s munificence here is immediately followed by a denial of relief across the board, and a notably deferential attitude with respect to Munaf and Omar’s claims that they might face torture in Iraqi custody. *(413)*

In the case of the British judiciary, Conor Gearty observes that the judges, aside from the odd exceptional decision, have continued their

footnote as a “strong signal” from the Court. But as she observes, the political branches did not get the hint. See Martinez, supra note 230, at 1051–53.

*(407)* See *Hamdan*, 548 U.S. at 636 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Nothing prevents the President from returning to Congress to seek the authority he believes is necessary.”). See also *id*. at 637 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“If Congress, after due consideration, deems it appropriate to change the controlling statutes, it has the power and prerogative to do so.”).

*(408)* See supra text accompanying notes 151–153.

*(409)* *Boumediene*, 128 S. Ct. at 2277 (“It bears repeating that our opinion does not address the content of the law that governs petitioners’ detention. That is a matter yet to be determined. We hold that petitioners may invoke the fundamental procedural protections of habeas corpus.”).


*(411)* Martinez, supra note 230, at 1029; See Resnik, supra note 394, at 629-30. President Barack Obama has undertaken to close the detention facility at Guantánamo. See Scott Shane, Mark Mazzetti & Helene Cooper, *Obama Reverses Key Bush Policy, but Questions on Detainees Remain*, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2009, at A16.

*(412)* See supra text accompanying notes 159–164.

*(413)* Munaf v. Geren, 128 S. Ct. at 2225 (“This allegation [of torture] was raised in Munaf’s petition for habeas . . . Such allegations are of course a matter of serious concern, but in the present context that concern is to be addressed by the political branches, not the judiciary.”). See also Harlan Grant Cohen, Munaf v Geren, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 854, 858–59 (2008).
pattern of deference in cases involving national security.\textsuperscript{414} Certainly this is true of the House of Lords’ decisions of \textit{Rehman},\textsuperscript{415} with its calls for deference to the expertise of the Home Secretary on the issue of national security.\textsuperscript{416} \textit{Gillan},\textsuperscript{417} with its apparent comfort with the repeated exercise of an exceptional power encompassing a wide geographical area in response to an amorphous terrorist threat,\textsuperscript{418} and \textit{RB},\textsuperscript{419} with its acceptance of the practice of obtaining diplomatic assurances from states with dubious human rights records to facilitate the deportation of terrorist suspects.\textsuperscript{420}

As with the Supreme Court’s detention decisions, Gearty’s exceptions to the rule, which include the \textit{Belmarsh} and \textit{Torture} decisions, become more ambiguous upon closer inspection. The question in the \textit{Torture} case,\textsuperscript{421} the admissibility of evidence procured through torture carried out by a third party, arose because SIAC’s procedural rules allowed it to receive evidence that would not be admissible in court.\textsuperscript{422} There was no express mention of torture in either the rules or their authorizing statute. Absent express statutory authorization, the House of Lords was unwilling to allow SIAC to receive such evidence. As Lord Rodger put it, “the revulsion against torture is so deeply ingrained in our law that . . . a court could receive statements obtained by its use only where this was authorised by express words, or perhaps the plainest possible implication, in a statute.”\textsuperscript{423} But under the Westminster system, nothing stops Parliament from legislating express words overriding the exclusionary rule against torture. So, like \textit{Hamdan}, the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{414} Gearty, Civil Liberties, supra note 4, at 48 (“[There is] plenty of evidence of the courts being very slow to challenge ministerial and police assumptions about what the exigencies of national security now require in this new era of alleged ‘global terrorism’.”). See also Clive Walker, Intelligence and Anti-Terrorism Legislation in the United Kingdom, 44 Crime, L. & Soc. Change 387, 407 (2005) [hereinafter Walker, Intelligence] (“The headlines about A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department may create the impression of a judicial revolt. But one should be cautious about claims that an new era of judicial activism has dawned. . . this case must be set against the vast majority where executive decisions have been upheld.”).
\item \textsuperscript{415} [2001] UKHL 47, [2003] 1 A.C. 153.
\item \textsuperscript{416} See supra text accompanying notes 171–175.
\item \textsuperscript{417} [2006] UKHL 12, 2 A.C. 307.
\item \textsuperscript{418} Case Comment: Police Powers—Whether Authorisation Given Under Terrorism Legislation Lawful, 2006 Crim. L. R. 751, 754 (“[O]ne might argue that their Lordships here too easily accepted evidence of vulnerabilities (which are indeed diffuse and permanent and so can be used to justify the diffuse and de facto permanent powers) as equivalent to evidence of threats.”). For a more sympathetic take on \textit{Gillan}, see Kavanagh, supra note 6, at 390–91.
\item \textsuperscript{419} RB(Algeria) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] UKHL 10.
\item \textsuperscript{420} See Elliot, supra note 205, at 140–41.
\item \textsuperscript{421} \textit{A v. Secretary of State (No. 2)}, [2006] 2 A.C. 221.
\item \textsuperscript{422} See Special Immigration Appeals Commission (Procedure) Rules, supra note 213.
\item \textsuperscript{423} \textit{A v. Secretary of State (No. 2)}, [2006] 2 A.C. [137] (Lord Rodger). See also id. at [51] (Lord Bingham), [114] (Lord Hope).
\end{itemize}
Torture case could be said to turn on the absence of legislative authorization. Moreover, the majority prescribed a strict standard of proof to be met before the exclusionary rule applied. The difficulty in satisfying the majority standard limits the practical effect of this decision, and renders the unanimous rejection of evidence obtained through torture largely symbolic, a holding with more bark than bite. Viewed in this light, the Torture decision starts looking less like an exception, and more like an instance of disguised judicial deference.

Even the flagship decision representing the changed attitude of the House of Lords, the Belmarsh case, is more deferential than it might initially appear to be. In his submissions to the Court, the Attorney General reiterated the familiar position that decisions about national security were rightly the province of the political branches, an argument to which the House of Lords had historically been receptive. On the question of whether there was a public emergency threatening the life of the nation that justified derogation, most of the Law Lords stayed true to the historical pattern of deference. It was only in relation to the question of whether the measures taken in response to the emergency were appropriate that the House of Lords could be said to have broken with historical precedent.

There is an element of inconsistency in the two positions that were adopted by most of the Law Lords. Logically, expressing a view about the appropriateness of measures taken in response to an emergency required some kind of assessment as to the nature of the emergency itself. It may be the case that the facts of the Belmarsh case were simply sui generis: the measures taken in this case had such obvious flaws—applying only to non-citizens, and being easily circumvented by voluntary departure—that

424. The majority held that SIAC should refuse to admit the evidence if it concluded on the balance of probabilities that the evidence had been obtained through torture. See id. at [116]–[118] (Lord Hope). The minority view was that SIAC should not admit the evidence if it could not conclude that there was not a real risk that the evidence was so obtained. See id. at [56] (Lord Bingham).

425. See Shah, supra note 378, at 432. See also Leigh & Masterman, supra note 245, at 221–25.


427. A v. Secretary of State (No. 1), [2005] 2 A.C. 68.

428. Id. at [37] (Lord Bingham).

429. See discussion supra Part I.B.

430. See A v. Secretary of State (No. 1), [2005] 2 A.C. [29] (Lord Bingham), [116] (Lord Hope), [154] (Lord Scott), [226] (Baroness Hale). See also Brice Dickson, Judicial Activism in the House of Lords 1995–2007, in JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN COMMON LAW SUPREME COURTS 351, 378–79 (Brice Dickson ed., 2007) (criticizing the majority of the House of Lords for their unwillingness to challenge the Government’s position); Walker, Intelligence, supra note 414, at 407.

431. Poole, Courts and Conditions, supra note 426, at 239.

432. See Ip, supra note 320, at 830–33.
whatever view one took of the emergency, these measures were not strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.

A further point made by some commentators about the Belmarsh case is that it was followed by the establishment of the control order regime, and thus did not change much. As Joo–Cheong Tham and Keith Ewing argue:

By accepting that there was a national security threat on the most gentle standards of review, the House of Lords [gave] the green light to legislation almost as offensive to human rights as that which was declared incompatible with the European Convention, in the form of control orders.433

As noted earlier, the House of Lords does not have the power to strike down legislation, but merely has the power to declare a statute incompatible with rights in the ECHR.434 Thus, the Belmarsh decision only declared that the ATCSA detention scheme was incompatible with the relevant articles of the ECHR. The decision about whether to repeal Part 4 of ATCSA remained with the political branches.435 The decision effectively ended the ATCSA detention scheme, but it did so because the scheme became politically, rather than legally, untenable.436

It is true that the PTA’s control order regime, which replaced the ATCSA detention scheme, was a careful response to the Belmarsh decision, particularly those portions where some of the Law Lords had suggested that lesser measures, such as electronic tagging and restrictions on travel and communications, would be a better way of responding to the terrorist threat.437

As for the House of Lords’ control order decisions, they arguably flatter to deceive as well.438 The JJ decision was in a sense a loss for the Government.439 But the PTA’s control order regime itself survived largely unscathed, and the House of Lords arguably gave an implicit endorsement

435. See Dyzenhaus, supra note 4, at 33 (“[T]he fact that a decision under the Human Rights Act declares an incompatibility between a provision in a statute with human rights commitments without invalidating the provision can be seen as letting the judges off the hook.”).
436. See Walker, Keeping Control, supra note 190, at 1407–08.
437. See A v. Secretary of State (No. 1), [2005] 2 A.C. [35] (Lord Bingham), [155] (Lord Scott). Indeed, Thomas Poole argues that the Blair Government took parts of a decision that ruled against it, and used it to construct “its revamped, non-discriminatory (but still decidedly illiberal) counter-terrorism policy.” See Poole, supra note 311, at 271.
439. See generally Secretary of State for the Home Department v. JJ, [2007] UKHL 45.
to the system subject to only a few minor modifications. All that JJ required was a reduction in the particular control orders’ period of curfew. The Government relied particularly on Lord Brown’s stated tipping point of sixteen hours, and adjusted various control orders accordingly—some from twelve to sixteen hours, and some from eighteen to sixteen hours.

The same critique can be made of the Article 6 control order decisions. In MB, the majority recognized that in certain cases—notably those where the key allegations against the controlee were contained solely in the undisclosed material—the provision of a special advocate might not be sufficient to satisfy Article 6. But rather than declaring the scheme incompatible with Article 6, the majority instead adopted an interpretative solution via Section 3 of the HRA. This eventually necessitated the follow-up decision of AF, which clarified that Article 6 required a certain minimum level of disclosure of the case against the controlee. But once again, both decisions could be said to be mere tinkering around the margins of the control order regime.

IV. A CONFLUENCE OF EXPLANATIONS

As ever, it is a combination of the proffered explanations that best explains the post-9/11 decisions of the Supreme Court and House of Lords. The explanation that the conventional account of judicial behavior in times of war is incorrect or incomplete can largely be discounted. Although there are some decisions that support this view, many of these decisions, as discussed earlier, amount to judicial courage after the fact or are only loosely related to national security policy. Many more decisions, especially those from the United Kingdom, are more consistent with the conventional account.

This then suggests that other forces are at work. The point in time when these cases were heard and decided is relevant. The Supreme Court’s first decisions were decided close to three years after the 9/11 attacks. Hamdan and Boumediene were decided even later. The House of Lords’ first decision in the immediate period after 9/11 was Rehman; the robust defence of liberty in Belmarsh was more than three years away. However, the

440. McGoldrick, supra note 245, at 184 (“The result of the series of judgments in the House of Lords in October 2007 was a mixed success for the government. The regime was upheld and orders could continue to be issued largely as they had been.”).
441. Secretary of State for the Home Department v. JJ, [2007] UKHL 45 at [105].
442. McGoldrick, supra note 245, at 184.
444. Id. at [35], [66], [85] & [90].
445. See supra text accompanying notes 199–203.
447. See discussion supra Part III.B.
448. See supra text accompanying notes 356–378.
same point might have been made of Korematsu, heard and decided in late 1944, more than two years after the internment had begun, and with the United States militarily ascendant. Similarly, Iqbal and RB are among the decisions of the Supreme Court and House of Lords most distant in time from 2001.

Another explanation for the greater judicial assertiveness is simply that the courts perceive the War on Terror to be different from a war or crisis. Lord Hoffmann’s dissent in the Belmarsh case, for example, expresses the view that the threat of transnational terrorism does not equate with previous wartime threats. Further, the War on Terror differs from traditional wars in other ways, notably in terms of its potentially indefinite duration. Accordingly, the courts may see the War on Terror as being a prolonged period of stress, rather than a war or crisis, and thus not necessarily afford the executive the same measure of deference.\footnote{See supra text accompanying notes 379–393.} That said, the outcomes of the decisions in Dennis\footnote{See supra text accompanying notes 58–61.} and GCHQ,\footnote{See supra text accompanying notes 95–103.} both decided during a period of stress in the form of the Cold War, point to the relevance of the two remaining explanations, which are essentially competing narratives about the significance and impact of the War on Terror decisions of the Supreme Court and House of Lords.

There is something to be said for the view that post–9/11 decisions such as Hamdi, Rasul, Hamdan, and Belmarsh represent a break from the past.\footnote{See supra text accompanying notes 225–254.} These cases contain various references to historical judicial deference to excessive security measures implemented by the executive, and are suggestive of a process of social learning.\footnote{See supra text accompanying notes 256–270.} Additionally, there has been the growth of a civil society—including advocacy groups, the media, and foreign governments—that has provided the courts the extra backing and cover that was not there to the same extent previously.\footnote{See supra text accompanying notes 271–280.} There have also been great legal changes in the past sixty years, including the establishment of international human rights law and the modernization of the law of armed conflict. These developments not only provided a framework and terminology by which to evaluate and critique counterterrorism policies, but also constrained the freedom of the respective executives. This is true of the Bush Administration’s plans to try terrorist suspects by military commission, and of the Blair Government’s various schemes to detain terrorist suspects. In the case of the United Kingdom, the enactment of the HRA merits further mention. Although it would be too simple to state that the HRA changed everything, the Act was significant in that it elevated the House of Lords’ perception of its institutional role and constitutional
mandate. Finally, executive actions that were perceived as being excessive may have undermined in the eyes of judges the claim that the executive is uniquely competent in national security matters.

At the same time, decisions such as Munaf, Iqbal, Gillan, and RB are generally consistent with the conventional account. Moreover, while the bulk of the post–9/11 decisions may represent a change from the historical pattern, their impact should not be overstated. Decisions such as Rasul and Hamdan, for example, turned on the interpretation of statutes. The Supreme Court’s adverse interpretations in those cases were obstacles that were quickly overcome by a largely compliant Congress. Hamdi confirmed the executive’s power to detain certain individuals as enemy combatants, subject to observing a modicum of due process.

For all the force of the House of Lords’ rejection of the use of tortured evidence in the Torture case, the standard of proof required makes the decision’s impact perhaps more rhetorical than real. For all the praise heaped upon the Belmarsh decision, the House of Lords did obligingly accept the existence of an emergency. Additionally, the Court declared one detention scheme incompatible with the ECHR, only for the government to enact another scheme that still raises significant human rights concerns. And so far, the House of Lords has only chipped away at the edges of the control order regime.

However, given the centrality of Parliamentary sovereignty in the United Kingdom’s constitutional arrangements and the consequent limitations on judicial review, it is hard to criticize the House of Lords for not doing more; the decision to create the control order regime was after all made by the political branches. In any case, this chipping away has some real effects, namely incentivizing prosecution and reducing reliance on control orders. Indeed, given the reluctance of the executive to disclose sensitive material, the AF case may presage the end of the control order system.

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455. See supra text accompanying notes 281–315. This trend is likely to be further bolstered by the replacement of the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords with the Supreme Court.
456. See supra text accompanying notes 316–342.
457. See supra text accompanying notes 438–446.
458. Kavanagh, supra note 246, at 293–95.
CONCLUSION

In all likelihood, the truth lies somewhere in between the last two explanations discussed in the previous part. In the main, the decisions of the Supreme Court and the House of Lords since 9/11 exhibit a degree of deference in relation to matters of national security that is inconsistent with the conventional account. But by the same token, these decisions are not always the dramatic and unambiguous rebukes to the executive branch that they are sometimes portrayed to be.

It should also be borne in mind that most of the Supreme Court’s decisions deal with counterterrorism policy embarked on during the early days of the War on Terror: all the decisions bar one in some way concern the Bush Administration’s claims of exclusive authority to detain or try terrorist suspects without judicial oversight.461 These were extreme cases.462 By contrast, the House of Lords has heard a wider variety of cases. It has been most willing to closely scrutinize cases involving indefinite detention and control orders, but less willing in cases involving other aspects of the War on Terror.463 For this reason also, it is in the end better to describe the post–9/11 decisions of the Supreme Court and House of Lords not as leading to a break in the cyclical pattern of contraction and expansion of liberty, but rather as leading to a dampening or flattening of that pattern.

461. The one exception is Iqbal. See Fallon, Jr., supra note 243, at 367–68.
462. Indeed, the Court has decided not to hear other cases involving other aspects of the War on Terror. See Stephen I. Vladeck, The Long War, the Federal Courts, and the Necessity/Legality Paradox, 43 U. Rich. L. Rev. 893, 913–17 (2009).